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Abstract 
 
This thesis is the first systematic treatment of the role of scientists in the 
highest levels of decision and policy making in the British government. Its 
focus is on the crucial defence sector during the period from the end of the 
Second World War and up to the 1960‟s. It shows the strong influence of a 
number of career government scientists in the formulation of Britain‟s post-war 
defence policy and their crucial role in the making of two particular decisions, 
focusing on nuclear delivery systems.  
 
The thesis offers a number of correctives to the standard image which is 
prevalent in the bulk of the literature and offers a set of arguments that extend 
and re-enforce recent trends in the historiography, both of 20th century Britain 
and the history of science. It argues that the key scientists in relation to 
government were not external to the system, expert academics who enter 
government to offer their, usually critical, point of view (as in the case of the 
famous Sir Solly Zuckerman), but career scientific civil servants, nursed in the 
workings of Whitehall and the machinations of government and with broad 
experience in running large R&D projects. It analyses in detail the careers of 
the two most important among them, namely Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir 
William Cook, placing them in the wider context of government science. It also 
argues, contrary to the view that post-war defence policy was driven mainly by 
inter-service rivalries, that the Defence Research Policy Committee of the 
Ministry of Defence became an important new element in the bureaucratic 
game in the 1950‟s. On the one hand, it shows that its chairman and Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Minister, Sir Frederick Brundrett, was much more 
influential than has been recognised in the 1957 Defence White Paper and its 
focus on R&D, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. On the other hand, Sir 
William Cook, the „father of the British H-bomb‟, was able to exert significant 
and at times decisive influence in the decisions to acquire the Polaris nuclear 
delivery system from the United States and to jump start its indigenous 
improvement programme, the Chevaline. 
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 – “They„ve been there for years” 
 
 
This thesis examines scientists and their role in the formulation of 
state policy. By examining British post-war defence policy, and 
changing the focus from the well-known cases of state outsider 
academics to the little-known cases of state insiders, it presents 
scientists not as external (expert) advisers to the state, who are 
there to offer one more input in the policy making process, but as 
de facto policy-makers who use their official positions to influence 
policy in the direction which their experience made them believe 
was best. This change in focus presupposes a rethinking of 
science-state relations as are traditionally treated, namely in terms 
of scientists as external advisers to the state, by recognising 
different roles for different scientists, depending on their position 
within, or relative to, the state policy-making mechanisms, and 
depends on new accounts of both the British state itself and its 
defence policy. In this thesis Britain is a strong technocratic 
warfare state with an ambitious grand strategy based on the health 
of its economy and technological innovation. 
Such a change in focus is not an easy one to make. The late 
Sir John Maddox, an informed contemporary and long-serving 
editor of Nature, remembering the government scientist Sir Robert 
Cockburn recalled that  
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There were lots of people like [Cockburn]… on 
the defence side, who [you] never knew they 
were there until you suddenly meet them in a 
bus going to some demonstration [of new 
equipment] and realise you hadn‟t seen them 
before and… they‟ve been there for years.1 
 
Maddox was The Manchester Guardian‟s science correspondent 
from 1955 to 1964 and in this capacity he was frequently visiting 
defence scientific establishments for press conferences and 
demonstrations of work performed there.2 Although very 
forthcoming about anything asked, he did not have much to say 
about the top brass of the British government‟s defence scientific 
establishment beyond this; even about Sir Robert Cockburn, whom 
he characterised as a friend. My own research experience 
reflected this same problem of the invisibility of government 
scientists. When I first delved into post-war British government 
science, my first focus was Lord Zuckerman, the person who is 
undoubtedly most associated with the subject of „scientists and 
government‟ in post war Britain as it has been traditionally studied.3 
My initial aim was to investigate how a man who had created the 
image of someone opposed to nuclear weapons could also be 
considered the most influential scientist in British government in 
the 20th century; that is in a country and at a time in which it 
vigorously procured both bombs and delivery systems. However, I 
                                                 
1
  Sir John Maddox during a digitally recorded interview conducted by Ralph Desmarais and the author 
at his house in London, in August 2008. 
2
    Maddox was a trained theoretical physicist who initially taught at the University of Manchester and 
after The Guardian went on to become editor of Nature from 1966 to 1973 and from 1980 to 1995. 
3
   See characteristically John Maddox, “The Rector and the Prof”, The Guardian, 9/4/1965, p. 15: “In a 
few years [Tizard] had risen to the top, consulted by everybody, the Sir Solly Zuckerman of his 
time” (my emphasis). For the secondary literature see later, section 1.4. 
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increasingly became aware of a number of people, who appeared 
to „have been there for years‟, who seemed to be present in most 
major events of defence policy in the post-war period, but who 
were hardly known in the literature. I started by looking at Sir 
William Cook, who led me to Sir Frederick Brundrett, who led me 
to Sir Robert Cockburn and so on. This thesis is about these 
people. They were scientists, permanently employed by the British 
state, who reached the highest positions that were open to them in 
post-war Whitehall, and exercised enormous influence over policy 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the era in which Zuckerman reached the 
highest levels of authority.4 
A large body of historical literature has ignored the existence 
of the highest ranking government scientists. Although they might 
appear as individuals in studies of defence policy, their existence 
as part of an institutional entity within the Whitehall defence policy-
making machine has gone largely unnoticed and so has their 
importance in the policy-formulation and decision-making 
processes. Confusions regarding the role of scientists in relation to 
the state in general hold strong in both the British and the 
American literature and the insistence with terms such as „scientific 
adviser‟ create a misleading image which continues to identify 
scientists as individuals – and science as an institution/entity – as 
something which is outside the normal government machinery, 
called upon to contribute their expertise. For the bulk of the 
literature, the important scientists in relation to state policy remain 
the few academics who at some points found themselves near the 
power centres of government.  
The central argument of this thesis is that in Britain, during 
                                                 
4
  The other significant period of Zuckerman‟s was, of course, his role in wartime air-bombing. 
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the first half of the Cold War period, government scientists were of 
central importance in the formulation of the country‟s defence 
posture and nuclear policy. Their influence was channelled through 
a new centre of power which was concentrated in the Ministry of 
Defence: it consisted of a group of scientists, with each of the top 
MoD scientists at its head and with strong support from specific 
non-MoD scientists and it pushed successfully for a strong British 
R&D effort and the primacy of ballistic missiles. This MoD scientist 
lobby has so far gone unnoticed in the literature. I further argue 
that an important role that top government scientists played in the 
post-war period was that of a de facto policy-maker, a role which 
makes them the yardstick to measure some external scientists‟ 
role and, though proposed for the post-war British case, this 
argument can be extended, with much caution, to other cases. It 
dictates that the terms „scientific adviser‟ and „expert‟ should not be 
used for scientists uncritically or unexplained. 
 
1.2 – Starting Points: The British State, Scientists and 
Defence 
 
Two key works by David Edgerton and George Peden are explicitly 
relevant to this thesis. They present new syntheses of the nature of 
the British state and British strategy, technology and economic 
policy and constitute the starting point of this thesis‟s arguments. 
Edgerton‟s Warfare State represents a very new account of the 
British state in relation to scientists and the military.5 It argues for 
                                                 
5
  David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). Edgerton‟s arguments which appear fully developed and substantiated in Warfare State first 
made their appearance in his England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological 
Nation (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1991). 
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three central characteristics of the period between 1920 and 1970, 
which are of direct relevance to this thesis. The first is that Britain 
was a warfare state as much a welfare one.6 This warfare state 
was comprised, apart from the traditional military professionals, of 
a large scientific and technical core and it had very strong links 
with industry, forming a formidable “military-industrial-scientific 
complex.”7 By consequence, and this can be considered as the 
second major characteristic, the British state itself should be seen 
as a strongly technocratic and interventionist state, especially as it 
concerns its nature and function, “operated not just by bureaucrats 
but also by technicians.”8 As much as science and technology are 
important for the British state, so this state has been important for 
science and technology and this is a third important point. On the 
one hand, it generously supported research and development, not 
so much in the academy, but more importantly in industry and its 
own laboratories, research very much oriented towards, and driven 
by, defence needs. On the other hand, except for the well known 
cases of academic scientists, some of whom have acted as 
advisers to the state, there have been a much larger number of 
scientists, employed by the state who acted in various roles.9 
Edgerton points to the importance of the scientific civil servants, 
„the research corps‟, in terms both of sheer numbers and work 
performed, and stresses that “the distinctions between the 
research corps and the academics, between the researchers and 
                                                 
6
  It is important to note that Edgerton does not dismiss the importance of the much studied welfare 
state, rather he attempts to set it aside in order to analyse and assess the importance of Britain‟s 
warlike – or, in more conventional terms, defence – apparatus. 
7
  Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 1 and 9. 
8
  Ibid, p. 1. 
9
    Ibid, p. 13. 
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the advisers, and different kinds of advisers, are crucial.”10 For the 
post-war British state, which is the focus here, Edgerton argues 
that it actually expanded in terms of the scope of the expert 
warfare-related departments and the relevant experts manning 
them and that it saw “the increased influence of long-standing 
civilian associates of the military.”11  
British defence policy is discussed in George Peden‟s study 
of strategy, economics and technology.12 Distinctive in studying a 
large period of time while delving into details, Peden proposes 
three arguments regarding British strategy in the 20th century: that 
it was the result of an integration of economic as well as military 
considerations; that technological innovation was at its centre; and 
that the focus on weapons systems was not a sign of decline, 
rather the result of the successful integration of economic and 
military considerations in its formulation, establishing British 
strategy as “more ambitious than is commonly believed”13 and 
leading Peden to the conclusion that, as one reviewer put it, 
“Britain did quite well”.14 Regarding the post-war period, 
emphasising both the 1952 Global Strategy Paper and the 1957 
White Paper on Defence, he shows that the economic and military 
considerations found a reflection on the reliance on the deterrent 
effect of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and, 
significantly, Peden explains in a positive way what has been 
traditionally seen as a sign of decline: Britain‟s reliance on 
                                                 
10
   Ibid, p. 165. 
11
   Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 167-8 and 146 for the quote. 
12
  George Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
13
  Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p. 1. 
14
  Richard Toy, “The Broadening of Economic History”, Contemporary European History, Vol. 17, 
No. 3, pp. 423-432, at p. 427. 
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American help for the nuclear deterrent.15 Regarding the 
policymakers of the period he insists on the ineffectiveness of the 
Ministry of Defence16 and focuses on the political figures involved 
in the decisions – Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys – the 
three Services and administrative civil servants of the Treasury and 
the Cabinet.17  
This thesis subscribes to a framework of a strongly 
technocratic warfare state with an ambitious strategy, as described 
by Edgerton and Peden. Of the varying roles that scientists could 
play in this state it will focus on the most senior permanent 
members, but apart from demonstrating their primacy over the 
academics in relation to the administration of research and 
development, technical resources and technical personnel, it will 
examine in detail their role in the formulation of defence policy and 
the making of relevant decisions. Peden‟s overall conclusions 
regarding Britain‟s defence posture in the post-war period will not 
be challenged. In fact, this thesis will reinforce them; though, 
crucially, by offering a new interpretation of the dynamics in the 
defence politics of the post-war period. In the resulting image the 
MoD scientist lobby is central and, therefore, dictates substantial 
reinterpretations of some of the most important episodes of 1950‟s 
and 1960‟s defence politics. 
 
1.3 – British Defence 
 
The specialist literature on nuclear policy downplays, indeed often 
                                                 
15
  On purpose or not, he uses the term „harness‟ to describe this: “When British economic resources 
were inadequate to sustain its armed forces, the resources of the United States were harnessed for 
the purpose.” Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p. 344. 
16
   Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p. 275. 
17
   Ibid, pp. 276 and 278. 
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ignores, the role of government scientists. The very detailed works 
by nuclear policy scholars John Baylis, Ian Clark and Nicholas 
Wheeler, although not always in agreement regarding their 
interpretations, form a very substantive and detailed image of 
British nuclear policy in the post-war period, especially in relation 
to the American factor.18 In this image, scientists, either externals 
or internals to the state, appear as individuals, though the crucial 
institutional distinctions between them are not made, neither are 
their important roles recognised. This is particularly evident in 
discussions of the important 1957 White Paper on Defence, to be 
discussed later in this thesis. The fullest existing account, by 
Martin Navias, recognises the trends of continuity and rightly 
stresses the importance of both the Minister of Defence Duncan 
Sandys' resolve and the importance of his Prime Minister's support 
in the formulation of the 1957 Paper and its defence posture.19 The 
Chief Scientific Adviser of the Ministry of Defence, Sir Frederick 
Brundrett, is only mentioned in passing. Simon Ball goes a step 
further in stressing Sir Richard Powell, the Ministry of Defence's 
Permanent Secretary‟s role and dismissing that of the Chief 
Scientific Adviser.20  
The literature on nuclear weapons and related decisions also 
                                                 
18
  Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1955 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s 
Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). John Baylis, Ambiguity and 
Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) by introducing 
the concept of „ambiguity‟ is leaving more room for what he calls “the political dimensions” (p.1) 
of nuclear policy. 
19
  Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991), pp. 1-10 and 134-187. 
20
  Simon Ball, “Harold Macmillan and the politics of Defence: the market for strategic ideas during 
the Sandys era revisited” 20th Century British History, 6 (1), 1995, pp.  78-100. See also Adrian 
Smith, “Command and Control in Postwar Britain: Defence Decision-making in the United 
Kingdom, 1945-1984” 20th Century British History, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1991), pp. 291-327. An exception 
is Laurence Martin, “The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The „Sandys Era‟”, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Mar., 1962), pp. 23-41, who stresses Sir Frederick 
Brundrett‟s role, but does not appreciate his overall significance in the 1950‟s. More on Martin and 
the relevant arguments about Brundrett in chapter 6, section 6.1. 
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has very particular approaches, regarding scientists and their role. 
Margaret Gowing‟s official histories of the British atomic weapons 
programme are very useful in their effort to discuss more general 
issues of policy when those affected, or, more importantly, when 
they were affected by, the work on nuclear weapons.21 Sir Henry 
Tizard‟s role is examined in detail and Gowing insists that his role 
in relation to nuclear weapons was initially marginal and later it 
was confined to a failed attempt to control the nuclear weapons 
programme.22 Ken Young's excellent study of the decision to 
acquire the submarine launched Polaris missiles as the carrier of 
the British deterrent rightly argues that the decision wasn‟t one 
imposed on the Navy, rather it was the result of substantial 
lobbying on behalf of Navy circles. He stresses Zuckerman as one 
of the main figures of the 'Polaris lobby' but ignores, on the one 
hand, the institutional importance of his official position as Chief 
Scientific Adviser and Chairman of the Defence Research Policy 
Committee of the Ministry of Defence and, on the other, Sir William 
Cook, the father of the British H-Bomb and a career scientific civil 
servant; Cook is reduced to being one more member of 
Zuckerman's entourage.23 Graham Spinardi, tracing the history of 
                                                 
21
  Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952. 2 Vols. 
(London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974); See also her Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 
(London: Macmillan, 1964). The official volume which followed the story through to the hydrogen 
bomb years, although very informative, hardly reaches the level and scope of Gowing‟s work. 
Lorna Arnold (with Katherine Pyne), Britain and the H-bomb (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2001). No scholar has attempted to write a history of the British nuclear projects after the official 
histories. 
22
   Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1, chapters 2 and 7. Tizard is also the focus of the only 
study of the Defence Research Policy Committee, where he is presented as its main architect. See 
Jon Agar and Brian Balmer, “British Scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy 
Committee and Information Networks, 1947-1964.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences Vol. 
28, No. 2, pp. 209-252. Chapter 5 of this thesis will offer a different interpretation of Tizard‟s role 
regarding both the setting up of the post-war machinery of government R&D and his actions in 
relation to the nuclear weapons programme in the late 1940‟s. On agar and Balmer‟s article see next 
section. 
23
  Ken Young, “The Royal Navy's Polaris Lobby, 1955-62.” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 
3 ((Sept. 2002), pp. 56-86. Terms like 'father of the H-bomb' have in many ways little historical 
21 
 
decisions regarding the development of British nuclear weapons, 
also focuses on Zuckerman and limits the state‟s permanent 
scientific officials to an unexpectedly, given his story, influential role 
in the late 1960‟s.24  
The problems with the above literature are elusive and can 
be easily missed, since some scientists do appear in the analyses 
and Solly Zuckerman is credited with a significant role; but they are 
of crucial importance. The first weakness is that in particular 
episodes, which will be examined later in this thesis, important 
roles of specific scientists have been missed. These refer primarily 
to Zuckerman‟s practically unknown predecessor and successor in 
the Ministry of Defence, Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William 
Cook respectively. The weakness which runs at a deeper level and 
explains the above misinterpretations, is that the above literature 
has ignored the institutional importance of government scientists in 
post-war Whitehall and the different institutional levels in which 
different scientists were involved in the politics of defence at 
different times. Recognising these differences and separating the 
roles of career government scientists – like Brundrett and Cook – 
from external scientific advisers, who at some point found 
themselves holding government posts – like Tizard and Zuckerman 
– I will demonstrate the continuing influence on defence matters of 
the so-far-unidentified Ministry of Defence scientist lobby of which 
Brundrett was the founding figure and Cook had been a key 
                                                                                                                                            
importance, but I use the term deliberately to express the fact that although Arnold, Britain and the 
H-bomb allows for three fathers, Cook was by far the most important, given his contributions to 
both design and, more importantly, the overall organisation of the project itself and the all important 
and successful tests in the pacific. For more see chapter 3, section 3.3.7.   
24
   Graham Spinardi, “Aldermaston and British Nuclear Weapons Development: Testing the 
'Zuckerman Thesis'”, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 27 (1997) pp. 547-82. I will return to 
Zuckerman and his image in the literature later in this chapter. For more on the literature on his role 
in nuclear politics see chapter 6, section 6.1. 
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member since the 1950‟s. By concentrating on the senior scientific 
civil servants, and especially Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir 
William Cook, and stressing their roles, I will offer important 
correctives regarding both Tizard‟s and Zuckerman‟s role in 
relation to nuclear weapons decisions. This thesis will present an 
image of the Whitehall defence policy-making scene in which 
government scientists held a prominent place during the 1950‟s 
and 1960‟s, both institutionally and as individuals. 
 
1.4 – Science, Scientists and the State 
 
This neglect of government scientists in matters of defence should 
not be surprising if one observes how the literature on science-
state relation has treated the subject. Until quite recently, studies of 
scientists and the British state have been conducted within a 
framework which systematically downplayed the role of 
government defence scientists and military R&D more generally.25 
Instead, there was a very strong focus on civilian organisations 
which funded research in Britain and in which mostly academic 
scientists participated,26 though, even here, important aspects had, 
                                                 
25
 Even though the military was a larger funder even for civil R&D than the DSIR. Edgerton, Science, 
Technology and the British industrial ‘decline’, p. 37 and the tables in pp. 38-39.  
26
 The Department of Scientific Research and Development (DSIR) is prominent as are the (in)famous 
Research Councils. On the DSIR see Ian Varcoe, Organising for science in Britain: A case study 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) and his “Scientists, government and organised research in 
Great Britain, 1914-1916: the early history of the DSIR, Minerva, 8, (1970), pp. 192-216; R. 
Macleod and E.K. Andrews, “The origins of the DSIR: reflections on ideas and men, 1915-1916”, 
Public Administration, 48 (1970), pp. 23-45; Note that these studies are written with an obvious 
underlying, though not explicit, tone of finding out what went wrong. On the Agricultural and 
Medical Research Councils see  T. DeJager, “Pure science and practical interests: the origins of the 
Agricultural Research Council, 1930-1937”, Minerva, 23 (1993),  pp. 129-150; G. W. Cooke, 
Agricultural Research, 1931-1981, (London: ARC, 1981); J. Austoker and L. Bryder, (eds), 
Historical Perspectives on the Role of the Medical Research Council: Essays in the History of the 
Medical Research Council of the United Kingdom and its Predecessor, The Medical Research 
Committee, 1913-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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until recently, been neglected.27 Thus, discussions of the place and 
role of scientists and the state have derived conclusions based on 
the limited sample of the civilian academic scientists.28 The result 
is that in much literature there has been a systematic exclusion of 
the military even from areas in which they were important.29 
Within this framework, an important study on the subject of 
scientists and the state, in terms of both their place and their role, 
is Philip Gummett‟s Scientists in Whitehall.30 This deserves 
particular attention because of its focus and status.31 Gummett is 
explicit from the beginning of the book that he will not discuss the 
defence sector, thus excluding the largest number of scientists in 
government.32 Furthermore, his study is based on the premise that 
there is a dichotomy in government between the „specialist‟, expert 
scientist on the one side, and the „generalist‟ administrator on the 
                                                 
27
    I am referring to the Colonial Office Research Fund which was completely neglected by both 
historians of science and scholars focusing on the British state and imperialism, even though its 
strength outstripped both the well known Research Councils in the post-war period. Sabine Clarke, 
“Experts, Empire and Development: Fundamental Research for the British Colonies, 1940-1960” 
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 2005) and “A Technocratic Imperial State? The 
Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940-1960”, 20th Century British History, Vol. 18 (2007), 
No. 4, pp. 453-480. 
28
  Even though there has been a systematic attempt to get away from this persistence to equate 
scientists and science with academic scientists and science, there is still a lot of work to be done 
towards achieving this aim. Regarding industry, see D.E.H. Edgerton and Sally Horrocks, “British 
industrial research and development before 1945”, Economic History Review, 47, (1994) pp. 213-
38;Edgerton “'British Industrial Research and Development, 1900-1970', Journal of European 
Economic History, Vol. 23 (1994), pp. 49-67; Horrocks, “'The Internationalization of Science in a 
Commercial Context: Research and Development by Overseas Multinationals in Britain before the 
mid-1970s”, The British Journal for the History of Science, (June, 2007), pp. 227-250 
29
  See characteristically Tom Wilkie, British Science and Politics since 1945. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1991); See also Jon Agar “Science and Information Technology” in Hollowell (ed), Britain Since 
1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003) and his Science and Spectacle: the Work of Jodrell Bank in Post-
War British Culture (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998) where the importance of the military in relation 
to the telescope and its funding and place in Britain, as demonstrated recently by Graham Spinardi, 
“Science, Technology and the Cold War: The Military Uses of Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope”, Cold 
War History, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2006), pp. 279-300 was unadressed. 
30
   Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980). 
31
  For the latest example of direct reference to Gummett as a key work see Kate Barker et al. (eds), 
Scrutinising Science: The Changing UK Government of Science (London and New York: Palgrave, 
2004). See also Wilkie, British Science and Politics. 
32
  Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, p. 5. 
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other.33 The most important weakness of Gummett‟s study, though, 
is his concentration on academic scientists who took temporary 
positions in the British government. He focuses on the well known 
figures of Sir Henry Tizard and Sir Solly Zuckerman whom he 
characterises as the two „giants‟ of science advising in 
governments.34 The permanent members of the scientific civil 
service, and especially its highest ranking members, are 
completely absent, in both the civil and defence fields.35 The focus 
is on academic scientists temporarily in Whitehall, rather than 
permanent scientists in the government machine, though the 
distinction is not made, and by consequence the only role 
recognised for the scientists at the top of the hierarchy is only an 
advisory one. 
 The focus on temporary academic scientific advisers, and 
the conflation of this category with state experts, is still central to 
many works on scientists-state relations, as they have been 
traditionally studied. Jon Agar‟s recent study of computerisation 
and expertise in the British government is a good case in point. His 
aim is to demonstrate a strong and effective technocratic 
movement in the heart of the British government in the twentieth 
century and in this he is convincing. Yet in a section where he 
discusses „scientific advisers‟ he turns to the familiar academic 
figures: “[t]he increase in influence of the scientific expert in 
government, exemplified by the Second World War careers of 
Blackett, Tizard and Lindemann, is a well-known historical 
                                                 
33
  Ringing bells, of course, of the „two cultures‟ analyses of C. P. Snow, whom he cites; Ibid, p. 109. 
34
  Ibid, p. 104. Other figures are Lords Blackett, Cherwell and Flowers and Sir Herman Bondi, all 
scientists whose primary professional position had been academic positions. 
35
  Sir Frederick Brundrett features two times, one simply to say that he was Chief Scientific Adviser 
in the Ministry of Defence between Zuckerman and Sir John Cockcroft and the other for a speech 
he delivered to the Institute of Public Administration: Ibid, pp. 32 and 109 respectively. Sir William 
Cook does not appear at all. 
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phenomenon.”36 Despite his focus on government technocrats, 
Agar follows Gummett‟s line of analysis and neglects the vast 
number of existing government scientists who also made names 
for themselves during the war, although, of course, neither in the 
public eye nor publicised in the manner that the academics 
promoted their own contribution.37 Scientists in relation to the 
highest places of government remain the external academics who 
played an advisory role. 
Before Warfare State, the only study which recognised the 
difference between the scientist-as-adviser and the more direct 
role that scientists could play in decision making processes is John 
Krige‟s “Scientists as Policymakers.”38 Krige focuses on the British 
decision to join the CERN programme in the early 1950‟s and 
shows clearly, and argues against the rest of the literature, that 
“scientists did not simply advise... [they] fought to have the policy 
that they wanted implemented... they were promoters.”39 Building 
from his case study he rightly argues against the generalisation of 
the model of the scientist-as-adviser and urges that scholars 
should be wary of the titles and terms of references of the 
                                                 
36
  Unsurprisingly the source which makes this phenomenon „well-known‟ is Gummett‟s Scientists in 
Whitehall. Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer 
(Cambridge, Mass and London: M.I.T. Press, 2003), pp. 251-2 and n.145, p. 493. Although the book 
doesn‟t focus on „scientific advisers‟ Agar has studied the role of scientists in policy in Jon Agar 
and Brian, “British Scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy Committee and 
Information Networks, 1947-1963” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 28:2 (1998), pp. 
209-252. See also Jon Agar, Science and Spectacle: the Work of Jodrell Bank in Post-War British 
Culture (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998). 
37
  See also Soraya de Chadarevian, Designs for Life: Molecular Biology after World War II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 2, whose story, although sensitive to re-
interpretations of the post-war period, ends up being the familiar one of academic scientists 
functioning as „scientific advisers.‟  
38
   John Krige, “Scientists as Policy Makers: British Physicists‟ „Advice‟ to their Government on 
Membership of Cern (1951-1952), in Tore Frangsmyr (ed), Solomon's House Revisited: The 
Organisation and Institutionalisation of Science (Canton, MA: Science History Publications USA, 
1990), pp. 270-291. 
39
   Ibid, p. 284. 
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committees that scientists participated in.40 Even though he rightly 
recognises a policy-making role for scientists, Krige does not break 
with the Gummett line: instead, he equates scientists with 
academic scientists sitting in government committees and does not 
realise the existence of the government scientists who held 
permanent institutional positions and their importance.41  
Recent work on the Defence Research Policy Committee 
(DRPC) sees Jon Agar and Brian Balmer examining the role of 
scientists in government by looking for a „science interest‟, 
explicitly in response to Krige‟s arguments mentioned above.42 A 
misleading aspect of their analysis is that Krige was examining the 
role of academics in a particular decision which very clearly 
affected them, while the DRPC was a permanent government 
committee, a research and development committee with 
government scientific officials and no academics in its 
membership. The authors argue that the DRPC pushed for 
biological and chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction 
as a counterbalance to its exclusion from nuclear matters. This 
thesis will show that in fact the DRPC, and especially its chairman 
in the 1950‟s, was of much wider significance in the British post-
war defence scene, regarding both R&D and general defence 
                                                 
40
   Ibid, pp. 285-287. 
41
   Importantly, these scientists participate in Krige‟s case study. Krige, “Scientists as Policymakers”, 
p. 284: “we saw scientists and government officials;” these officials are characterised as 
“bureaucrats” and include Sir Ben Lockspeiser, in the early 1950‟s one of the most senior career 
government scientists (at p.280: he is “one high-level government official”). It is clear that scientists 
are the academic scientists; but this line of thought neglects the fact that some of their key allies in 
promoting their case in government were the career government scientists in the person of 
Lockspeiser and the DSIR. Sir John Cockcroft, also a participant in the decision, is implicitly 
presented as a member of the academic scientific community, though at this time he is a 
government scientific official, heading one of the two government nuclear establishments. On 
Cockcroft see chapter 2, section 2.3. 
42
 Jon Agar and Brian Balmer, “British Scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy 
Committee and Information Networks, 1947-1964.” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences Vol. 
28, No. 2, pp. 209-252. The DRPC is examined in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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policy and that distinctions between different government scientists 
and between government and academic scientists are crucial to 
understanding this. 
Brian Balmer‟s study of expertise in defence is probably the 
only study that explicitly addresses the issue of expertise and 
defence policy, and focuses on the role of the expert biologist or 
chemist who advises only on matters of biology and chemistry in 
relation to the development of biological and chemical weapons 
systems. In his words the main argument of his study is that “policy 
[on biological and chemical weapons] shifted along with the 
dominant conceptions of the threat in the scientific and policy 
arena.”43 Though, following Jasanoff and Collinridge, Balmer rightly 
argues that “scientific advisers cannot be regarded as standing 
outside of the policy process and injecting a measure of objectivity 
into the proceedings”, he nevertheless only allows for scientists an 
advisory role, as is clear from his introduction: “this book is about 
how scientists called upon by the British Government to provide 
advice on biological warfare attempted to cope with such 
challenges.”44 Important as this aspect of the role of scientists in 
British defence policy might have been, the only role recognised 
for scientists in government remains an advisory one and Balmer‟s 
useful conclusions should not be generalised.45 By recognising the 
existence of different roles for different scientists, either internals or 
externals to the state, this thesis will present government scientists 
                                                 
43
  Brian Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert Advice and Science Policy (Hampshire and 
New York: Palgrave, 2001) p. 9.  
44
   Ibid, pp. 7 and 2 and pp. 184-187 (my emphasis). 
45
  Melissa Smith, “Architects of Armageddon: The Home Office Scientific Advisers‟ Branch and 
Civil Defence in Britain, 1945-1968”, British Journal for the History of Science, online publication, 
October 2009, by focusing on a low level advisory committee of the Home Office and avoiding 
discussion of general defence policy at a higher level follows the same pattern. She discusses 
“expert advisers enlisted by the state to provide the scientific and technical data” (p. 3). 
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in a much more important role, that of policy-makers at the top 
level of British defence policy. 
The studies which focus on specific defence scientific and 
technological projects in Britain are very useful in relation to the 
details of these programmes and scientists are observed in one of 
their roles in government, namely that of performing research.46 
Unlike Gowing‟s work mentioned earlier, these studies do not 
engage with broader issues of defence policy nor do they relate to 
any historiographic context and remain focused exclusively on 
what was going on in terms of research in this or that field, or in 
this or that government research establishment. A partial exception 
regarding engagement with issues of policy is Stephen Twigge‟s 
The Early Development of Guided Weapons, though the author 
necessarily limits himself to policy decisions relating to guided 
weapons development and does not engage in a methodological 
way regarding the matter of the role of scientists in government.47 
One explanation that has been offered for the misleading 
assumptions of the literature on Britain is that the arguments of 
academic scientists have been accepted by scholars without 
critical examination, and without placing them in historical 
perspective or comparing them with the actual situation about 
which their arguments had been made.48 Another is that some of 
                                                 
46
  For a collective image of authors who have published individually on their particular subjects see 
Robert Bud and Philip Gummett (eds.), Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s 
Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990. (London: Science Museum, 2001), 1
st
 pub. 1999. An excellent 
study is Matthew Uttley, Westland and the British Helicopter Industry, 1945-1960: Licensed 
Production Versus Indigenous Innovation (London: Frank Cass, 2001).  
47
   Stephen Twigge, The Early Development of Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960 
(Chur, Switzerland and Reading: Harwood Academic, 1993). 
48
  David Edgerton, “British Scientific Intellectuals and the Relations of Science, Technology and 
War” in Paul Forman and Jose Sanchez-Ron, National Military Establishments and the 
Advancement of Science and Technology (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic, 
1996), pp. 1-35. On scientific intellectuals see also Ralph Desmarais, “Science, Scientific 
Intellectuals and British Culture in The Early Atomic Age, 1945-1956: A Case Study of George 
Orwell, Jacob Bronowski, J.G. Crowther and P.M.S. Blackett.” Unpublished PhD thesis, Imperial 
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the literature on science and the British state assume that the 
British case was like the better-known American one, which, 
actually, had very different characteristics. In the American case 
the academic world was much more important and, unlike the 
British case, the Cold War saw American universities becoming 
significant research and development contractors for the state.49 
Related to this is the fact that much of the literature on science 
policy and the relationship between science and scientists and the 
state in general has a fixation on separating „science‟ and 
„scientists‟ with the „state‟ and by implication state officials.50 A 
direct consequence of this is that the central concern of much 
literature is the impact that the military or the government had on 
science. In David Hounshell‟s words “… there have been only two 
major historiographic issues… One of these debates centres on 
the production of knowledge during the Cold War…The other 
major debate centres on the production of technological goods 
during the Cold War, and has definite parallels to the debate about 
knowledge production. The matter is rarely the role of scientists 
and technologists in the shaping of broader policy issues, rather it 
                                                                                                                                            
College London, 2009. 
49
 The classic studies are Stuart Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-industrial-
academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York and Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1993); 
Everett Mendelsohn, Merritt Roe Smith and Peter Wiengart (eds), Science, Technology and the 
Military, 2 Vols. (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, 1988); Paul Forman, “Behind 
Quantum Electronics: National Security as a Basis for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-
1960.” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 18 (1987), pp. 149-229; Michael 
Aaron Dennis, “„Our First Line of Defence‟: Two University Laboratories in the Postwar American 
State”, Isis, 85 (1994), pp. 427-455; Everett Mendelsohn, “Science, Scientists and the Military”, in 
John Krige and Dominique Pestre (eds.), Companion to Science in the Twentieth Century (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 1
st
 pub 1997, pp. 175-202. 
50
  I have in mind the concept of the Triple Helix model which seeks to be an analytical tool for the 
analysis of the university-industry-government relations. For an exposition of the concept and 
comparison with other analytical tools see Henry Etzkowitz
 
and Loet Leydesdorff, “The dynamics 
of innovation: from National Systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university–industry–
government relations”, Research Policy, 29:2 (Feb 2000), pp. 109-123. In a recent lecture to 
students of the Cold War in Europe Summer School Programme (organised by the ESF and 
Tensions Europe), Helmuth Trischler suggested adding a fourth dimension to the Helix, namely the 
military, thus creating an even more complicated picture. 
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is how those policies have shaped, or in most cases corrupted, the 
course of science.”51 Again this literature focuses on the USA, 
having made little headway since Forman‟s seminal article of 
1987.52 
The general assumptions about the role of scientists in 
relation to government policy and decision making are tainted by 
the peculiarities of the American case. As it was expressed in the 
introduction of a volume of studies which focused on the Cold War 
period, the consensus seems to be that the “literature has helped 
to call into question the (still widely prevalent) notions about the 
value and existence of a clear-cut boundary between politics, on 
the one hand, and scientific investigation on the other.”53 Despite 
such claims about blurred boundaries, the separation of two 
worlds, that of science, on the one hand, and the state, in one of 
its forms, on the other, is prevalent. Sheila Jasanoff is clear in this: 
“many of the key institutions of modernity…54 demand an intense 
and ongoing collaboration between the institutions of law and 
those of science and technology.”55 On issues which are closer to 
                                                 
51
 David Hounshell, “Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; 
Rethinking the Social Study of Science and Technology.” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 31, No. 2 
(April 2001), pp. 289-297 at p. 290. An important exception is to be found in David M. Hart, 
Forged Consensus: Science, Technology and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), who manages to integrate perfectly economics, 
ideology and scientists and non-scientists to demonstrate convincingly that what the literature has 
recognised as a consensus in policy towards the funding of American science in the immediate post-
war period is very misleading since it regards only a fraction of the resources devoted to it, namely, 
Vannevar Bush‟s brainchild, the National Science Foundation. In fact what prevailed was a 
„national security liberalist‟ ideology, where military agencies dominated the funding of science. 
For the consensus argument see Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II 
(Washington: Brookings, 1990). 
52
   Paul Forman, “Behind quantum electronics: National security as basis for physical research in the 
United States, 1940-1960," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 18, Pt. 
1, 1987, pp. 149-229. 
53
   Mark Solovey, “Science and the State during the Cold War: Blurred Boundaries and a Contested 
Legacy,” Introduction to “Science in the Cold War,” thematic issue of Social Studies of Science,” 
Vol. 31(2001), no. 2, pp. 165-170, p. 165. 
54
   Health care, environmental protection, insurance, education, security, financial markets, intellectual 
property, criminal justice. 
55
   Sheila Jasanoff, “Making Order: Law and Science in Action” in Edward J. Hackett, Olga 
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this thesis, Gregg Herken‟s study of the scientists‟ role in making 
“Cardinal Choices,”56 meaning nuclear choices, is characteristic of 
how the separation of two worlds holds strong in his statement that 
“it seems remarkable today…that more than a decade after the 
Second World War there had yet to be established a direct channel 
of communication between the nation‟s scientific community [on 
the one hand] and the president [on the other].”57  
Herken is not exceptional in this. Regarding defence-related 
decisions, the literature on the US focuses on the development of 
the atomic bomb and the decision to go thermonuclear and tells a 
story of what is taken to be a radically new engagement between 
academic scientists and the state after the Manhattan Project, in 
which “physicists emerged… as heroes – and theoretical physicists 
as Übermenschen”, to quote one scholar.58 Thus the literature on 
scientific advice in the American case is one of the aloof, academic 
physicist who found himself in the unfamiliar territory of the 
bureaucratic struggles and confrontations of the politics of 
weapons procurement.59 Bernstein was characteristic when he 
described the process of decision making as follows: “[scientists]… 
shaped the menu of technological-scientific possibilities from which 
the policymakers... selected the weapons deemed necessary for 
                                                                                                                                            
Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch and Judy Wajcman (eds), The Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies, Third Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), pp. 761-786, p. 761 (my emphasis). 
See also her earlier work, especially The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), throughout which, despite the title of the 
book, the scientist and the policymakers are always two different entities.  
56
   Borrowing the term „cardinal choices‟ from the arch divider of cultures into scientific and other, C. 
P. Snow. 
57
   Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising, paperback, 2000), p. x (my 
emphasis). 
58
 S. S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe and the Moral Responsibility of 
the Scientist (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 1
st
 pub. 2000, p. xv. A 
similar story is implicit in Herbert York, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the 
Atomic Bomb to the SDI (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2000) Rev and Ext edition; 
Lawrence Badash, Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons: From Fission to the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1939-1963 (NY: Humanity Books, 1998). 
59
  See York, Cardinal Choices; Badash, Scientists and the Development.  
32 
 
American foreign policy.”60 The academic scientists provide advice 
and the politicians formulate policy and make decisions. 
Even if the above conclusions were valid for the American 
case, regarding Britain, and possibly in other European states as 
well, they should not be treated as valid frameworks of analysis; 
and this, because British state bureaucracy included from the early 
20th century and even before, a large number of scientists and 
technical personnel in general who in the post-war period had 
found their place at the top of the decision making process, 
especially in the defence field, but not confined to that, shaping the 
nature of the state and its bureaucracy.61 An important starting 
point of this thesis is that British state scientists thought of 
themselves not as a hybrid breed, trying to balance their identity 
between two different or even opposing identities, but as exactly 
what they were: professional government scientists. If seen under 
this light, a number of questions about the „moral responsibility of 
the scientist,‟ or about the scientific „vocation‟ that a scientist has to 
pursue and which comes to opposition with his role as a 
government adviser on weapons of mass destruction have no real 
substance for this group.62 It was exactly their job, as „professional 
government scientists‟ to be actively involved in these matters and 
this job did not come in any kind of opposition with their identity. 
On the contrary, as we shall see, it had been one of their goals as 
a group to become privy to this kind of information and contribute 
their important expertise to the decision making process. 
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   Barton Bernstein, “Four Physicists and the Bomb: the Early Years, 1945-1950.” Historical Studies 
in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 18, No. 2, (1988), pp. 231-263, p. 263. 
61
  Edgerton, Warfare State for the general argument. See also Clarke, “A Technocratic Imperial state” 
for the Commonwealth Office. 
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  The references are to S. S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe and the 
Moral Responsibility of the Scientist. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 2000) and Charles Thorpe, 
Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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In fact the problem extends back to the US case as well, 
since it discusses scientists and their role in relation to the state in 
ways which do not properly reflect the underlying issues. The 
centrality of biographies of Oppenheimer to the study of the role of 
scientists in relation to the state and its policies and decisions in 
the USA is illustrative, since he is portrayed not as a remarkable 
figure in his domain, not as an exception but as a case 
representative of social groups, cultural movements and political 
ideologies.63 Oppenheimer has enjoyed numerous biographies one 
of which won the Pulitzer Prize for biography in 2006.64 His 
achievements in setting up one of the most important American 
centres for physics in the interwar period and in running the 
scientific side of the Manhattan Project should not be 
underestimated, neither should the role he assumed as a public 
intellectual after the revoking of his security clearance; but in all the 
issues that relate to institutions outside the academic world of 
science there were other individuals, who were arguably equally, if 
not more, important than Oppenheimer. These were General Leslie 
Groves, a U.S. Army engineer, regarding the Manhattan Project, 
the first thorough academic study of whom was published only 
recently,65 and Edward Teller who, although also enjoying a recent 
biography, has been systematically excluded from academic 
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   Thorpe, Oppenheimer: “The [Oppenheimer] hearings crystallised tensions between competing 
understandings of the legitimate place of scientists and scientific expertise in the American 
polity.”63 Oppenheimer is presented as the scientist, and at the same time he is the representative of 
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did not enjoy and therefore he could afford a relative independence of mind and in complete 
contrast with most individuals persecuted by McCarthy he retained his position at Princeton and did 
not get fired. 
64
  The Pulitzer winning biography is that of Martin Sherwin and Kai Bird, American Prometheus: 
The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Knopf, 2005).  
65
  See Robert Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project's 
Indispensable Man (Vermont: Steerforth Press, 2002). 
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treatments of the relationship between scientists and the state;66 
nevertheless, it is Oppenheimer who remains the representative 
case.67 
The British case offers a similar, even if more peculiar, 
example, in that the main scientific personality discussed in the 
literature covering post-war Britain and particularly in relation to 
matters nuclear did not achieve anything close to what 
Oppenheimer did, either at the academic level or at the level of a 
government R&D project. Lord Zuckerman is the most famous 
scientist associated with British government policy after the war.68 
He is the only scientist who appears in the best-selling Anatomy of 
Britain69 and in Gummett‟s Scientists in Whitehall he is one of the 
“two giants in British government science,” as mentioned earlier.70 
In studies of Britain‟s „special relationship‟ with the US71 and in 
analyses of the impact of science on society and the Social 
Relations of Science movement in the United Kingdom, he figures 
very prominently.72 Up to a point, this level of attention is justified. 
His career in government politics, as scientific adviser in various 
levels, started with the end of the Second World War and 
                                                 
66
  See Peter Goodchild, Edward Teller: The Real Dr Strangelove (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
2004). 
67
  Thorpe, of course, recognises Teller‟s role (“Teller… played a crucial behind the scenes role”), but 
implicitly reduces him to the scientist who was happy to go along with state policies and was 
consumed by the state bureaucracy as indicated by Thorpe‟s comment later on in the same chapter 
that the nuclear scientists after the Oppenheimer case “marked the integration of science into the 
apparatus of the state, and the routinization and bureaucratisation of the scientific role.” See Thorpe, 
Oppenheimer, pp. 210 and 242 respectively. 
68
  As noted by Richard Maguire, “Scientific Dissent amid the United kingdom Government‟s Nuclear 
Weapons Programme” History Workshop Journal, Issue 63 (2007), pp. 113-135. 
69
  Anthony Simpson, Anatomy of Britain Today. (London: Hodder and Stonghton, 1965). He appears 
under the chapters both on „defence‟ (ch. 19) and on „scientists‟ (ch. 20). 
70
  Phillip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall. (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1980), p. 104. 
71
  See for example Ian Clarke, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent 
and America, 1957-1962. (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1994), (throughout). 
72
  See for example Garry Werskey, The Visible College: The Collective Biography of British Scientific 
Socialists of the 1930’s. (London: Allen Lane, 1978) and William McGucken, Scientists, Society 
and the State: the social relations of science movement in Great Britain, 1931-1947. (Columbus: 
Ohio State UP, 1983). 
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continued until after his official retirement from government service 
in 1971. He was associated directly with controversial decisions, 
like the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964, the 
cancellation of the TSR2 aeroplane, the decision by the UK to buy 
the Polaris submarine. He had a close relationship with 
Mountbatten and became the first Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
government as whole, a position created for him by the new 
Labour Prime Minister in 1964, Harold Wilson. But, Zuckerman 
was also keen on making his views – and himself, for that matter – 
known and accepted. He published two volumes of 
autobiography,73 a number of books, numerous articles in 
specialised journals and magazines and gave innumerable public 
lectures, both while at office and after retiring.74 His favourite 
subject was the spread of nuclear weapons and the impact of 
science on society, politics and its relation to war.75 Through these 
activities and through his extensive social circle76 he made sure his 
views were not only listened to, but were well registered in the 
public‟s thinking.77 By consequence he enjoys two biographies.78 
As this thesis will show, Zuckerman‟s fame in the literature 
misleads as to both his significance and his typicality as a 
government related scientist and this is not only a matter of 
                                                 
73
  A characteristic of a retired politician and not a civil servant. Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 
and Monkeys, Men and Missiles. 
74
  For a list of these see P. L. Krohn, “Solly Zuckerman Baron Zuckerman, of Burnham Thorpe, O. 
M., K. C. B. 30 May 1904-1 April 1993”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, 
Vol. 41 (Nov., 1995), pp. 577-598, at pp. 595-598.  
75
  Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (London: Collins, 1982) and his Beyond the Ivory 
Tower (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1970) and Scientists and War (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1966). 
76
  His contacts extended from the Duke of Edinburgh to the „reds‟ P. M.S. Blackett and J.D. Bernal. 
77
  His preoccupation for setting the historical record right, according to his own views, is 
demonstrated in Andrew Brown, J.D. Bernal: The Sage of Science. (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
UP, 2005), pp. 477-484. 
78
    John Payton, Solly Zuckerman: a Scientist out of the Ordinary (London: John Murray, 2001); 
Bernard Donovan, Zuckerman: Scientist Extraordinary (Bristol: BioScientifica, 2005). 
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influence in policy and decisions but, also, of identification of where 
the focus should be in discussions of scientists and the state, in 
Britain and other cases as well. 
 
1.5 – The Thesis 
  
This thesis will show that in Britain the important scientists in 
relation to defence policy and decision making were primarily the 
highest ranking permanent scientific civil servants and secondarily 
the well known academics, like Zuckerman, whose role can only 
be assessed in relation to the former. Beyond the existing 
traditional roles of the government scientist as researcher and low 
level expert adviser, this thesis will identify, analyse and clearly 
demonstrate a role for scientists in relation to government which 
the bulk of the literature has ignored: the role of a policymaker.79 It 
will do this on two fronts.  
The first is to describe in some detail the senior scientific civil 
servants in the defence world of the post-war period. Chapter two 
identifies the elite members of the defence side of the scientific 
civil service, that is, those who reached the highest available 
positions in the defence side of Whitehall during the first half of the 
Cold War. It argues that they were overwhelmingly career 
government scientists and, through a comparison with the total of 
the scientific civil service, the elite members of the academic 
scientific community and the elite administrators of Whitehall, that 
these people had a distinctive identity both within the rest of 
                                                 
79
    The term, as we have seen, was used by Krige, “Scientists as Policy Makers.” Though right to 
identify such a role for academic scientists, outsiders to government, the term is much more 
appropriate for the scientists discussed in this thesis: the permanent, highest ranking scientific civil 
servants with seats at the top tables of policy and decision making. 
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Whitehall and within the scientific community at large. They were 
professional government scientists and had graduated from 
Britain‟s elite educational institutions at secondary and university 
level and were members of Britain‟s elite social institutions, such 
as the Royal Society and the Athenaeum. Although a tradition of 
studying elites in post-war Britain exists, the scientists are very 
much neglected, except for studies on the Research Councils and 
the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy80 which are all 
incorporated in Gummett.81 Gary Werskey‟s Visible College only 
discusses people who were consciously outsiders to government.82 
The overwhelming majority of analysis of British scientific culture 
concentrates on academics, Fellows of the Royal Society, 
intellectuals and even when, by exception, such studies delve into 
the relationship between elite outsiders and the state they prefer to 
concentrate on an analysis of outsiders.83 This group of elite 
government scientists is also important because from its ranks 
sprang a number of individuals who turned out to be of crucial and, 
more often than not, decisive importance in the formulation of 
British defence policy in the 1950‟s and the 1960‟s, as later 
chapters will show. Also in chapter two I have included brief 
biographies of the three famous holders of the position of Chief 
Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Henry Tizard, Sir 
                                                 
80
  See for example W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite. (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1965) 
and Stuart Blume, Towards a Political Sociology of Science. (London: Collier Macmillan, 1974). 
81
  For the period of interest here they are: Lindemann, Tizard, Blackett and Zuckerman, who were all 
brought into government from positions outside of it. See Phillip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall. 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 1980), pp. 93-108 for the analysis of Scientific Advisers.  
82
  Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of 
the 1930’s. (London: Allen Lane, 1978). The one scientist and socialist who had an impact on 
policy, both during the 2
nd
 World War and in the 1960‟s, Patrick Blackett, Werskey left deliberately 
out of his study.  
83
  As does Philip Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals Within the Civil Service: Scientists as Insiders 
During the Interwar Period”, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kent, 1997. On scientific 
intellectuals as an influential cultural elite see Desmarais, “Science, Scientific Intellectuals and 
British Culture.” 
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John Cockcroft and Lord Zuckerman. 
In the third chapter I analyse the careers of the most 
important scientists in government, namely Sir Frederick Brundrett 
and Sir William Cook. Like Tizard, Cockcroft and Zuckerman, they 
reached the highest scientific positions in the post-war Ministry of 
Defence, but they have never enjoyed full scholarly attention. 
Chapter three will examine Brundrett‟s and Cook‟s lives in as much 
detail as the available material allows. In view of their importance 
in matters of defence, the strong focus is their government careers, 
the examination of which reveals a number of important points 
about Brundrett and Cook as individuals, but also about 
government scientists in general. These two were not just skilled 
research experts; rather they assumed a number of varying roles 
in government defence science, moving with equal ease in 
provincial R&D establishments and Whitehall committee rooms 
throughout their careers. 
Chapters four, five and six seek to answer the question „what 
was the role of scientists in the formulation of Britain‟s post-war 
defence policy?‟ Scholars who have asked this question, like Agar 
and Balmer,84 have done so in very limited scopes and without 
recognising the underlying issues, as I showed earlier. This thesis 
not only concentrates at the top level of defence policy but does so 
in a different framework. On the one hand, it does not put all 
scientists in one basket, but recognises the important differences 
between the various scientists involved. On the other, it explicitly 
relates specific decisions to issues of general defence policy. I will 
seek to establish an answer to the above question after examining 
both the institutional setting which government scientists helped 
                                                 
84
   Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”; Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare. 
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shape and operated in (chapter 4) and the specific way in which 
some of them influenced general defence policy and particular 
related decisions (chapters 5 and 6). In chapter four I show how 
the post-war period saw the state machinery regarding defence 
research and development changing, with the establishment of a 
new coordinating, inter-service committee situated in the new 
coordinating Ministry of Defence, the Defence Research Policy 
Committee (DRPC). This new player in the Whitehall scenery, 
managed to situate itself at the centre of matters regarding 
defence issues, not only as it concerns research and development, 
but also general defence policy. The main architect of this process 
was the committee‟s Deputy Chairman and later Chairman in the 
1950‟s, Sir Frederick Brundrett, who concentrated in his person, 
and bequeathed to his successor, Zuckerman, the control of a wide 
network of important committees and subcommittees, which 
included control of the most important nuclear intelligence network 
and ballistic missile research and development. This chapter will 
offer important correctives regarding the institution of the 
committee, it will stress that its origins laid with existing 
government practices and was not the result of the influence of 
outsiders and will argue that it constituted the, so far unidentified, 
main channel of influence of the pre-1964 Ministry of Defence. The 
role of the committee‟s first chairman, Sir Henry Tizard is also re-
evaluated. 
Chapter five argues that Brundrett was also one of the central 
government figures regarding the formulation of the defence 
priorities expanded in the famous White Paper on Defence of 
1957. It shows how Brundrett, having placed himself at the centre 
of the defence machinery, was a key figure regarding both the 
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general posture (priority of a strong economy and reliance on high 
technology) described in the White Paper, for which there was a 
wide consensus, and, more importantly, specific decisions as to 
what was the best way to achieve the posture declared in the 
paper (strong R&D effort and ballistic missiles). He had around him 
a group of scientists who were very much in favour of nuclear 
weapons and who pressed for the initiation and the continuation of 
Britain‟s indigenous effort to develop a ballistic missile capable to 
deliver the bombs. This was a pro-nuclear, pro-missile scientist 
lobby, revolving around the Ministry of Defence and thus at the 
heart of the Whitehall defence scene in the 1950‟s; this MoD 
scientist lobby has gone unnoticed so far in the literature. Chapter 
six follows the story of this lobby in the 1960‟s and examines its 
influence in relation to the acquisition of the Polaris submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and the commencement of the British 
indigenous effort to improve the Polaris missiles. It argues that 
Zuckerman‟s influence can only be appreciated if examined in 
relation to the MoD scientific lobby which was formed in the 1950‟s 
and that the key scientific figure in government in the 1960‟s was 
Sir William Cook, the foremost nuclear expert in the UK, and not 
the famous Zuckerman.  
One point which should be made clear is that we shouldn‟t 
think in terms of replacing the famous Tizard and Zuckerman with 
two unknown government scientists, Brundrett and Cook; each had 
their roles in the defence politics of the 1950‟s and 1960‟s. This 
thesis will offer the first complete image of what these roles were, 
arguing that the important actors relating to the issue of scientists 
and the state and the issue of scientists and defence policy were 
Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook and the roles of 
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Zuckerman and Tizard, important as they were, can only be 
appreciated if examined in relation to the former. 
 
1.6 – Sources 
 
A very large amount of the material presented in this thesis has 
been derived from the UK National Archives. What has in the end 
been cited is only a small part of what has been consulted, since I 
have consciously tried to cite secondary sources wherever 
possible, mainly to illustrate the point that secrecy, of which much 
has been made as an obstacle to academic research in these 
matters, is not the reason why government scientists have been 
neglected in the literature both of defence policy and of scientists 
and government.85 In this respect I also need to point to the fact 
that the majority of the archival material I have used has already 
been used by scholars;86 the neglect of the importance of the 
scientists is thus not a matter of lack of knowledge and availability 
of material.87 This is especially true, regarding the careers of Sir 
Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook. 
This brings me to the issue of other primary sources 
regarding the two protagonists of the thesis. To start with Cook, 
unfortunately it wasn't possible to find any personal papers, or 
even any living relatives. Thus for Cook, I have relied on 
secondary sources and the reading of government archives, a fact 
which prohibited me from being able to have a substantiated image 
                                                 
85
 A scholar who has made a big deal of the matter of secrecy see Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: 
Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 2002),esp. his introduction. For a history of secrecy 
regarding state matters in Britain, see David Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832-1998 
(Oxford and NY: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
86
  Especially Baylis, Clarke, Navias and Wheeler, whose work is cited earlier, n.17 and n.18. 
87
   Rather, it is the misleading assumptions of a large body of historical work, as demonstrated earlier. 
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of Cook the person, as opposed to Cook the government official. 
For Brundrett, the situation was not very different, despite the fact 
that some of his papers were given to Churchill College Archives 
by his brother. Unfortunately, they consist mostly of speeches 
given by Brundrett at various occasions, a number of which were 
already available in the public domain. Still, there were a few hints 
about his thoughts at a more personal level, like his intention as a 
student to follow a career in the administrative class of the civil 
service. Regarding Brundrett I was also fortunate to interview 
Chapman Pincher, the Daily Express reporter with whom Brundrett 
had a close relationship, although not necessarily other than 
professional.88 Mr Pincher confirmed many of the facts about which 
he had already written in his various books regarding Brundrett 
and also gave me an impression of Brundrett the man, although I 
felt that his assumptions were coming more from the famous 
journalist's own convictions than from Brundrett's and thus, not 
being able to confirm similar impressions from other people, I have 
kept them out of the material presented in this thesis. 
Particularly helpful were a number of autobiographies of, 
mainly, scientists who participated in government work, before, 
during and after the Second World War and similar people who 
have written unofficial histories of the establishments in which they 
had been employed. I have not always utilised this material, 
especially if I have not been able to corroborate it from archival 
sources. Nevertheless, they proved a very helpful guide.  
  
                                                 
88
  I would like to thank Dr Michael Goodman, at that time of King's College, London and now 
Official Historian of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the Cabinet Office, who brought me in 
touch with Mr Pincher. 
Chapter II 
 
Britain‟s Post-War Elite Defence Scientists, 
1946-1964 
 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
David Edgerton in his Warfare State has given a preliminary 
mapping of the scientists involved in warlike state research and 
scientific advice in the years between 1920 and 1970. He has 
given an account of their place in British government relative to 
administrators and the military in terms of position, status and 
significance.1 This chapter extends, and indeed enriches, 
Edgerton‟s research on government scientists, through a 
prosopographical analysis of those scientists who reached the 
highest positions within the defence machinery of the UK in the 
post war period. I also go further through comparing and 
contrasting these scientists with top scientists outside government 
and the highest ranks of the administrative civil service. I show that 
the highest ranking government scientists of the post-war period 
had a higher social status than the total of the scientific civil service 
and comparable to that of both the elite academics and the post-
war permanent secretaries.2 
The twenty individuals analysed here administered a very 
large part of the public money devoted to scientific and 
                                                 
1
  David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970. (Cambridge; Cambridge UP, 2005) chapters 3 
and 4. 
2
   Hennessy, Whitehall; Kevin Theakston and Geoffrey Fry, “Britain‟s Administrative Elite: Permanent 
Secretaries, 1900-1986”, Public Administration, Vol. 67, (summer 1987), pp. 129-147 and the 
relevant literature cited; see also Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 129. 
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technological research and had access to the highest levels of 
policy formulation in their departments, sitting alongside their 
military and administrative service colleagues. This chapter will 
clearly demonstrate that these scientists were overwhelmingly 
career scientific civil servants and that those among them who 
joined during the Second World War should be thought of as 
joining an already existing group within Whitehall. It will also show 
that by all relevant criteria (secondary and university education, 
expertise in a number of fields of research, accumulated 
experience in running R&D programmes and recognition by 
professional scientific societies) these scientists were of a high 
calibre. Since most were recruited in the interwar period, I dispel 
some criticisms about the quality of the scientists recruited then.3 
Almost half were products of public schools and more than half 
were Oxbridge men, and were involved in elite institutions, such as 
the Royal Society and the Athenaeum. 
Having established the profile of these twenty individuals, the 
chapter will turn to the three most important elite academic 
scientists who were appointed in top positions in the post-war 
defence machinery: Sir Henry Tizard, Sir John Cockcroft and Lord 
Zuckerman. Edgerton has argued that the academic scientific 
advisers “were in general very similar in educational background to 
the administrative class.”4 While this is true for these three as well, 
this chapter will show that the similarities – and not only in 
educational background – were equally strong with the top brass of 
                                                 
3
   Criticisms presented in Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 129. In pp. 129-134 Edgerton diffuses these 
criticisms by presenting the senior civilian scientists of the defence departments in the inter-war 
period and showing how many of the inter-war research corps distinguished themselves later. In this 
chapter I reinforce Edgerton‟s argument by showing that among those recruited in the inter-war 
period those who rose to highest available positions in government after the 2
nd
 World War were 
indeed of the highest calibre. 
4
   Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 184. 
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the scientific civil service as well. This is important since it is the 
world of the scientific civil service that the academic scientists were 
entering and not that of the administrators. In this regard, the 
comparison between the three outsiders and the top of the 
defence scientific civil servants will also highlight important 
differences, the most important being the different career patterns 
before ascendance at the top positions. While this might seem 
obvious, since we are talking about insiders and outsiders, the 
point is often obscured by the uncritical use of the general term 
scientist, or sometimes expert, to encompass everyone who had a 
scientific degree and held a scientific position in Whitehall.5 This 
chapter will show why this approach is misleading and will give 
essential background for the later chapters which will focus on the 
role of scientists in the formulation of policy. Last, but not least, this 
chapter will discuss how these three individuals should be thought 
of in relation to the state, clearly demonstrating why Tizard, 
Cockcroft and Zuckerman should be considered, albeit at different 
degrees, as primarily outsiders. 
My group of top government defence scientists consists of all 
the civil service scientists who during the period 1946-1964 held 
the top scientific positions in the War Office, the Admiralty, the Air 
Ministry and the Ministry of Supply (later Aviation).6 Within these 
departments I have included the civilians who held the titles of 
„Scientific Adviser,‟ „Chief Scientist‟ and „Controller‟.7 Positions of 
                                                 
5
   A clear example of this confusion is Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, whose approach is still 
followed by many scholars, as I showed in the Introduction. 
6
  The Ministry of Supply was the government department which was responsible for procurement for 
the Army and the RAF. The Admiralty was responsible for its own procurement, although there was 
some inevitable overlap and liaison between the two departments. On the Ministry of Supply see 
later, chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
7
     In the Admiralty there was no Scientific Adviser or Chief Scientist, but the Chief of the Royal 
Naval Scientific Service. I have also included the position of the Deputy Controller (Research and 
Development) of the Admiralty. 
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Controllers were traditionally held by Service personnel, but this 
changed in the post-war period, especially with relation to guided 
missiles and aircraft in the Ministry of Supply.8 I thus exclude those 
attached to advisory committees, whose primary position was 
outside the government machinery. My group were ex officio 
members of the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) 
which was in place between 1946 and 1964. The group includes 
two of the most influential figures in post-war British defence and at 
times heads of the Ministry of Defence‟s scientific side namely Sir 
Frederick Brundrett (Chief Scientific Adviser, MoD, 1954-1960) and 
Sir William Cook (Chief Adviser, MoD, 1966-1970). In virtue of their 
significance Brundrett and Cook will be studied in full detail in 
chapter three. Excluded are three scientists who held the position 
of Chief Scientific Adviser in the Ministry of Defence but did not 
come from a career in the civil service, namely Sir Henry Tizard, 
Sir John Cockcroft and Lord Zuckerman; 
The group consists of the following twenty men: 
 
Table 2.1 Elite Defence Scientists 
Brundrett, Sir Frederick (1894-1974) Johnson, Patrick (1904- 1996) 
Carroll, Sir John (1899-1974) Lockspeiser, Sir Ben (1891- 1990) 
Cawood, , Sir Walter (1907-1967) Mitchell, Sir Steuart (1902- 1990) 
Cockburn, Sir Robert (1909- 1994) Morgan, Sir Morien (1912- 1978) 
Constant, Hayne (1904-1968) Purcell, Dr Ronald (1904- 1969) 
Cook, Sir William (1905-1987) Sargeaunt, Henry (1907- 1997) 
Davies, Handel (1912- 2003) Scott Hall, Stewart (1906- 1961) 
Gardner, Sir George (1903-1975) Sutton, Sir Graham (1903- 1977) 
Garner, Sir Harry (1891- 1977) Wansbrough-Jones, Sir Owen (1905-1982) 
Hulme, Dr Henry (1908-1991) Willis, Dr Hector (1909- 1989) 
 
 
                                                 
8
  The notable exception was the position of Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics, mostly 
held by civilian scientists. See the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries. 
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The primary source of information about the lives of the top 
government defence scientists is their entries in Who’s Who.9 
Where necessary and when available, I have augmented the 
information from entries in the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography and obituaries in newspapers or specialised magazines 
and journals.10 For comparison I will use Philip Chaston‟s 1997 
prosopographical analysis of the elite members of the scientific 
community, which he takes to include a Fellowship of the Royal 
Society, a declared membership to the Athenaeum Club (a sign of 
acceptance by the Establishment) and an entry to the Dictionary of 
National Biography.11 He studies the period 1915 to 1950 and 
although the period doesn‟t coincide precisely with mine (1946-
1964), changes in the composition would not alter his sample 
significantly. 
 
2.2 – Prosopography of elite defence scientists 
 
2.2.1 – Education 
 
The group of people under investigation here were educated 
overwhelmingly in two types of schools; public12 and grammar. 
Almost half of them graduated from a public school and an equal 
number from a grammar school.13  
 
                                                 
9
    All twenty have Who’s Who entries, available online at http://www.ukwhoswho.com/.  
10
   ODNB entries exist for Brundrett, Cawood, Constant, Cook, Lockspeiser, Morgan, Sutton, 
Wansbrough-Jones and Zuckerman and are available online at http://www.oxforddnb.com/.  
11
  Philip Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals Within the Civil Service: Scientists as Insiders During 
the Interwar Period”, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kent, 1997 
12
  Public School is one which is a member of the Headmasters‟ Conference. 
13
  Sir Walter Cawood attended Archbishop Holgate's School, a Church of England school; I haven‟t 
been able to find which school Willis attended. 
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Table 2.2 Schools attended by the elite defence scientists and other 
related groups  
SCHOOL Elite 
Defence 
Scientists 
1946-1964 
Elite Academic 
Scientists  
1915-1950 
Total of 
Government 
Scientists  
1960’s 
Permanent 
Secretaries  
1945-1964 
     
Public  9 (45%) 40% 20% 58.7% 
Grammar 9 (45%) 18% 57%  
Public & 
Grammar 
18 (90%) 58% 77%  
Other 2 (10%) 42% 23%  
Sources: Elite defence scientists: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries; elite academic scientists: 
Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals”, p. 97; total of government scientists: Edgerton, Warfare 
State, p. 184; permanent secretaries: Kevin Theakston and Geoffrey Fry, “Britain‟s Administrative 
Elite: Permanent Secretaries, 1900-1986”, Public Administration, Vol. 67, (summer 1987), pp. 129-
147 at p. 132. 
 
If one compares this group with that of Chaston‟s scientists, and 
take school attendance as one indicator of social class, we reach 
the conclusion that the top government defence scientists were of 
similar or higher social background to that of his elite scientists. 
One striking difference is that among the elite defence scientists 
nearly all went either to public or grammar school, while for the 
Chaston‟s group, only just over half did so. The proportion 
attending public school was about the same however.14   
The elite defence scientists were more socially exclusive by 
education than the scientific civil servants as a whole, concerning 
both public school attendance (45% to 20%) and if one looks at the 
total percentage of combined public and grammar school 
attendance (90% to 77%).  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
  I have used the same criteria for a public school as Chaston. 
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Table 2.3 Universities attended by the elite defence scientists and related 
groups15 
UNIVERSITY Elite 
Defence 
Scientists 
1945-1964 
Elite 
Academic 
Scientists 
1915-1950 
Total of 
Government 
Scientists 
1960’s 
Permanent 
Secretaries 
1945-1964 
     
Cambridge  10 (50%)  --- --- 26.7% 
Oxford 2 (10%) --- --- 40% 
Oxbridge 12 (60%) 45% 16% 66.7% 
Provincial 4 (20%) 12% ---  
16% Imperial 2 (10%)  
19% 
--- 
London 1 (5%) 27% 
Royal Naval 
Colleges 
1 (5%)  --- --- --- 
Source: Elite defence scientists: the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries; elite academic scientists: 
Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals”, p. 99; total of government scientists: Edgerton, Warfare 
State, p. 184; permanent secretaries: Theakston and Fry, “Britain‟s Administrative Elite”, p. 132. 
 
Twelve out of the 20 (60%) attended Oxbridge at either an 
undergraduate or a post graduate level, the overwhelming majority 
attending Cambridge. Of these twelve, half had attended a public 
school. Another five people came from grammar schools and 
managed to study at either Cambridge or Oxford, again a strong 
majority going to Cambridge and, with the exception of Sutton, all 
at undergraduate level.16 The rest of the universities include 
Imperial College17 (2), University of Wales (1), three went to the 
Universities of Leeds, Bristol and Belfast, while Mitchell attended 
                                                 
15
    I have taken Cambridge and Oxford as the top, followed by Imperial College and then other 
universities. The purpose of the university education is to identify who attended the elite 
universities and therefore I have not limited myself to the undergraduate level. For example 
Lockspeiser, who attended Cambridge and then the Royal College of Mines (Imperial), is 
considered to be Cambridge and Sutton (University of Wales and then Oxford) is considered 
Oxford. 
16
  Sutton studied at a postgraduate level at Oxford coming from a grammar school and the University 
College, Wales. Two public school boys did not attend either of the two prestigious universities, 
Gardner going to Queen‟s University, Belfast coming from an Irish public school (Campbell 
College) and Mitchell who attended the two Royal Naval Colleges (Dartmouth and Osborne). 
17
  Or the Royal College of Science before 1907. 
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only the Royal Naval Colleges of Dartmouth and Osborne. The 
elite defence scientists‟ attendance of Oxbridge is markedly higher 
than that of the elite academics of Chaston.18 From within the 3400 
or so scientific civil servants in the 1950‟s19 the ones who occupied 
the top positions in defence were most likely to be of an 
educational background of the highest level, a fact which both 
confirms the prevalence of the top schools and universities in 
Britain‟s social elite and refutes accusations that government 
scientists were of a lower calibre to the elite of the administrative 
class.20 
The case of Cambridge man Hayne Constant, the jet engine 
pioneer, is most interesting to see in more detail since he changed 
a number of schools, both public and grammar ones.21 The son of 
a dental surgeon, Frederick Charles Constant, from the age of 
eleven Hayne attended all four types of schools, the most 
prestigious one being the public King's School at Canterbury, 
graduating in the end from Sir Roger Manwood's, a grammar 
school.22 Constant appears to have been a very talented student of 
mathematics and physics and was awarded a State Scholarship to 
study at Queen's College, Cambridge as an open exhibitioner. 
According to William Hawthorne, who wrote both his Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography entry and Royal Society 
biographical memoir, he “pursued a course commonly taken by the 
                                                 
18
  Science Advisers‟ attendance of Oxbridge is 60%, while Chaston‟s elite FRS‟s is 45%. See 
Chaston, Gentlemanly Professionals, p. 99. Of course there is some overlap in the two groups. 
According to Chaston‟s criteria (pp. 95-96) Constant and Lockspeiser could be part of his sample, 
since they were both elected FRS before 1950 and were both members of the Athenaeum. 
19
  The number is taken from Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 168. 
20
  Ibid, pp. 183-185.  
21
 The following details come from his ODNB and Who's Who entries, as well as the biographical 
memoir of the Royal Society. Hawthorne, Cohen and Howell, “Hayne Constant, 1904-1968” 
Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 19 (Dec, 1973), pp. 268-279 (from now 
on Constant Bio. Mem.). 
22
  This is why I have categorised him as a grammar school graduate. 
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more gifted students”, thus taking the mathematical tripos part 1 in 
1925 and the mechanical sciences tripos in 1927, obtaining a first 
class.23 After a year of postgraduate studies, Constant went 
directly to the Royal Aircraft Establishment, abandoning it for two 
years (1934-6) of academic work at Imperial College and returning 
to pioneer the development of jet engines at the RAE during the 
Second World War. He continued his career in government service 
until his death in 1964. 
It is worth noting that the only scientist from the group who 
attended Oxford as an undergraduate was Patrick Johnson, 
Scientific Adviser to the Army Council in the mid 1950's. Johnson is 
the second case of an academic who came to government service 
during the war, and stayed afterwards, although he spent a number 
of years at the RAF College in Cranwell.24 The other top 
government scientist who attended Oxford did so at a 
postgraduate level after the University College of Wales gaining, 
though, a BSc in 1925 and was a mathematician by training; he 
became one of the leading figures in meteorology in post-war 
Britain.25 Sir Graham Sutton spent the war at various positions 
mainly at Porton Down, being Superintendent successively of the 
Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment, the Tank 
Armament Research Station and Chief Superintendent of Malvern. 
He had a brief stint as Scientific Adviser to the Army Council 1951 
(which is why he is included in this study) while he was Professor 
of Mathematical Physics and then also Dean of the Royal Military 
College of Science. He finished his government career as Director-
                                                 
23
  Constant Bio. Mem. 
24
  See Johnson's Who's Who entry. 
25
  The following information is from F. Pasquill; P. A. Sheppard; R. C. Sutcliffe, “Sir Graham 
Sutton”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 24. (Nov., 1978), pp. 529-546; 
Sutton's ODNB entry and Sutton's Who's Who entry. 
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General of the Meteorological Office (1953-1965).26 
Another aspect of the university education of the group is the 
level of studies which they achieved.27 Here the results cannot be 
strongly conclusive, since the information is not available for all the 
individuals included in the group.28 It is important to note, however, 
that at least eight of them acquired a doctorate.29 Of the rest, 3 had 
only a first degree and another 6 a postgraduate one, while 
Mitchell attended only the Royal Naval Colleges. It should be noted 
at this point that there appears to be no correlation between the 
university attended and the level of degree of the members of the 
group.30 At the same time there is a quite even distribution 
between disciplines, with a stronger leaning towards 
physics/maths, and at least three engineers.31 Among the group 
there are 3 chemists, 3 mathematicians and 3 three physicists, 
while Davies and Hulme studied a combination of mathematics 
and physics.32  
 
2.2.2 – Career Before and After Government 
 
The flow of scientists between the academy, the government and 
                                                 
26
  It should be noted that Sutton published a number of books on Meteorology and of popular science 
nature as well as many scientific articles. They can be found in the Royal Society memoir. 
27
  Something which Chaston does not include in his analysis.  
28
  I am uncertain about four individuals, an important number in the 20 who constitute the group; 
these were Garner, Mitchell, Sargeaunt and Willis. 
29
    These were Carroll, Cawood, Cockburn, Hulme, Purcell, Sutton and Wansbrough-Jones. 
30
  The hypothesis would be that a strong degree Cambridge or Oxford would be enough. We shall see 
later the correlation between the level of degree acquired and the pre-government career of the 
group. 
31
  Again Mitchell stands out since he studied only at the RN Colleges, a fact which makes it difficult 
to place him within a traditional academic discipline. 
32
  These results should be treated with obvious caution, because it is not easy to distinguish the 
disciplines. For example, Cook took an MSc in mathematics, which by definition places him under 
the mathematicians, but he performed research on the determination of intermolecular fields and 
equations of state in gaseous mixes, under Lennard-Jones at Bristol before he went on to 
government service; this would put him  under mathematical physics.  
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industry is important, because a point has been made in the 
literature about the mobility between government service and the 
academy and has led one scholar to argue for the „professional‟ 
nature of scientists, regardless of where they were employed.33 In 
order to establish whether this is the case I will examine the issue 
from three angles; first by looking at whether and where the top 
government defence scientists were employed before they entered 
government service; second by looking at which time they went to 
government service, especially in relation to the Second World 
War; and third by looking at their careers after government service. 
 
Chart 2.1 Career of elite defence scientists before government service. 
 
Source: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the total is 20). 
 
Eight of the twenty elite defence scientists had pursued an 
academic career before they entered government service while 
only three came from industry. Six selected to come directly to 
government service after their graduation and one had a school 
teaching career before entering. A link between the academy and 
government is indeed obvious, but this conclusion needs some 
qualifications. 
                                                 
33
  See Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals” p. 100-2. 
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Chart 2.2 War as a factor for elite defence scientists’ entrance in 
government service 
* World War 1 is zero 
Source: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the total is 20). 
 
Most of the members of the group entered government 
service in peacetime, choosing it as a career and not obliged or 
motivated because of the Second World War to do so; it is 
therefore more accurate to think of those who entered government 
service during the war and stayed later, as joining a group which 
already existed. This is important because it is a common 
perception that the Second World War brought a lot of fresh blood 
in government service.34 
Further qualifications about the flow between the academy 
and government are obvious if one looks at what the elite defence 
scientists did after they retired from government service.35 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
  The point is made very strongly in Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989). 
35
  Again some caution is needed with this aspect, since I take it that if no post-retirement career is 
mentioned in their Who‟s Who entry, it makes it the case, a fact which might not be necessarily so. 
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Chart 2.3 Career of elite defence scientists after government service 
 
Source: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the total reaches more than 20 since some combined 
different careers after government service and have therefore been placed in more than one category). 
 
At least six of the group went into „industrial‟ posts after their 
retirement from government service.36 Of the six, Cockburn 
combined these posts with an academic post.37 Of the remaining 
five (i.e. excluding Cockburn), three went to academic posts – only 
Carroll took a professorship, while the other two (Morgan and 
Sutton) took administrative positions in universities,38 Morgan 
combining this with an advisory role to the government on 
aeronautical issues.39 More than half of the members of the group 
followed neither an academic nor a career in industry after their 
retirement. Of these eleven, eight did not take up any position,40 
while three followed diverse careers, for example Brundrett in 
breeding and farming and Garner in Chinese art. If one combines 
these results with the careers of the individuals before they entered 
                                                 
36
  This includes directorships, chairmanships and consultancies. 
37
  A Senior Research fellowship at Churchill College, Cambridge. 
38
  They were Master of Downing College, Cambridge and Vice-President of University College 
Wales respectively. 
39
  At the Air Traffic Control Board, the Air Warfare Advisory Board and the Airworthiness 
Requirements Board.  
40
  Four of them because they passed away while they were holding their posts or immediately after. 
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government service, those from an academic past had nothing to 
do with industry after their retirement, while of the three who went 
into academic posts only one came from the industrial sector 
before joining government service.  
The group shows a stronger tendency towards the industrial 
sector after retirement from government, especially among those 
who were not related to the academy earlier in their lives.41 This is 
important, because from Chaston‟s elite academic scientists there 
appears to be no strong relation with industry.42 The careers of the 
top government scientists qualify this in significant ways. For these 
scientists, experience in government level would mean expertise in 
organising, coordinating and setting priorities for research and 
development; they would have had little problem going to work for 
the industrial sector where this kind of expertise would be relevant. 
The case seems to be that there could be a flow from the academy 
to government, at the early stages of a scientific career, and from 
government to industry, at the late stages. 
A clear example of the type of work that the top government 
scientists could undertake after retirement from Whitehall is offered 
by the career of Sir Steuart Mitchell, who is also the notable case 
of someone who was educated only at the Royal Naval Colleges.43 
Mitchell started his government service as a cadet at the Royal 
Navy during the First World War (1916), becoming a gunnery 
specialist in 1927. From 1931 onwards and through the Second 
World War he was at the Naval Ordnance Inspection Department, 
transferring to the Army in 1945 as Chief Engineer and 
                                                 
41
  An extension of the group to government scientists of a lower level at the point of retirement could 
make this point clearer. 
42
 He makes the point that from his sample he could not “substantiate the traditional „big picture‟ of 
pure science untainted by industrial work”; Chaston, Gentlemanly Professionals, pp. 100-2. 
43
  Information on Mitchell is derived from his Who's Who entry. 
57 
 
Superintendent of the Armament Design Establishment of the 
Ministry of Supply. He was the first and longest serving Controller 
of Guided Weapons and Electronics from 1951 to 1962 with a 
break from 1956 to 1959 when he was Controller of the Royal 
Ordnance Factories. His record after retirement is indeed very 
impressive, having been Vice Chairman of British Railways; 
Chairman of the Machine Tool Industry EDC, the Shipbuilding 
Industry Training Board and Carrier Engineering Co; Director at 
Parkinson Cowan Ltd and Plessey Numerical Controls Ltd; and 
Member of the Scottish Economic Planning Council and the 
National Economic Development Council. 
In contrast to Mitchell, Sir John Carroll came from a 
successful academic career before government service and 
returned to a purely academic post after it.44 Carroll was an 
extraordinary case, since he became Professor of Natural 
Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen at the age of 31. His 
notable abilities were demonstrated at a very early age, when, 
before he went to study at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge on 
an open scholarship, he went to serve in 1916 at the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment, doing work which resulted in scientific publications 
even before he became an undergraduate at Cambridge.45 He 
entered the Second World War effort in the Admiralty at the 
Department of Scientific Research and Experiment and in 1946 
stayed in government service at the most senior position available 
for a scientist in the Admiralty, that of Deputy Controller (R&D), 
retaining that post for an amazing total of eighteen years, retiring 
                                                 
44
  The following information on Carroll is derived from his Who's Who entry and his obituaries at The 
Times (4/5/1974) and the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, Vol. 16 (1975), pp. 
100-3. 
45
  An interesting thing to note is that the two senior Admiralty scientists in the immediate post World 
War Two period, Carroll and Brundrett, were Sidney Sussex men. 
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as Chief Scientist (Royal Navy) in the unified Ministry of Defence in 
1964. Upon his retirement he took the Gresham Professorship in 
Astronomy, until 1968. 
 
2.2.3 – Prestige 
 
Let‟s now turn to learned societies membership.  
 
Chart 2.4 Fellowships of Societies  
Source: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries.  
 
Five members of the group were Fellows of the Royal 
Society. These were Constant, Cook, Lockspeiser, Morgan and 
Sutton. Given the Society‟s 60 year rule concerning the archives 
for election of Fellows it is not possible to know the reasons for the 
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elite defence scientists‟ election.46 The largest number of defence 
scientists had a Fellowship of the Royal Aeronautical Society, nine 
in total.47 Davies, Gardner and Morgan were at various points 
elected Presidents of the Royal Aeronautical Society.48 There were 
also two fellows of the Royal Society of Chemistry;49 three were 
fellows of what became the Royal Academy of Engineering; there 
are three fellows of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and two 
fellows of the Institute of Physics.50 Given that a claim to some 
specific contribution to the discipline of the societies is needed to 
be elected a fellow,51 one possible explanation could be that those 
not elected to any, simply did not make such a contribution. 
Brundrett would be an example of such a case, having admitted so 
himself.52 After all, as we will see in more detail in the next chapter, 
apart from sheer scientific/technical ability, probably a more 
important factor for advancement in scientific Whitehall were the 
skills in organisation and management of projects and people. All 
in all, five out of the twenty elite defence scientists were not fellows 
of any learned society, according, at least, to their Who‟s Who 
                                                 
46
  A few informed guesses can be made: Constant was elected in 1948 a little after the development 
of the Metrovick F2 jet engine and Cook in 1962 a few years after the successful H-bomb tests of 
1957-8.  
47
  Three of the nine were also Fellows of the Royal Society (Constant, Lockspeiser and Morgan). 
Morgan served also as president of the Aeronautical Society (1967-8). 
48
  This says as much for the individuals elected, as for the Society and the discipline of aeronautics 
and its strong connections with government.  
49
  More precisely one of the RSC (Wansbrough-Jones) and one of the Royal Institute of Chemistry 
(Purcell), which since 1980 are one institution. 
50
  Carroll was a Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society. The social status of these societies was 
not comparable to the fellowship of the Royal Society, but is an indication that those who held 
fellowships of these professional societies were acknowledged members of their respective 
professional communities. They certainly wrote the corresponding initials after their names. What 
exactly was required to be a fellow and not a member is not the same for each case, but the election 
to a fellowship certainly was to some degree honorary. For example the Royal Aeronautical Society 
elects as fellows “those in the profession of aeronautics or aerospace who have achieved one of the 
following: made outstanding contributions; attained a position of high responsibility; have had long 
experience of high quality” 
(http://www.raes.org.uk/cmspage.asp?cmsitemid=Membership_Fellowship). 
51
  Although the RS famously made exceptions to this in the late 40‟s and early 50‟s, electing Clement 
Attlee and other Labour officials to its Fellows. 
52
  See the Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. 
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entries. 
Sir Morien Morgan is one of the three government scientists 
who were Fellows of both the Royal Society and the Royal 
Aeronautical Society.53 His was also a Cambridge (St Catherine's 
College) man and attended no less than five different schools, 
completing his secondary education at the (public) Rutlish School, 
Merton in London. All his years in government service were spent 
in aeronautic related matters. He started at the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment in 1935, until, after successful work in both the flying 
qualities of aircraft and, significantly, guided weapons, he went first 
to the Air Ministry as Scientific Adviser and then to the Ministry of 
Aviation to become Deputy Controller and then Controller of 
Aircraft and later Controller of Guided Weapons at the Ministry of 
Technology.54 His close involvement with many aeronautical 
projects, which include the Concorde and the Harrier, easily 
explain his election to the Presidency of RAeS (1967-8) and his 
election at the late age of 60 to the Fellowship of the Royal 
Society.55 
Turning to honours more common for civil servants, those 
bestowed by the Monarch, among the elite defence scientists only 
one did not receive any Honour.56  
                                                 
53
  The other two were Sir Ben Lockspeiser and Hayne Constant. The following information on 
Morgan are derived from his ODNB and Who’s Who entry and E.G. Broadbent, “Morien Bedford 
Morgan”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 26. (Nov., 1980), pp. 371-
410. 
54
  MinTech absorbed most parts of the Ministry of Aviation in the mid 1960's. Morgan returned to the 
RAE as its director from 1969 to 1972. 
55
   “SIR MORIEN BEDFORD MORGAN, C.B., Director, Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, 
Hampshire. Distinguished for his many personal contributions to the practice of aviation, especially 
in stability and control, and for his leadership and direction of aeronautical research covering a very 
wide field.” Quoted in “The Society‟s Notes”, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 
Vol. 27, No. 1 (Aug., 1972), pp. 167-171. 
56
  This was Hulme whose life was stigmatised in 1954, a fact which is likely to have impaired if not 
his advancement in the government hierarchy (he retired as Chief, Nuclear Research at AWRE in 
1979), probably his social advancement. Hulme left Britain for New Zealand to become Rector of 
Canterbury University College. In 1954 his daughter Juliet at the age of 15 was involved in the 
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Chart 2.5 Top Honours awarded to the elite defence scientists 
 
Source: relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the total is 20). 
 
All the rest received at least an OBE, with six receiving a CB. More 
than half (60%) received a knighthood, which includes three KCB‟s 
awarded to Brundrett, Cook and Lockspeiser. The rest include two 
Knight Bachelors (Morgan and Sutton) and seven KBE‟s.57 Of 
course some caution should be taken when assessing these 
awards. The recipients did not necessarily receive them while they 
were serving at a position which has included them in this group. 
To take the KCB‟s to see what the above point means, Brundrett 
received his after he became Chairman of the DRPC and Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence;58 Cook upon his 
retirement from the Ministry of Defence in 1970;59 and Lockspeiser 
                                                                                                                                            
murder of her friend‟s mother, in the summer of that year. The murder was fictionalised in the Oscar 
nominated Peter Jackson movie Heavenly Creatures. See the article on Time magazine at the time at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,889979,00.html (last accessed 12/10/2008) and 
more recently The New Zealand Herald, at 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10371147 (last accessed 
12/10/2008). 
57
  Carroll, Cawood, Cockburn, Gardner, Garner, Mitchell and Wansbrough-Jones.  
58
  This was a position which as we shall see later was of equal status to a Permanent Secretary. 
Brundrett already had a KBE. 
59
  He was already a Knight Bachelor, after the successful completion of the H-bomb tests in 1958. 
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after he left the Ministry of Supply (which includes him in the elite 
defence scientists) and most likely because he became Secretary 
of the DSIR.60 Given that we are talking about civil servants, it is 
safe to assume that some of the positions reached by the elite 
defence scientists were in practice knighthood positions. If we look 
at the highest awards that they had received while they were 
members of the DRPC at any given time there were Hulme and 
two more without any, and again a strong number of CB‟s (10) and 
also five Knights.61 
Sir Ben Lockspeiser, who apart from Brundrett and Cook was 
the only one who received a KCB, is a government scientist who 
deserves closer attention, since he has been associated with the 
development of the first electronic computers and was instrumental 
in the setting up of CERN.62 It is also notable that he is the only 
one of the group of top government scientists of a Jewish origin 
and an open membership of the Labour Party (Farnborough 
branch). Lockspeiser was also a Cambridge graduate (Sidney 
Sussex College), gaining a first in the natural sciences tripos 
(1912) and a second class in part two of the mechanical sciences 
tripos a year later. After service in the 1st World War, he joined the 
Royal Aircraft Establishment in 1920 and before leaving for an 
                                                 
60
  He was also already a Knight Bachelor, since 1946; it is not clear whether this was for services 
during the war or because of his position as Ministry of Supply Chief Scientist, although the former 
explanation seems more likely. 
61
  The Knights were four KBE‟s (Carroll, Gardner, Garner and Wansbrough-Jones) and one Knight 
Bachelor (Lockspeiser). There were also two OBE‟s (Johnson and Sargeaunt) and one CBE 
(Sutton). Presenting the awards in this way can give an indication of the prestige or the status of the 
individuals who were members of the DRPC at any time. This excludes the chairmen of the 
Committee, who would all be Knights during their tenure of the post, and Brundrett as the Deputy 
Chairman of the Committee during 1950-1954, who had been knighted right before he took this 
position. This means at least one more Knight in the Committee at any given time. 
62
  The following is from A. P. J. Edwards, “Sir Ben Lockspeiser”, Biographical Memoirs of the 
Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 39, (Feb. 1994), pp. 246-261 and Lockspeiser‟s ODNB and Who’s 
Who entries. On Lockspeiser‟s role in CERN see D. Pestre, A. Hermann, J. Krige, U. Mersits, 
History of CERN, Vol.1., Launching the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Amsterdam: 
North Holland, 1987), passim. 
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administrative position in 1939 he had been head of the air 
defence department of the establishment. He ended the 2nd World 
War as director-general of research at the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production and became the expanded post-war Ministry of 
Supply's first Chief Scientist. In 1949 he became Secretary of the 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, a position which 
resulted in his KCB and, probably, the election to the Fellowship of 
the Royal Society, retiring in 1956. 
 
Chart 2.6 Honours awarded to the elite academic scientists.  
  
Source: Chaston, "Gentlemanly Professionals", p. 104. The total reaches 101%, which suggests an 
overlap between the categories. The total of Chaston‟s sample is 198 scientists. 
 
Compared with Chaston‟s data, the state honours awarded 
show a smaller percentage of Knighthoods. This is explainable by 
the simple fact that the elite defence scientists were awarded these 
honours as civil servants and by consequence there were limits to 
the level of honours they could receive. Thus they would be 
excluded from peerages, since those were preserved for the 
highest military men, usually after their retirement, and the 
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Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury and post-war to the 
Cabinet, who also traditionally received peerages after their 
retirement.63 
 
2.2.4 – Fields of expertise and Career Patterns in 
Government
64
 
 
Let‟s now examine the kind of fields that the elite defence 
scientists were involved in, while at government service. This is 
important because it relates to two issues. One is to see what the 
balance was between the fields of expertise within Whitehall and 
whether there was any dominant one; the other reason, related to 
the first, is to examine whether there was any correlation between 
the fields of expertise and the advancement of a scientist within 
Whitehall.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63
  I should note here, with some reservation, that Sir Frederick Brundrett was considered for a GCB 
but did not receive it because of his more than forthcoming relationship with The Express 
correspondent Chapman Pincher; see Chapman Pincher, “Bugs in the Banquette”, The Spectator, 
Aug 22 1998, also online at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_199808/ai_n8813497 
last accessed 15/7/2009. 
64
  The classification between fields, like in the examination of the subjects of study, is of course 
contestable. I have categorised the fields according to the relation between the establishment were 
the scientists held positions and the Air Ministry, the Admiralty and the War Office, unless there is 
an explicit correlation between the type of work they did and a general field of research. 
65
  I will use the categories Air, Admiralty and War, for research related to Air Ministry, Admiralty and 
War Office respectively. Guided Weapons, which begun within the Ministry of Supply as rocket 
research and stayed there when it consolidated with the MAP after the war, has been considered as 
War during the war and as Air after it since the main establishment responsible was the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, the establishment with the most direct relations with the RAF. 
On the issue of the consolidation of rocket research under the RAE, see chapter 3, section 3.3.5. 
65 
 
 
 
Chart 2.7 Fields of expertise of elite defence scientists. 
 
Source: Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the total is 20). 
 
As was indicative from the membership in learned societies, 
there is a somewhat strong leaning towards Air research. More 
than half of the twenty members of the group came from fields that 
had a strong relation to aeronautical issues.66 The number is 
almost the same as the membership of the Royal Aeronautical 
Society.67 There are six who were involved in Admiralty related 
issues and another six with War Office ones.68 Some movement 
between different fields is noted, since four individuals had held 
positions related to more than one field of research. Of all the 
twenty elite defence scientists only Cockburn was at some point 
involved with research in the nuclear field, and even for him this 
can be seen as a diversion from his main interests which lay with 
                                                 
66
  Three of them, it has to be noted, had also been involved with other type of research as well.  
67
  Indeed, as Edgerton has noted, research in aerodynamics was almost exclusive to government 
establishments during the interwar period, when, as we have seen, most of the Science Advisers 
entered government service. See Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 112. 
68
  The fact that the total number reaches more than the total of the group is explained by the fact that 
there are four individuals who were placed under more than one category.  
Air & War 1
Air 7
Air & other 1Air & ADM 1
ADM 4
ADM & War 
1
War 5
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Air issues.69 The issue of nuclear related expertise is important 
because of the important place which the nuclear matters have 
been dealt with in the historiography for the post-war period. As we 
shall see later, nuclear issues were of paramount importance, but, 
until 1954, administrative responsibility rested with the Controller of 
Production, Atomic Energy in the Ministry of Supply70 and later with 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, an independent 
department, after that date and until now, which was not 
administratively part of the Civil Service.71 Regarding issues of 
policy in the nuclear field the situation was much more 
complicated.72 
A comprehensive analysis of the matter of expertise is not the 
purpose here, but it is important to note that, for this group of 
scientists, expertise should be seen as a fluctuating qualification.  
A first level of expertise should be considered the university 
qualification that the overwhelming majority of them had acquired. 
They were physicists, mathematicians, engineers etc;73 then 
comes the expertise that resulted from their work as researchers in 
government establishments. Each of them would be an expert in a 
specific field of research and development, for example 
aerodynamics or rockets or nuclear warheads; this should be seen 
as a technical expertise. Some, indeed most of them, had 
                                                 
69
  Cockburn was at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, the Telecommunications Research 
Establishment and Atomic Energy Research Establishment, before he became Scientific Adviser at 
the Air Ministry. From then on he stayed either with Aircraft or with Guided Weapons matters. 
Cook, who later was Deputy Director of Aldermaston, had not done any nuclear related work before 
he reached the position of Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service which places him in the elite 
defence scientists. After this post he would become Britain‟s foremost expert in matters nuclear, as 
will be seen in the next chapter. Sir John Cockcroft who would become briefly Chief Scientific 
Adviser in the Ministry of Defence was also a nuclear expert, being the head of the Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment. 
70
  Under Lord Portal (retired CAS) and Sir Edwin Plowden (former Treasury official) respectively. 
71
 On both these points see Chapter 4.  
72
   For the important scientists in nuclear policy issues see chapters 4 to 6. 
73
  Of course this would come at different levels. Others had simple BSc‟s and others PhD‟s. 
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developed expertise in a number of different fields, whether 
interrelated or not.74 To the above specifically technical, should be 
added the acquired expertise in organisational and administrative 
matters and more importantly issues of policy. For example most of 
the members of this group had reached positions as heads of 
sections of government research establishments and, of course, 
heads of whole establishments. This had given them experience in 
organising large scientific teams for research and development 
towards specific goals and a corresponding expertise in being able 
to assess the demands that projects could make to the technical 
and financial resources of the state. Last, the administrative aspect 
cannot be stressed enough. The positions of Scientific Adviser and 
Chief Scientist concentrated in being able to co-ordinate the 
allocation of scientific personnel, the general research performed 
by a government department and also to overview the work of 
specific establishments that came under their direction. These 
people should be considered as de facto scientific administrators 
and policy-makers, as later chapters will show. 
An examination of relations between disciplines studied, 
universities attended and the type of research performed during 
their careers shows that there is no strong correlation between 
universities attended and the field of research that the elite 
defence scientists did while at government, although this 
conclusion should not be extended to the total of the scientific civil 
service. Of the ten Cambridge men, and with some overlap, five 
found themselves in Air establishments, four in Admiralty 
establishments and only two in War related establishments. At the 
                                                 
74
  A good example of this case would be Cockburn who had been involved with research on radar and 
electronics and later in nuclear research at Harwell before he took the position of Scientific Adviser 
at the Air Ministry. 
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same time there appears to be no correlation between the subject 
of studies and the departmental establishments that the elite 
defence scientists found themselves in during their careers.75 
Regarding the departments which the elite defence scientists 
belonged to when they first reached a position which situates them 
in the group, there appears to be no correlation between 
universities attended and departments, but the same cannot be 
said about disciplines. All three engineers were at the Air Ministry. 
Of the three chemists, Wansbrough-Jones and Cawood were at 
the War Office while Purcell was at the Admiralty. Of the three 
mathematicians, Brundrett and Cook were at the Admiralty and 
Sutton was at the War Office. Both physicists/mathematicians 
(Davies and Hulme) were at the Air Ministry. The three physicists 
(Carroll, Cockburn and Johnson) were equally divided between the 
three departments, while Lockspeiser, who studied both physics 
and engineering, was at the Ministry of Supply, as Chief Scientist.76  
The relationship between specific positions and universities 
and disciplines shows that Cambridge provided half the Scientific 
Advisers of the Air Ministry (the rest came from Imperial, University 
of London and a University College) and half the Chiefs of the 
Royal Naval Scientific Service.77 Cambridge also provided three of 
the four Chief Scientists of the Ministry of Supply, the other 
(Cockburn) coming from London. Both Oxford men (Sutton and 
Johnson) became Scientific Advisers at the War Office, the other 
three coming two from Cambridge (Wansbrough-Jones and 
Sargeunt) and one from Leeds (Cawood). There appears to be 
little relation between disciplines and positions during the post-war 
                                                 
75
  Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries. 
76
  Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries. 
77
  The other two were Cook from Bristol and Purcell from Imperial. 
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period, except for the two civilian Controllers of Aircraft who were 
engineers, having studied at Belfast (Gardner) and Cambridge 
(Morgan). Half of the six Scientific Advisers at the Air Ministry had 
studied some form of physics (the two with a combination of 
mathematics) and two were engineers (Morgan and Constant).78  
A point which is important to make is that of the twenty elite 
defence scientists few seem to have assumed more than one of 
the top positions which would include them in the group. These 
were: Cockburn with three positions (Scientific Adviser, Air Ministry; 
Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics, Ministry of Supply; 
Chief Scientist, Ministry of Aviation); Morgan with two (Scientific 
Adviser, Air Ministry; Controller of Aircraft, Ministry of Aviation); and 
Wansbrough-Jones with two (Scientific Adviser, War Office; Chief 
Scientist, Ministry of Supply).79 
Pursuing the career patterns of the elite defence scientists, 
the issue of after how many years of experience the elite defence 
scientists had before they reached the positions which have 
included them in this study is important.80  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78
  Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries. The fact that half of the elite defence 
scientists had studied at Cambridge easily explains the roughly equal distribution. 
79
  Data derived from Appendix II. 
80
  This means when they reached the position for the first time, since a number of them moved to other 
positions of equivalent status, or higher or even lower. 
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Chart 2.8.1 Years of Service of elite defence scientists before reaching 
elite position 
  
Source: Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (total is 20). 
Chart 2.8.2 Years of Service of elite defence scientists before reaching 
elite position 
 
Source: Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (the different categories of ages 
overlap and therefore the total is not 20). 
 
The average number of years comes between 19 and 20. 
Fifteen of the twenty (75%) members of the group reached the 
position after at least 16 years of government service. Of the five 
who were promoted faster than this, four had entered government 
service because of the 2nd World War, at least three of whom were 
academics.81 They had an average age of 43 years, which makes 
them younger than the average age of the rest of the group, which 
                                                 
81
  For Gardner, who is the fourth, I am not sure about his pre-government career, so I have placed him 
under „unknown‟, but the fact that he held a Rhodes Research Grant in 1939 suggests an academic 
career. 
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was well into their 50‟s when they reached the positions which 
have included them in the group. With some caution, again, this 
does suggest that the academics who entered government work 
during the war did rather exceptionally well within government, a 
fact which is exemplified by the career of Carroll.82 
Chart 2.9 Age of elite defence scientists when reaching top position 
 
Source: Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (total is 20). 
 
One last point regarding the careers of the elite defence 
scientists has to do with their experiences in government 
departments. If we exclude the ones who took directly an 
appointment in Whitehall, most of whom entered service because 
of the Second World War, the average time of service before a 
Whitehall appointment came to almost 17 years.83 For most of 
these scientists a large part of their adult lives would have been 
spent at a government research establishment, outside London. 
Some, though it would be very difficult to establish how many and 
for how long, kept houses outside London for the duration of their 
                                                 
82
  With the end of the war Carroll became Deputy Controller (Research and Development) at the 
Admiralty, a position nominally higher than that of Brundrett (Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific 
Service), who was a career government civil servant, since the end of the of the 1st World War and 
5 years older than Carroll. 
83
  Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries. This is a rough estimate, presented to 
give an indication only. The ones excluded are; Caroll, Johnson, Wansbrough-Jones who all entered 
because of the war; Sutton who was at the Met Office, but unknown whether he was at its London 
headquarters or else; and Willis whose appointments before CRNSS are not known.  
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professional careers. On top of this, almost all the scientists in the 
group were exclusively at warfare related posts before they 
assumed the positions which have included them in this study. 
 
2.2.5 – The Athenaeum  
 
Last, but not least, is the elite defence scientists‟ membership of 
the Athenaeum. Chaston has noted that membership to this most 
prestigious of gentlemen‟s Clubs was a “recognition of their 
eminence beyond the scientific world… when… [they] reached the 
pinnacle of their career.”84 For the elite defence scientists, who 
were civil servants, membership of the Athenaeum signified 
acceptance not outside their world, but very much in their world. 
 
Chart 2.10 Membership of elite defence scientists in gentlemen’s clubs 
 
Source: Data derived from the relevant Who’s Who and ODNB entries (total is 20). 
 
As we can see, eight out of the twenty elite defence scientists were 
declared members of the Athenaeum. This puts them at the same 
level as all of Chaston‟s elite scientists.85 But some explanation is 
                                                 
84
  Chaston, “Gentlemanly Professionals”, p. 78. 
85
  For Chaston, membership of the Athenaeum was a prerequisite for inclusion in his 
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needed concerning membership to a Club and Brundrett is a good 
case to demonstrate this. He was for many years the most senior 
defence scientist in Whitehall. He was also awarded a KCB – as 
we have seen he was one of the only three of the group under 
study who did so. All in all he had all the necessary qualifications to 
be a member of the Athenaeum, since people with lower status 
than his were members. But Brundrett was a member of the United 
Oxford and Cambridge Club and not the Athenaeum; given the 
above one can, with some caution, assume that this was by choice 
and not because he wasn‟t considered for or even offered a 
membership.86 Why one would not want to be a member is a 
matter of speculation, a likely possibility being the fact that one 
might consciously not want to be associated with the 
Establishment that the Athenaeum represented. Therefore, 
membership of the Club should be taken to mean acceptance by 
the Establishment, but lack of membership should not 
automatically be considered as exclusion from the club of the 
„Good and the Great.‟87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
prosopographical study. 
86
  It would take some years to establish whether he had been put forward for election as a member 
and was not elected, since the Athenaeum has a strict 70 year rule for disclosure of the Club‟s 
archives. 
87
  Theakston and Fry, “Britain‟s Administrative Elite”, pp. 145-146 take a similar position regarding 
club membership. 
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2.3 – The Outsiders: Tizard, Cockcroft and 
Zuckerman88 
  
I will now turn to the three individuals who held the position of 
Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence coming from 
outside the civil service. These were Sir Henry Tizard (1946-1952), 
Sir John Cockcroft (1952-1954) and Sir Solly (later Lord) 
Zuckerman (1960-1966). The details of their lives are well known 
and will not be reproduced here; rather the focus will be on aspects 
which have been either neglected or their importance overlooked 
in the literature. 
In many ways Tizard, Cockcroft and Zuckerman were quite 
similar to the elite defence scientists. All three were associated 
with elite educational institutions: Tizard with Oxford as both a 
student and an academic chemist; Cockcroft with Cambridge as a 
Nobel Prize level researcher; and Zuckerman with Oxford as a 
researcher in anatomy. All three were knighted: Tizard was 
awarded a GCB in 1949; Cockcroft a KCB in 1953; and 
Zuckerman, awarded a KCB in 1964, became a life peer after his 
retirement in 1971.89 The three also became Fellows of the Royal 
                                                 
88
  Details of Tizard‟s life from Ronald Clark, Tizard (London: Methuen, 1965), the only biography; R. 
V. Jones and William S. Farren, “Henry Thomas Tizard. 1885-1959”, Biographical Memoirs of 
Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 7 (Nov., 1961), pp. 313-348; and his obituary at The Times 
(10/10/1959). A thorough academic biography of Tizard is missing. Details of Cockcroft‟s life from 
Guy Hartcup and T. E. Allibone, Cockcroft and the Atom (Bristol: Hilger, 1984); Mark Oliphant and 
Lord Penney, “John Douglas Cockcroft, 1897-1967”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal 
Society, Vol. 14 (Nov. 1968), pp. 139-188, from here on Cock Bio.Mem.; and Cockcroft‟s ODNB 
entry. Details of Zuckerman‟s life from Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords: the 
Autobiography (1904-1946) of Solly Zuckerman. (London: Hamilton, 1978); Solly Zuckerman, 
Monkeys, Men and Missiles: an Autobiography 1946-88. (London : Collins, 1988); P. L. Krohn, 
“Solly Zuckerman Baron Zuckerman, of Burnham Thorpe, O. M., K. C. B. 30 May 1904-1 April 
1993”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 41 (Nov., 1995), pp. 577-598, 
from here on Zuck.Bio.Mem; and Zuckerman‟s ODNB entry. 
89
  Cockcroft and Zuckerman were also awarded the Order of Merit, a most exclusive distinction, since 
at each time there are 24 members one of whom is the Sovereign. The only zoologist other than 
Zuckerman to have been awarded the Order of Merit is Lord May in 2002, who was, like 
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Society: Tizard in 1926; Cockcroft in 1936; Zuckerman in 1943. 
Tizard and Cockcroft were members of the Athenaeum. At the 
same time, there are a few differences which set them apart in 
significant ways and since we are talking about exceptional cases 
they should be examined separately.  
The reason why Sir John Cockcroft is not included in the elite 
defence scientists is that he did not hold any of the senior positions 
in a defence department during the period of interest here.90  But at 
the same time, he has more similarities with some of them than he 
does with Tizard and Zuckerman; essentially because he entered 
government service because of the Second World War and 
remained a full time scientific civil servant after it.91 He was director 
of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, remaining in 
government service until his retirement in 1959.92 But there is good 
reason why he should be considered as an outsider when he went 
to the Ministry of Defence as Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister 
and Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee, from 
1952 to 1954: the fact that he came directly from his research 
                                                                                                                                            
Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government and also President of the Royal Society. 
See Stanley Martin, The Order of Merit: One hundred Years of Matchless Honour (New York: I.B. 
Tauris & Co., 2007), chapter 9. There should be little doubt that these distinctions would not have 
been awarded if Zuckerman did not have the government career that he did. 
90
  Cockcroft is the only Nobel Prize level scientist among those studied in this thesis. He started his 
education at Manchester (first class BscTechn, 1920;  MscTechn, 1922), but gained his PhD from 
Cambridge where he distinguished himself as a researcher in experimental physics, directing the 
Royal Society Mond Laboratory (1935), under the wing of the Cavendish, and becoming the 
Jacksonian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Cambridge in 1939.  
91
  Cockcroft was introduced to war related work by Sir Henry Tizard in 1938 working on radar. From 
1940 to 1944 he was Chief Superintendant of the Air Defence Research and Development 
Establishment, a post which gave him some hands on experience on R&D organisation. In 1944 he 
became Director of the Atomic Energy Division of the National Research Council of Canada, taking 
charge of the Montreal Laboratory and supervising the construction of the heavy water reactor 
which was to be built in Chalk River. 
92
  His later involvement with Pugwash has obscured the fact that Cockcroft was a firm believer that 
Britain should pursue atomic research for weapons development independently of the US. In 1954, 
with the formation of the Atomic Energy Authority, an organisation independent of the normal civil 
service structure, he was the first member for research, while he retained the position of Director of 
AERE. was one of the very few distinguished FRS level academics – and a Nobel laureate at that – 
who stayed full time in government after the war. See Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 167 for the 
academics who stayed in government after the war. 
76 
 
establishment at Harwell, with little experience of London and 
Whitehall politics. This appointment was his only diversion from 
atomic energy research.93 He was certainly the first nuclear 
scientist to assume the senior scientific position in the Ministry of 
Defence;94 by all accounts he was not suited for Whitehall and he 
was not a successful successor to Sir Henry Tizard.95 Indeed his 
career is a clear indicator of the very differences between an 
expert government scientist, doing research and providing the 
relevant expertise to the policy makers, and the elite defence 
scientists, who were in Whitehall positions, as scientists, in 
coordinating and policy-making roles, which this thesis 
emphasises.96 
Tizard is peculiar in comparison with the elite defence 
scientists, having been educated at a Clarendon school and 
Oxford, characteristics more associated with civil service 
administrators than scientists.97 Three points need to be stressed 
in relation to his government career. The first is his limited 
experience in running research and development programmes, 
which was limited to a few years during the First World War. All his 
posts after that were in London, in headquarters and in committee 
rooms; his experience in that is undoubted and few if any 
contemporary scientists who were not career scientific civil 
                                                 
93
  A post which he held in conjunction with his post at AERE. 
94
  The next would be Sir William Cook as we will see in the next chapter. 
95
  His sympathetic biographers are very clear on this and in fact one of them, T. E. Allibone, in Cock 
ODNB does not even mention the assumption of the position; see Hartcup and Allibone, Cockcroft 
and the Atom. 
96
  After retirement Cockcroft returned to the academic world as the first Master of Churchill College, 
Cambridge. 
97
  Tizard's father was a Captain of the Royal Navy, a Fellow of the Royal Society and at the end of his 
distinguished career Hydrographer of the Admiralty. Henry Tizard was educated at Westminster and 
Magdalen College, Oxford, studying mathematics (first class in Mathematical Moderations) and 
chemistry. He studied chemistry under Sidgwick at Oxford and Nernst in Berlin. After a stint at the 
Royal Institution, in 1911 Tizard became a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford and a Lecturer in 
Natural Science. 
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servants could be found that could match him. Nevertheless, even 
though his qualities as a man of character and wisdom were never 
in doubt, his administrative and organisational skills may not have 
been at the level which his positions after the Second War would 
have demanded, a fact which may explain his constant misgivings 
with narrow minded Whitehall.98 This brings me to the second 
point. Tizard was not a career scientific civil servant. If one sees 
his official positions, it is obvious that he spent a roughly equal 
amount of time as an administrator of Colleges (Imperial and 
Magdalen, Oxford) as he did in official positions in Whitehall. 
Crucially, the movement from the one world to the other was not 
one-way, as we have seen with some of the elite defence scientists 
and Cockcroft – that is from the academy to government from 
which they eventually retired; rather, Tizard was every few years 
jumping from one world to the other. Although, no doubt, accepted 
by his peers in Whitehall, one possible explanation being his 
education and social standing as Chaston has argued, he was 
nevertheless as much an academic man as he was a government 
official and given his frustrations with Whitehall, it is tempting to 
consider him more of the former than the latter. Sir Henry Tizard 
should be thought of mainly as a scientific administrator with 
service in both the academy and government. In his own words he 
was “a scientist in and out of the civil service.”99     
Zuckerman‟s case is again different in more ways than one. 
Coming from South Africa100 by 1939 he had a successful 
                                                 
98
  Although undoubtedly an admirer of Tizard, Sir Frederick Brundrett noted in a letter to The Times 
(12 October 1959) that “[Tizard] was not a patient man nor did he excel in the fields of organisation 
and administration” adding wittingly that “consequently, life with him was always exciting.” 
99
  See Sir Henry Tizard, A Scientist in and out of the Civil Service, (London: Birckbeck College, 
1955). 
100
  Both sides of his family were late 19
th
 century Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. Zuckerman 
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academic career,101 an extended social life in the Bloomsbury 
circle and married into British nobility.102 The war found him at 
Combined Operations Headquarters as scientific adviser to Lord 
Mountbatten – a relationship which was to prove very important in 
the 1960‟s – studying the effects of bombing on humans and later 
buildings.103 Important to note regarding Zuckerman‟s war record 
as a scientist is the fact that he had nothing whatsoever to do with 
any scientific or technological research regarding the procurement 
of weapons. He was an operational research man, developing his 
expertise about bombing as the war continued.104 
At the end of the war he returned to academic life and there 
is every reason that he should be thought of mainly as an 
                                                                                                                                            
graduated from the South African College School and the University of Cape Town where he 
entered as a medical student, before he came to England to complete his medical studies at 
University College Hospital.  
101
  He became a demonstrator and lecturer in Le Gros Clark‟s department of Human Anatomy at 
Oxford in 1934 and was offered the Chair of Anatomy at Birmingham in 1939. 
102
  His social life proved very important indeed since this is how he met his wife, Lady Joan Rufus 
Isaacs, daughter of the second marquess of Reading and the Hon. Eva Violet (née) Mond, who, 
according to Philip Ziegler “supported her husband's career, entertaining politicians and royalty.” 
Ziegler also comments that both sides of Zuckerman‟s wife‟s family were “wealthy and 
politicised... prominent in liberal Jewry”; see Zuck.Bio.Mem. Lady Zuckerman‟s father was a 
barrister and a Conservative politician, being Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (1951-1953) and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1953-1957). A recent 
analysis of Zuckerman‟s early career, which focuses on the scientific side is Jonathan Burt, “Solly 
Zuckerman: the Making of a Primatological career in Britain, 1925-1945”, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol. 37 (2006), pp. 295-310. 
103
  A key figure in Zuckerman‟s early life was the radical scientist J. D. Bernal, being a co-author of 
the anonymous Penguin special Science in War (Harmondswarth: Penguin, 1940). The pamphlet 
was the product of many writers, members of the dining club Tots and Quots, which Zuckerman had 
started in 1933 and resurrected with the prospect of war in the late 1930‟s. Co-authors included E. J. 
Carter (architect), J. G. Crowther (journalist-author), Cyril Darlington (geneticist), W. K. Slater 
(chemist Ministry of Agriculture official), Conrad Waddington (geneticist and embryologist), J. Z. 
Young (zoologist). Bernal was the person who introduced him to Mountbatten. See Ralph J. 
Desmarais, „Tots and Quots (act. 1931–1946)‟, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online 
edn, Oxford University Press, 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/view/theme/95704, accessed 20 Nov 2009]. 
To place the book‟s argument‟s in context see Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 318. 
104
  His record during the war was marked by his support of precision bombing of the transportation 
systems in France and the Lower Countries preceding the Allied invasion and against the 
continuation of area bombing in the heart of Germany. The important thing to remember from this 
involvement is, as Stephen Garrett has stressed, that Zuckerman‟s opposition to area bombing was 
purely on utilitarian terms, seeing “little reason for questioning the Transportation Plan on the 
grounds of its possible effect on civilians... it was calculations of pure military efficiency that drove 
his thinking.” Stephen A. Garrett, Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of 
German Cities (New York: St Martin‟s Press, 1996), p. 68-71. 
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academic, who at some point found himself working for the 
government. True, from 1945 until 1960, “he was to serve… on 
every Whitehall committee in which issues of scientific importance 
were discussed… the list [of which] could be almost interminable,” 
advising on issues which had very little if nothing to do with his 
scientific credentials.105 There should be little doubt that this 
government related work gave Zuckerman a very useful 
experience in the workings of Whitehall, but his main identity was 
that of Professor of Anatomy at Birmingham, continuing to publish 
academic papers, organising research teams at the university and 
heading an academic department. It should also be noted that 
even his most important government contribution during this 
period, that of deputy chairman of the Advisory Council on 
Scientific Policy from 1950 onwards, gave him only a glimpse of 
what was going on in the government‟s research and development 
establishments and related issues of policy, certainly in the field of 
defence.106  
Even when in 1960 he went full time in government, turning 
from an amateur to a professional, to use his own words, he 
insisted on retaining his chair in Birmingham without pay;107 he 
was still, remained so, and wanted to be thought of as Professor 
                                                 
105
  Zuck.ODNB Ziegler lists: agricultural resources, fuel and power, natural resources, scientific 
manpower. 
106
  It is during this period and, continuing from his pre-war record, that Zuckerman was a very strong 
proponent of more science, that is more of scientific method, and scientists in government. The only 
scholar to have studied Zuckerman‟s views has, I think misleadingly, attributed them to a deep 
moral and intellectual dilemma, and although recognises different approaches in Zuckerman‟s 
thinking, he fails to recognise the fact that the shift from the view of „more science and scientists in 
government‟ to „more rational thinking in government‟ coincided with Zuckerman‟s advancement in 
Whitehall. The deeper he was involved with matters of defence, the more he realised that scientists 
were not only present but very influential, as this thesis will show, and therefore he shifted the focus 
of support to his views to rationality and not science. He was a zoologist after all. 
107
 In Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles, he gives the title of the section of the book dealing with 
his committee work as „an amateur in Whitehall‟ and the one dealing with the Ministry of Defence 
as „a professional in Whitehall‟; see pp. vii and viii for the titles of the sections and p. 191 regarding 
his professorship. 
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Sir Solly Zuckerman.108 Despite his experience in Whitehall 
committees, Zuckerman was a stranger to the government defence 
scientific machine, both at the level of research and development 
in government establishments and at the level of policy making in 
Whitehall. He was very much a jack-of-all-trades, who through his 
social and political contacts found himself at the senior defence 
R&D post109 and later the Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
Government, under the Premiership of Harold Wilson.110 
 
2.4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
If one wanted to take a representative case of an elite defence 
scientist they would look something like the following. He would be 
almost definitely from a public or a grammar school, with a good 
chance of having attended Oxbridge, most likely Cambridge, at 
some level later on. He would be more likely to have had some 
kind of career, the academia being the most likely candidate, 
before entering government service, but then he would have 
stayed permanently as a scientific civil servant; he would be more 
likely than not to have been influenced in his choice by the 
outbreak of the Second World War. There is no way to say in which 
department he would have found himself, but the chances are very 
                                                 
108
  It is indicative of my point that Zuckerman‟s Who’s Who entry lists him as: Sands Cox Professor of 
Anatomy, University of Birmingham, 1943-68, then Prof. Emeritus; Professor-at-Large, University 
of East Anglia, 1969-74, then Prof. Emeritus. 
109
  There is little doubt that Lord Mountbatten, the new Chief of the Defence Staff, played an important 
role in the appointment and it is not by chance that their relationship was later dubbed as the „Zuck-
Batten Axis‟. 
110
  In 1964, after refusing a ministerial post in the new Labour government of Harold Wilson, he took, 
in addition to his post at the MoD, the position of Chief Scientific Adviser to the Cabinet and head 
of the civil service scientific staff. As Philip Ziegler notes, this post should definitely be seen as a 
promotion; but at the same time, and coupled with his overwhelming personality, the dual post 
created problems with Denis Healy, the Secretary of State for Defence and led to Zuckerman‟s 
resignation from the Ministry of Defence in 1966. He officially retired from public duty in 1971 and 
was created a life peer. 
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strong that he would have stayed under the department he initially 
entered for the duration of his career. He would be in his fifties or 
maybe late forties when he reached a top position, with about 
twenty years of government service, but depending on his age of 
entrance and his previous career. The likelihood is that he would 
retire from his initial top position and, if he pursued some form of 
career after that, it would be most likely an industrial post. He 
would most likely become a fellow of a learned society and 
awarded a state honour, with a good chance of gaining a 
knighthood. The chances of reaching an even more senior 
scientific post during his career would not be good. 
The data regarding school and university attendance of the 
highest ranking scientific civil servants of the first half of the Cold 
War period point to a high degree of social homogeneity for the 
group. But school and university attendance cannot be a criterion 
for a strong conclusion. As Theakston and Fry have stressed in 
their prosopography of Permanent Secretaries in the 20th century, 
officials “usually spent longer being professional Whitehall 
bureaucrats than... school-boys or undergraduates.”111 Applying 
this line of thinking to elite defence scientists, the shared career 
paths and the corresponding experiences of the group noted 
above reinforce the conclusion of a high degree of homogeneity for 
the group, especially since their government careers would 
assimilate in the group even the individuals who did not share the 
educational experiences of the majority.112  
                                                 
111
  Theakston and Fry, “Permanent Secretaries.” 
112
  The homogeneity of the group refers to their professional and social characteristics inside a vast 
bureaucracy; they were the top defence scientists in Whitehall. This feeling would have been 
reinforced with the formation of a unified scientific civil service in the immediate post-war period, 
of which these the members of the group were the highest ranking officials, and also with the 
formation of the Defence Research Policy Committee, which brought the top scientific officials of 
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Taking Theakston and Fry‟s argument about the importance 
of the characteristics of one‟s professional career and not just the 
educational background is also important in order to place the top 
government scientists in relation to both the elite academic 
scientists and the top administrators. Undoubtedly, they had a 
number of characteristics in common with both these groups, 
especially their participation in learned societies, membership in 
gentlemen‟s clubs and the state honours they received. These 
characteristics point towards thinking of them as part of the top 
echelons of post-war British social elite. As a group they were 
without doubt part of the establishment. But, as we have seen, 
these social characteristics were combined with career paths and 
corresponding experiences shared only between them and with 
which individuals from the other two social groups could not have 
related. Thus, as a group, the elite defence scientists were distinct 
both in relation to the elite of the academic scientific community 
and to the top of the administrative civil service. 
Edgerton has noted the importance of the large number of 
technical staff in government regarding our perceptions of the 20th 
century British state in general.113 This chapter went a step deeper 
by focusing on the field of defence and on the highest ranking 
scientists there. It clearly established that they were 
overwhelmingly career scientific civil servants. With an eye on the 
analysis of the role of scientists in the formulation of British 
defence policy, which will follow in later chapters, the purpose was 
on the one hand to identify  and on the other hand to analyse who 
                                                                                                                                            
the war related departments in one body. More on the Defence Research Policy Committee in 
chapter 4. 
113
  Edgerton, Warfare State, especially ch. 4. 
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the scientists who could play important roles were.114 The twenty 
individuals identified and studied above have so far been invisible 
in the literature, though unjustifiably so, since these were the main 
officials responsible for the bulk of government controlled research 
and development, while also contributing, at varying levels, in the 
formulation of government policy, certainly regarding R&D. They 
formed the main core of the post-war British government‟s in-
house scientific force, which was frequently augmented, again at 
various levels, by outside contributions from academic and 
industrial specialists. The twenty individuals of this chapter, with 
the social characteristics identified above, were the most important 
scientific members of the post-war military-industrial-scientific 
complex of the British warfare state and their profile is essential in 
understanding the latter. 
The literature has not only neglected these government 
scientists, but it has focused on the ones I termed, and 
demonstrated why they should be thought of this way, as the 
outsiders, especially Tizard and Zuckerman, equating the picture of 
a government scientist with that of the academic who goes to 
government fighting the ignorance of an un-scientific Whitehall.115 
While both Tizard and Zuckerman were undoubtedly important in 
the post-war period, they were both a-typical as this chapter has 
shown. Although they shared a number of similar characteristics of 
a social nature with the state‟s permanent scientific officials, their 
professional careers stand, at different degrees, as markedly out of 
the norm. This makes them the exceptions to what this chapter has 
                                                 
114
  Which individual scientists among the twenty played influential roles will be shown and analysed in 
later chapters. 
115
  Not neglecting of course the general mapping of scientific Whitehall offered in Edgerton, Warfare 
State, which was the starting point for the analysis in this chapter. 
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painted as the image of high level government scientists, with their 
shared career patterns and experiences and the corresponding 
accumulated expertise. To put it somewhat crudely: the immediate 
association of the term „high level government scientist‟ should be 
with a Robert Cockburn or a Hayne Constant and not with Tizard 
or Zuckerman.116 The same applies when thinking about the 
important officials in relation to defence in post-war Britain; the 
politicians and the military and administrative officials of the war 
related departments are well known and there are a number of 
prosopographical studies of the latter. In the post-war period there 
was a third group of state servants sitting at the top tables of 
government and these were the twenty individuals analysed in this 
chapter. They were the British warfare state‟s basic core of 
research and development expertise.117 It is from this group of 
people that the two protagonists of this thesis, Brundrett and Cook, 
were coming from and to these two this thesis will now turn.  
 
  
                                                 
116
  To this point one could counter-argue that Tizard and Zuckerman might not have been typical, but 
they were certainly more influential and therefore more important than the group of government 
scientists profiled here. The full answer to this counter-argument lies at the heart of the chapters that 
follow in this thesis, which will clearly show the level of influences of both Tizard and Zuckerman 
as largely overstated and in need of important qualifications; these qualifications include the 
important point that even when Tizard and Zuckerman were influential this was very much 
connected with the support that they received from members of the elite defence scientists, 
especially Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook. 
117
  And not simply experts on a specific technical research subject 
Chapter III 
 
The Lives and Careers of  
Sir Frederick Brundrett and Sir William Cook 
 
3.1 – Introduction  
 
This chapter will concentrate on the lives and careers of the two 
elite defence scientists who held the highest available positions in 
the post-war Ministry of Defence: Sir Frederick Brundrett, who was 
deputy Chief for two years and then Chief Scientific Adviser from 
1952 to December 1959; and Sir William Cook, who was Deputy 
Chief Scientific Adviser from 1964 to 1966 when he succeeded 
Zuckerman as the scientific member of the Defence Board to 
become, in 1967-8, Chief Adviser (Projects and Research), until 
his retirement in 1970. Even if one judges solely by the positions 
they held, they were both important individuals in the state 
machinery; their impact on policy was significant.  In this chapter I 
profile them as much as the public record and the private nature of 
their lives allows.1 At the same time, the detailed study of their lives 
will give a useful glance at what scientific civil servants did during 
their careers in government and how they managed to rise in the 
hierarchy.2  
                                                 
1
   Unfortunately Cook did not leave any personal archive and it proved impossible to trace a member 
of his family. Regarding Brundrett, his brother left some papers of the government scientist at that 
invaluable place for any scholar of government and science, the Churchill Archives, at Churchill 
College, Cambridge. The papers consist mainly of drafts of lectures that Brundrett gave in public 
and articles the few articles he had published while alive. The only member of Brundrett‟s family 
whom I managed to get in touch with, was not willing, in the end to meet with me or give me 
information in any other way about him.  
2
   Keeping always in mind that, regarding the level they reached, the careers of Brundrett and Cook 
were not typical. 
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Their careers exemplify two general points. First is the 
obvious fact that apart from a good education and ability in 
scientific and technological research, indispensible were the 
organisational qualities that the two men definitely had in matters 
of R&D and, of course, the ability to be good Whitehall operators 
and the existence of senior patron-figures during their careers.  
Second, and more important, is that World War 2 gave both 
the chance to prove themselves under a stressful situation and 
indeed for both the war made the difference, especially compared 
to colleagues of an equal status at the same departments as the 
two. So far the bulk of the literature has associated the war with 
two things: the introduction of academics in various government 
roles;3 and the contribution of the war to the advancement of post-
war academic research.4 But the war was very important, indeed 
most important, for the careers of government scientists as well.5 It 
was their chance to show what they were capable of. For the total 
of the government research corps it meant recognition which took 
the form of the creation of the Scientific Civil Service. Individually, 
for Brundrett this was his great moment; for Cook it created a good 
name, which gave him chances for advancement later on. Each 
had a niche: for Brundrett it was no doubt his war effort, which 
established him as an effective inter-service coordinator, a fame on 
which he capitalised and confirmed later in his career. For Cook it 
was definitely his decisive involvement with the British warlike and 
civil nuclear programmes. 
 
 
                                                 
3
   See for example Hennessy, Whitehall. 
4
   See for example de Chadarevian, Designs for Life. 
5
   As Edgerton, Warfare State has shown for the scientific civil service in total. 
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3.2 – Sir Frederick Brundrett 
 
3.2.1 – Early Life 
 
Frederick Brundrett was born on 24 November 1894, the first of 
eleven children of Walter and Ada (née Richardson) Brundrett. He 
seems to have come from a well off middle-class background, a 
fact obvious from his father‟s occupation – general secretary and 
accountant of the Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron and Coal Company, one of 
the main such companies in Wales – and most importantly from 
Brundrett‟s education: he attended a public school.6  
Rossall School – in Fleetwood, Lancashire – was a public 
school of some distinction. Among its graduates are numerous civil 
servants, military people and some notable engineers and 
scientists.7 Although in the history of the school, the Headmaster 
from 1908 to 1932 notes that “Mathematics has never been 
regarded as Rossall‟s „strong suit,‟” the two chief Mathematical 
masters, while Brundrett was at the school, were both able 
mathematicians.8 Brundrett‟s performance at Rossall must have 
been of considerable distinction since he won a scholarship to 
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge in 1913.9 In Brundrett‟s year, 
                                                 
6
   Richard Powell, „Brundrett, Sir Frederick (1894–1974)‟, rev., Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 (from now on ODNB Brundrett). 
7
   See W. Furness (ed.), The Centenary History of Rossall School. (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1945), 
pp. 338-351. It is notable that the number of civil servants in the Empire is notably strong. In 1945, 
the year of the history‟s publication, Rossall graduates included several MP‟s, a number of top and 
higher Service people and quite a few Professors in a number of Universities and disciplines.    
8
   Furness, Centenary History, p. 96. J. H. S. Bailey was a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society 
and was the author of Elementary Analytical Conics (1936) and W. F. Bushel became president of 
the Mathematical Association in 1946. They both became Headmasters of schools in their later 
careers (Bailey became Headmaster of Lancaster Royal Grammar School and Bailey of 
Birkenhead), careers which were notable enough to result in Who’s Who entries;  
9
   Either an Open or a Mathematical Scholarship. See the biographical note in the Journal of Royal 
Naval Scientific Service (from now on JRNSS) Vol. 2 No. 3 (May 1947), p. 127. The centenary 
history of his school mentions Brundrett as receiving a Mathematical Scholarship for Sidney 
Sussex; see Furness, Rossall School, p. 104. 
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for example, there was one more Rossall graduate who won a 
Mathematical Scholarship to Cambridge.10 
Attending Cambridge was an important step for any young 
man in the 1910‟s. Brundrett studied mathematics with the 
intention of taking later the exams to enter the Administrative Class 
of the Civil Service.11 His obtaining a first class at part one of the 
mathematical tripos in 1914 and becoming a Wrangler in part two 
in 191612 would undoubtedly have helped him a great deal towards 
his goal, but instead young Frederick decided to join the Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve[‟s wireless branch] and contribute to his 
country‟s war effort.13 
 
3.2.2 – Early Career: World War I and the Inter-War Period 
 
In later life Brundrett made a case about how he was „discovered‟ 
as a Wrangler and then transferred to work of a kind that would 
take advantage of his scientific credentials.14 According to his 
account, after training as a wireless operator at Crystal Palace – 
the Navy‟s training location for the RNVR – he was drafted for 
service in a whaler which would operate as a Patrol Craft in the 
Northern Waters. Luckily enough he never went to sea because of 
                                                 
10
  It is not possible to know exactly what the teaching of mathematics at Rossall consisted of, the only 
clue being that the school later developed a strong astronomical tradition. The school‟s strongest 
year in mathematics was 1924, under the Mathematics master George Bowen. See Furness, 
Centenary History, pp. 96 and 110-111 
11
   See a small biographical note by Brundrett intended as part of speech on „Science in the State‟ (15 
January 1951) in BRUN 1/1. Since Brundrett is his own source, the fact that he wanted to become 
an Administrative Civil Servant should not be taken at face value. 
12
   The fact that he became a Wrangler is mentioned in both the history of Rossall School and, of 
course, in the Times; see Furness, Centenary History, p. 106 and The Times, 16/6/1916, p. 10. There 
were 10 more Wranglers in the same year. 
13
   See ODNB Brundrett and BRUN 1/1. In the JRNSS entry it is stated that Brundrett entered as an 
ordinary seaman.  
14
   See BRUN1/1: „Science in the State‟ and JRNSS Vol.2 No. 3 (May 1947), p. 127-8.  
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an infectious disease which kept him in three months‟ isolation.15 
There, in his own words, “someone in authority discovered I was a 
Wrangler” and arranged for him to be transferred to the Wireless 
Experimental Department at HMS Vernon, in Portsmouth, as a 
mathematical assistant to H. A. Madge.16  
The Navy had started to perform research on wireless 
telegraphy well before the First World War, with the establishment 
of a Wireless Telegraphy Branch in 1907. An established 
organisation on the scientific/experimental, training and operational 
level was well under way before the war started and indeed there 
was a pool of expertise from which the Navy could draw, for both 
operators of wireless telegraphy apparatus and engineers, in 
collaboration with the Post Office and the Marconi Company.17 H. 
A. Madge, Brundrett‟s first boss, himself, who is considered to be 
the first „Government scientist‟, was the head of the Wireless 
Section of HMS Vernon since 1904, after being transferred from 
Marconi.18 Madge‟s title at this point appears to be „Civilian-in-
Charge‟ which implies that he was typically under the 
„Experimental Commander‟, at this point Commander F.C.A. 
Ogilvy.19 Madge was joined in 1908 by another Trinity College, 
                                                 
15
   Brundrett had contracted mumps 
16
   See BRUN 1/1: „Science in the State‟ p. 9 
17
   On the adoption of Wireless Telegraphy by the Royal Navy see A.J.L. Blond Technology and 
tradition: wireless telegraphy and the Royal Navy 1895-1920, unpublished PhD thesis, Lancaster, 
1993; for the point I‟m making see chapter 3, especially 154-7, 161 and 168-9; see also ADM 
116/1454. 
18
   Madge was a Cambridge man (Trinity College) which suggests a smooth cooperation with 
Brundrett; he left government service right after the end of the war to become a missionary. See 
Willem Hackman, „Sonar, Wireless Telegraphy and the Royal Navy: Scientific Development in a 
military context, 1890-1939‟ in Nicolaas A. Rupke (ed.), Science, Politics and the Public Good: 
Essays in Honour of Margaret Gowing. (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1988) pp. 90-118, at 
p. 95. The characterisation „first government scientist‟ means the first civilian scientist. See also 
Guy Hartcup, The War of Invention: Scientific Developments, 1914-18. (London: Brassey‟s, 1988), 
p. 14-15. 
19
   See J. F. Coales, “The Origins and Development of Radar in the Royal Navy, 1935-35 with 
Particular Reference to Decimetric Gunnery Equipments” in F. A. Kingsley (ed.), The Development 
of Radar Equipments for the Royal Navy, 1935-45. (Basingstoke: Macmillan for the Naval radar 
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Cambridge man, Carl Glen-Bott, who is appropriately considered 
as the second government scientist, and a third one in 1913-4, B. 
S. Gossling, who left after the war to join GEC Labs.20 Although 
there is some evidence that his establishment was understaffed, it 
is also true that by 1917, the year that Brundrett joined Vernon, the 
Wireless section had 22 technical staff, ending up with 30 
engineers when it was set up as a department (HM Signal School) 
in 1919.21 Even more important to note is that the Signal School 
had two sections that were related to technical research and 
development. One was the Engineering department under Madge 
(and after 1921 under H. Morris-Airey) and an Experimental 
Department, with its own Superintending Scientist, G. Shearing.22 
Having been commissioned Lieutenant RNVR in September 1917 
and, working under Madge, the only thing known about Brundrett‟s 
work during the war is that he concentrated on underwater 
communications with submarines.23  
With the end of the war Brundrett decided to stay in the newly 
set up Wireless Experimental Department at HM Signal School, 
                                                                                                                                            
Trust, 1995), pp. 5-66, at p. 6. Professor Coales CBE, F Eng, FRS was a Cambridge graduate who 
was at the Admiralty from 1927 until the end of the war, becoming Professor of Electrical 
Engineering (later Emeritus Engineering) at Cambridge. 
20
   Wilfred S. Peake joined as a design assistant coming from the University of London and the 
Cambridge Scientific Instruments Company, in 1911. See Hackmann, „Sonar, Wireless Telegraphy 
and the Navy‟ pp. 96-97. 
21
   See Hartcup, The War of Invention, p. 128 and ADM 1/8409/17 as his evidence; in a report of 
August  1913 on „changes of the Wireless Staff and Equipment of HMS Vernon‟ it is described that 
Madge is asking for an extra assistant, not more staff, „who should be a mathematician and have 
experience of scientific work‟.  On the number of staff see J. F. Coales and J. D. S. Rawlinson „The 
development of UK naval radar‟ in Russell Burns (ed.), Radar Development to 1945. (London: 
Peter Peregrins Ltd for the Institute of Electrical Engineers, 1988), pp. 53-96, at 53 and 89. See also 
Barrie Kent, Signal: A History of Signalling in the Royal Navy. (Hampshire: Hyden House, 1993), 
p. 79, who gives the number of „civilian technical staff‟ to be 35 when (later Admiral of the Fleet 
Sir) James Somerville became the Experimental commander in 1918. 
22
   Although it is not exactly clear whether the two were separate entities as it appears from the chart or 
the Experimental Department was under Principal Engineer. See Coales, “Origins and Development 
of Radar”, p. 7 and the organisational chart on p. 8. 
23
   See ODNB Brundrett.  
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being appointed Engineer Grade III.24 It has not been possible to 
trace what specific work Brundrett was engaged in, but it has been 
suggested that what distinguished him was not his contribution to 
scientific developments but the application of already developed 
knowledge to making new types of equipment.25 Indeed, it has 
been proved impossible to connect him specifically with any 
scientific or other development from the surviving reports of the 
Signal School, during his period there.26 He does appear to have 
been involved with mathematical work relating to the Leader cable, 
electrode signalling and aerial design. According to his ODNB 
biographer Sir Richard Powell, Brundrett‟s most exceptional work 
during his years at the Signal School was “the detailed 
organisation of the early world-wide trials in [Short Waves]… and 
the analysis of the results – work which led to the adoption of the 
Naval Short Wave Policy.”27 Brundrett appears to have also been 
responsible for the administration of the Experimental Department 
at the Signal School and he seems to have been handling staff 
matters as well.28 Brundrett also became „The Secretary,‟ which 
                                                 
24
   The fact that he chose to stay as an engineer in the Civil Service casts some doubt to his claim that 
his intention after leaving Cambridge was to join the Administrative Civil Service, since it would 
have almost impossible for him to achieve this through the scientific side. 
25
   Ibid. Brundrett described himself as „the worst circuit engineer who ever joined the Royal Naval 
Scientific Service‟. The ODNB entry is written by Sir Richard Powell, who was the Permanent 
Secretary at the Ministry of Defence while Brundrett was Chief Scientific Adviser there, so there is 
good reason to consider the quote as reliable. A. B. Wood in his history of science in the Navy for 
the JRNSS published in 1965, mentions Brundrett, as one of the „other Scientific and Technical 
Staff‟ at the Signal School as late as 1936, which indicates that he was not considered a 
distinguished member of the group; this indication should be treated with caution since Brundrett 
seems to have displeased Wood, while Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service. See later, 
Section 3.2.4. 
26
   See ADM 186/769-792. This is not that strange, since most the reports don‟t mention names of 
individual researchers. In this, Cook‟s case, which will be examined later, is an exception to the 
rule. The fact that Brundrett hasn‟t filed for any patent, or written a paper that survives, suggests not 
that he was not a good researcher/experimenter; rather that he was not as exceptional as Cook. 
27
   See ODNB Brundrett.  The same is stated in Brundrett‟s biographical note in the JRNSS Vol. 2, No. 
3, p. 128. 
28
   Coales, “Origins and Development of Radar” p. 15. One extra hint that this is probably the case 
comes from Brundrett himself, if he is to be believed, and again there is little reason not to be; in 
reviewing one of the volumes of the official histories of the Second World War and trying to present 
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appears to have meant that he was head of the civilian staff.29 
There is little reason to doubt this information since, by 1935-6, 
Brundrett was Assistant to Shearing, the Superintending 
Scientist.30 While at the Signal School he obviously created quite 
an impression as an administrator, since he has been 
characterised as “„the power behind the throne‟ in the Experimental 
Department of Signal School” from the early 1920‟s.31 There is little 
doubt that the above achievements, which must have required 
organisational skills, were factors which led to Brundrett going in 
1937 to the Admiralty, as Principal Scientific Officer at the 
Department of Scientific Research and Experiment at Admiralty 
Headquarters. 
The Department of Scientific Research and Experiment 
(DSRE) was in many ways a result of the First World War, coming 
out of the Board of Invention and Research (BIR).32 It was briefly 
named the Department of Experiments and Research and in 
December 1919 finally took the name that was to carry it to the end 
of the Second World War.33 Its first Director (DSR) was F. E. (later 
Sir Frank) Smith, who came from the National Physical Laboratory, 
and later became Secretary of the Department of Scientific and 
                                                                                                                                            
the case of the Navy‟s contribution, which he judges lacks from the book, Brundrett says that due 
credit should be given to Charles Wright for preaching „the gospel that that the side with the 
shortest wave-length would win the next war.‟ Sir Frederick Brundrett, „Science and the Armed 
Services in the Second World War‟ (review of H. M. Postan et al., Design and Development of 
Weapons. London: HMSO, 1964), Nature, Vol. 206, No. 4985 (May 15, 1965), pp. 651-2. See also 
Ronald W. Clark, The Rise of the Boffins, (London: Phoenix House, 1962), p. 72; This is the only 
reference in the secondary literature I have found that Brundrett was responsible for staff matters at 
the Signal School. 
29
   This is reported in Kent, Signal!, pp. 81-82, but it‟s not clear when this happened exactly. Kent 
notes that Brundrett took over from George Shearing and gave the post to Cecil Evershead and 
Cecil Horton. A nice anecdote is provided in pp. 264-5 of the book. 
30
   Coales, “Origins and Development of Radar” p. 13. According to Coal this gave him access to the 
„Most Secret‟ research on radar carried at the time at the Signal School.  
31
   Ibid. p. 30. 
32
   On the BIR see R. Macleod and K. Andrews, „Scientific advice in the War at Sea, 1915-1917: the 
Board of Invention and Research‟ Journal of Contemporary History.1971; 6: 3-40. 
33
   See Willem Hackmann, Seek and Strike: Sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal Navy, 1914-
54. (London: HMSO, 1984), pp. 35-7, 100 and 109-112. 
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Industrial Research.34 Smith was succeeded by C. V. Drysdale, 
who had been Superintendent of the Admiralty Research 
Laboratory, same as his successor and the last DSR, C. S. (later 
Sir Charles) Wright.35 The official record is not clear as to what 
exactly Brundrett‟s responsibilities at the DSRE were, but one 
source has him as being “moved to DSR headquarters…to recruit 
scientists and engineers, and allocate them to the most 
appropriate naval establishments.”36  
 
3.2.3 - World War II 
 
Brundrett‟s transfer to the DSRE took place before the beginning of 
the war. His rise in grade had been rather quick, though not 
exceptionally so, but during the war it developed even more 
rapidly. This last point is illuminated if one compares and contrasts 
Brundrett‟s rise with that of John Buckingham, already a member 
at the DSRE team from the 1920‟s. In 1938, the first year that 
Brundrett appears in the Civil Service Yearbook as a member of 
the DSRE, he had the rank of Principal Scientific Officer, while 
Buckingham was already Deputy Director of Scientific Research to 
C. S. Wright. In 1940 Brundrett became Superintending Scientist, 
appearing third in the list after Wright and Buckingham, and with a 
lower salary than both, and in 1941 he became Assistant Director, 
                                                 
34
   Sir Frank Edward Smith was a graduate of the Royal College of Science and had joined NPL from 
its creation in 1900, working in the physics department under Sir Richard Glazebrook; see the 
memoir by Charles F. Goodeve in the Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 
18. (Nov. 1972), pp. 525-548. (He is not to be confused with Sir Frank Ewart Smith, an ICI 
engineer who did government work during the 2
nd
 World War, also an FRS). 
35
   On Drysdale see the entry in the ODNB. On Sir Charles Wright see JRNSS, Vol. 1, No. 7 (Sep. 
1946). On the DSR‟s in all three Services during the interwar period see Edgerton, Warfare State, 
pp. 129-131. 
36
   Coales, “Origins and Development of Radar” p. 30. Coales mentions seven people who went to the 
Signal School following Brundrett‟s recruitment efforts. This is important, since staff recruitment 
was one of the areas where Brundrett made his reputation in during the WWII. 
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earning the same as Buckingham who remained Deputy DSR.37 
Two years later Brundrett became Deputy DSR himself, at 
Buckingham‟s side and with the end of the war he assumed the 
position of acting DSR at Wright‟s absence. When finally in 1947 
Sir Charles Wright officially retired from service, Brundrett 
assumed his place as Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, 
while Buckingham stayed behind as a Chief Scientific Officer.38 
One of Brundrett‟s main contributions during the war appears 
to have been his involvement with the development of electronic 
valves.39 During the inter-war period valves were developed in a 
number of Government establishments. Apart from the Admiralty, 
the Air Ministry had a considerable research programme on the 
field,40 but crucially the Admiralty had the capacity to expand its 
work to include research in the lines of interest to the Air Ministry, 
as early as 1932.41 The establishment responsible in the Admiralty 
for research in valves was the Signal School and it had managed 
to establish a working relationship with the General Electric 
Company for the development of “valves and circuits for 
communications work on waves below 1 meter” and generally for 
                                                 
37
   See the Imperial Calendar and Civil Service Yearbook, for the relevant years. The salary being the 
same implies that the two men had reached the same status within the Civil Service hierarchy. On 
this point see also later the discussion about Brundrett becoming Deputy to Tizard in the DRPC in 
section 3.2.5. 
38
   Ibid, for the relevant years.  This does not mean to imply that Buckingham‟s contribution to the war 
effort was not significant, but that Brundrett left an exceptional impression to Wright and others at 
the Admiralty, especially on the organisational aspect; I have found no reason to believe that there 
were „outside influences‟ that resulted in Brundrett taking over the post of CRNSS; although it 
cannot be ruled out as possibility. This promotion was by no means certain and in fact Brundrett 
expressed doubt about his position after the war as late as July 1943. On this see Robert Clayton 
and Joan Algar (eds.), A Scientist’s War: the War Diary of Sir Clifford Paterson, 1939-45. (London; 
Peregrinus and Science Museum, 1991), pp. 388, 392. 
39
   Valves were needed for a number of functions, most notably for the development of radar.  
40
   See E. B. Callick, Metres to Microwaves: British Development of Active Components for Radar 
Systems, 1937 to 1944. (London: Peregrinus and IEE, 1990), p. 1-3 and Hartcup, The Challenge of 
War, p. 54-55. 
41
   See AVIA 15/648, paper from SRE Department to DCD Air Ministry on the history of Valve Co-
ordination, 21/3/1940.  
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valves for special purposes.42 Thus, when the need arose for the 
coordination of all work on electronic valves, especially because of 
the pressure from needs for radar development, the Admiralty was 
well placed to assume responsibility for this.  
The Coordination of Valve Development (CVD) was 
exercised through the CVD Policy Committee, under which a 
number of permanent and ad hoc committees were functioning.43 
The Committee was formally presided over by DSR Admiralty, but 
as we shall see Brundrett assumed an increasingly important, 
mainly behind the scenes, role.44 Indeed it was Brundrett who 
presented to the Policy Committee the case for DSR Admiralty 
taking over the coordination of valve research and experimental 
development, as well as the supply coordination, at its third 
meeting, in March 1940.45 The motion did not go through without 
opposition from the Air Ministry; indeed the Air Ministry 
representative, L. S. Harley wrote an internal Air Ministry memo on 
the matter, but the issue seems to have been decided outside the 
Committee, with Harley giving preliminary Air Ministry consent at 
the 4th meeting and confirming this at the 5th, in July 1940.46 
Brundrett‟s behind the scene role can be observed at the 
meetings of the CVD policy committee. The issues he contributed 
to and his direction was called upon had to do mainly with: the 
allocation of work to different government and outside 
                                                 
42
   Ibid. See also J. D. Scott and R. Hughes, The Administration of War Production, (London: HMSO, 
1955) p. 115, who put the date back to 1930.  
43
   See Callick, Metres to Microwaves, pp. 10-11. 
44
   Given the „behind the scenes‟ nature of Brundrett‟s role, the official record of the meetings provides 
only glimpses to this.  
45
   AVIA 15/648, minutes of 3
rd
 meeting of the CVD Policy Committee, 27/3/1940. The CVD Policy 
Committee was the descendant of the initial Committee coordinating policy between the Admiralty, 
represented by the Signal School, and the GEC Laboratories.  
46
   AVIA 15/648, memo by Harley, 29/3/1940 and AP/RDC to DDCD1 (Harley) 25/4/1940; and AVIA 
15/649, CVD Policy Committee, minutes of the 4
th
 meeting, 27/5/1940 and 5
th
 meeting, 22/7/1940. 
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establishments; the allocation of personnel; and the important 
matter of the pre-production of valves. Although I haven‟t been 
able to locate official sources of the meetings regarding pre-
production, their importance can be seen from the war diaries of C. 
C. (later Sir Clifford) Paterson of the General Electric Company 
(GEC).47 The pre-production issue involved the development of 
new valves at GEC Labs up to the level of first production, so that 
the Services could test them at a very early stage, thus making it 
easier to establish their value and approve them or not for full 
development.48 This process was controlled in an executive 
capacity by Brundrett and Harley (Air Ministry), in regular meetings 
with Paterson, which started in August 1941 and took place 
throughout the war.49 
A second notable contribution by Brundrett to the war effort 
concerned the allocation of suitable scientists and engineers to 
establishments for research work. Again here the official record is 
patchy but we do know that his efforts regarding personnel 
recruitment and allocation were extended to more places than the 
Admiralty. According to Maurice Hankey, “Mr Brundrett of the 
Admiralty… has considerable contacts with the Universities and 
Technical Colleges, and… has rendered great assistance in finding 
high-grade personnel for other Departments besides his own.”50 
                                                 
47
   See Clayton and Algar (eds), A Scientist’s War, passim.  
48
   Hartcup, The Challenge of War, p. 67. The information given by Hartcup should be treated with 
caution since they are very similar to the history of CVD as presented by Brundrett himself, who of 
course did not mention his own contribution and role, but referred to the „Admiralty‟. See 
Brundrett, „Science and the Armed Services in the Second World War‟, p. 651. 
49
   Clayton and Algar (eds), A Scientist’s War, pp. 140, 145 and passim. Paterson says that the initiative 
for the small committee was his and he noted from quite early that “there is a real advantage in 
bringing the Brundrett and Harley combination into our confidence” (11 Nov. 1941), in ibid, p. 174. 
The fact that Brundrett and Paterson new each other well before the preproduction meetings, 
suggests that they could communicate quite well. Indeed the diaries are full of compliments for 
Brundrett: [he] “is most helpful,” a “good fellow” and “one in a thousand.”  
50
   WO 32/10992, “Skilled Radio Personnel for the Fighting Services: 1st Interim Report by the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster”, 25/10/1940. 
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Hankey recommended that “the Minister of Supply should consider 
the desirability of availing himself of Mr Brundrett‟s services in the 
same way as the Air Corps.”51 Brundrett‟s efforts were seen by the 
official body responsible for the allocation of personnel with a 
degree of exacerbation.52 A. L. Fielding noted how if any men were 
not absorbed by other Departments, “…the men would be lost to 
Mr Brundrett of the Admiralty,” and he also referred to “the men 
taken by Brundrett from Dr Snow.”53 It appears that Brundrett was 
responsible, if not necessarily in an official capacity, for staff 
recruitment for a number of the Ministry of Aircraft Production‟s 
establishments.54 
Hartcup notes that “much of the credit for recruiting suitable 
scientific staff for the Admiralty‟s scientific establishments must go 
to…Sir Frederick Brundrett.”55 A more extended account is given 
by Ronald Clark in his Rise of the Boffins.56 According to Clark, 
Brundrett had set up a system of categorising scientists and 
placing them in different grades, which had been approved by the 
Treasury, and he had made arrangements with the security 
authorities to ensure rapid clearances.57 Clark attributes the 
installation of such machinery to Brundrett‟s past handling of staff 
matters at the Signal School and subsequently at DSRE and to his 
                                                 
51
   Ibid.  
52
   This body was the Central Register of the Ministry of Labour and National Service. 
53
   LAB 8/873, Secret Minute by A. P. Fielding, no date. 
54
   LAB 8/873, memo by C. P. Snow, 29/3/1941, lists Brundrett as responsible for “Navy and T.R.E., 
R.A.E. etc”  (my emphasis). A strong indication of his mastery of the personnel situation is obvious 
in LAB 8/873, Brundrett to Fielding, 22/10/1940, a four and a half pages letter outlining “the staff 
problem as it affects the Services.” I am grateful to my colleague Max Stadler for the references in 
notes 51-54. 
55
   Guy Hartcup, The Challenge of War: Britain’s Scientific and Engineering Contributions to World 
War Two (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1970), p. 25. 
56
   Clark, The Rise of the Boffins. The references should be treated with caution, since the book is 
primarily based on interviews, Brundrett being among those interviewed.  
57
   Ibid. p. 72. 
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“boffin ingenuity and perception.”58 According to Clark, by the end 
of the war “[Brundrett] had interviewed some ten thousand 
scientists and men who could be trained for scientific work – not 
only for the Admiralty but also for the Air Ministry, the War Office, 
and the Ministry of Supply.”59 If this number is even vaguely 
accurate, then Brundrett‟s accomplishment should be considered 
as very important, especially if it is compared with the number of 
scientists included in the Central Registrar of the Ministry of 
Labour.60 
Brundrett was obviously responsible for professional 
personnel recruitment and allocation within the Admiralty 
organisation and Clark‟s claims have some backing from other 
secondary sources. A clear case which supports them comes from 
the CVD organisation mentioned earlier. After the Admiralty was 
given responsibility for the organisation during the war, it appears 
that the Air Ministry suggested that the Admiralty should also be 
responsible for personnel allocation to the different establishments 
of the Services. In the words of Professor Coales: “Brundrett, the 
Assistant DSR, was appointed to give this effect [and] in particular 
recruitment of the new professional staff for the Signal School was 
entirely at his hands.”61 Although this responsibility does not 
obviously prove the numbers that Clark claims for Brundrett‟s 
recruitment efforts, it does prove the point that it was certainly an 
area in which he excelled. 
                                                 
58
   Ibid.  
59
   Ibid, p. 73.  
60
   The number for the Registrar was at the scale of seven thousand (Ibid., pp. 68, 71). Indeed, 
allowing for inevitable overlap with the Registrar, it seems that Brundrett‟s work was not just 
complimentary to the official recruiting machinery, but as central, if not more. The Registrar was 
the responsibility of C. P. Snow who made his name as an expert on matters of scientists in 
government, largely because of his wartime record; see Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 96-97.  
61
   Coales, “Origins and Development of Radar” p. 31. 
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3.2.4 – Post-War II: The Royal Naval Scientific Service 
 
Soon after the end of the war the Admiralty abolished the position 
of Director of Scientific Research and replaced it with the position 
of Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service (Chief RNSS). This 
was not only a change in name but more importantly a change in 
status and responsibilities. During the interwar period the DSRE 
was responsible for scientific research within the Navy. This in 
practice meant that it was responsible for a relatively small part of 
the Navy‟s „scientific‟ work (that performed at the Admiralty 
Research Laboratory), being responsible mainly for scientific 
personnel and having an advisory capacity in matters with 
scientific and technological components.62 The Admiralty led the 
way in creating a unified scientific corps, with the formation of a 
scientific pool, in 1923, and a technical pool, in 1928, both under 
the administration of DSR.63 The Royal Naval Scientific Service 
had been initiated by Wright since his early days as DSR, but it 
only materialised with the recommendations of the Barlow 
Committee and the official creation of the Scientific Civil Service 
with the end of the war. Quoting Edgerton, “one could, and 
perhaps should, see this as reflection of the rising status of 
researchers with respect to both administrators and serving 
officers.”64 
The creation of the Royal Naval Scientific Service and the 
position of its Chief should not be seen as encompassing all 
                                                 
62
   Indeed the DSR was directly responsible only for the Admiralty Research Laboratory. See Scott and 
Hughes, The Administration of War Production, pp. 129-130. On the DSRE see John Buckingham, 
“The scientific research department in the time of its first director.” JRNSS, Vol. 7. 
63
   Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 116 and Scott and Hughes, The Administration of War Production, pp. 
130-1. 
64
   See Hackmann, Seek and Strike, pp 112-4, and Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 116. Thus the comment 
earlier about Madge being the „first government scientist.‟  
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research and development for the Navy, but as a unification of the 
scientific and engineering personnel working in the Admiralty. In 
fact the Chief RNSS was only one among those responsible under 
the Controller of the Navy for research and development.65 
Immediately under the Controller, was a Deputy Controller 
(Research and Development), a post which was initially created as 
an Assistant position and was retained after the war.66 The Chief 
RNSS was placed immediately under the Controller‟s office, as 
were 13 other Directors, who had under their supervision the 
majority of the Navy‟s R&D establishments, and whose 
independence from the Controller varied.67 The CRNSS had, in 
turn, immediate responsibility over four Directorates:68 These were: 
the organisational „Research Programmes and Planning‟ and 
„Operational Research‟ and the more research and development 
focused, „Aeronautical and Engineering Research‟ and „Physical 
Research‟. By 1950, the last two had nine establishments and 
laboratories under their immediate supervision. 
As we have seen, one aspect of Brundrett‟s work at DSRE 
during the war was the responsibility for matters of personnel; this 
also included the institution of the Royal Naval Scientific Service.69 
Officially the first Chief was Sir Charles Wright, with Brundrett 
retaining a position as Assistant to Chief RNSS (Reconstruction).70 
This is probably why the latter is considered to be the „architect‟ of 
                                                 
65
   The Controller of the Navy, or Third Sea Lord, was the Board of the Admiralty‟s member 
responsible for procurement and materiel  
66
   See Scott and Hughes, The Administration of War Production, pp. 132-3. 
67
   The Director of Naval Construction for example was responsible also to the Board of the Admiralty, 
as noted in Scott and Hughes, The Administration, p. 15.  
68
   ADM 282/67, RNSS, Report on Admiralty R&D Organisation, March 1947. All the following 
information comes from this report. 
69
   See ADM 1/15197, Note on the organisation of the Chemical Pool by the DDSR, 30/11/1942; Cf 
with Hartcup, The Challenge of War, p. 90. 
70
   See „Editorial‟, JRNSS, Vol. No. 7, p. 217; Hackmann gets this point wrong saying that Brundrett 
was the first Chief, See Hackmann, Seek & Strike, p. 246. 
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the Navy‟s Scientific Service.71 That Brundrett was to be Wright‟s 
successor seems in retrospect obvious, but it certainly didn‟t look 
that way during the war. When approached by Sir Clifford Paterson 
in July 1943 about the possibility of continuing the CVD 
arrangements after the end of the war and keeping the 
collaboration between GEC Labs and the Admiralty at a similar 
level, Brundrett gave him “the strongest assurance” that if Wright 
and himself were in charge this would be the case, but warned him 
that they “were not popular in some quarters” and might not be in 
control after the war. During lunch „at the club‟ two weeks later he 
expanded on this and, in Paterson‟s words, “paid me the 
compliment of discussing with me his departmental and staff 
difficulties and relationships.”72 
These difficulties of course were not at all obvious in 1947 
when Brundrett assumed the position of Chief of the Royal Naval 
Scientific Service. Indeed, in the first issue of the Service‟s Journal, 
which started its publication with the institution of the Service at the 
end of the war, it was Brundrett and not Buckingham or even C. S. 
Wright who offered a celebratory note on the formation of the 
Service. In it he described how the Service was instituted with the 
amalgamation of the Admiralty Scientific and Chemical pools into 
the new Service, giving it thus the “status and responsibilities 
commensurate with its high importance.” He concluded by warning 
his fellow Service-men and women that despite the fact that “the 
national outlook is today far more appreciative of the value of 
                                                 
71
   Hackman, Seek & Strike, p. 246 and 328. 
72
   Clayton and Algar (eds), A Scientist’s War, entries for 21 July and 6 August 1943, pp. 388 and 392 
respectively. Unfortunately Paterson noted that Brundrett‟s “confidences are not for the record.” 
This is the only reference of the kind that I have found, but since from the diaries it seems that the 
relationship between Paterson and Brundrett had developed to be quite close, there is no reason to 
doubt Brundrett‟s sincerity about his doubts, though it does not necessarily mean that they were 
well founded. 
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science for defence purposes than ever before,” the success of the 
RNSS depended not on what others do for them, but on what they 
do for themselves.73 
With the assumption of his responsibilities, Brundrett showed 
clear signs of his control over the business of the Service. This is 
illustrated by his choice of William R J Cook, a man with no 
connection to naval science, for the place of Director of Physical 
Research (DPR).74 The position was rather important, since the 
DPR was responsible for the Royal Naval Physiological Laboratory 
(RNPL, established in 1943) and, more importantly, the Services 
Electronic Research Laboratory (SERL, established in 1945). The 
latter was created to inherit the various aspects of the wartime 
CVD organisation, organising and performing research on 
electronic valves for all the Services, and therefore can be 
considered as Brundrett‟s child.75 Cook‟s Deputy Director was A. B. 
Wood, a scientist whose association with naval science stretched 
back to the First World War, which demonstrates the new Chief‟s 
willingness to disregard seniority within the Service in order to find 
appropriate individuals for high-level posts.76 Brundrett‟s priorities 
                                                 
73
   The article‟s last words were „Long live the Royal Naval Scientific Service!‟ See the note by F. 
Brundrett on the RNSS in JRNSS, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Sept. 1945), pp. 3 and 14.  
74
  How Brundrett came to know Cook and his abilities and recruit him to the RNSS I haven‟t been able 
to locate, but given the former‟s inevitable connection with other Service establishments (the result 
of his informal scientific staff allocation activities), it is not surprising. Furthermore, during the war 
and immediately after there were a number of Committees and Sub-Committees in which the Navy 
was represented and in which Brundrett and Cook could have met, or Brundrett could have 
appreciated Cook‟s work as a researcher and project organiser. A possible occasion could be a 
meeting at the Ministry of Supply to discuss Guided projectiles (Cook‟s field), which was attended 
by Sir Alwyn Crow (Cook‟s immediate boss) and by Wright and Goodeve. See ADM 2/14016, 
Meeting on Guided Projectiles, 22/2/1945.  
75
  SERL was the first Laboratory working for all three Services and its contributions reached the laser 
field. See Robert Bud and Philip Gummett, Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s 
Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990, (London: Science Museum, 1999), passim; see also G P Wright, 
Services Electronics Research Laboratory: a brief history of the many successful electronic device 
developments and the wide ranging research work carried out at SERL (Malvern: Royal Signals 
and Radar Establishment, 1986).  As we saw earlier the department responsible for valves initially 
in the Navy was the one where Brundrett had started his career in the (scientific) civil service. 
76
  A. B. Wood studied physics at Liverpool and worked with Rutherford in Manchester on underwater 
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were made clear on the assumption of his duties: “the promotion 
staircase of the RNSS is not an escalator, it is a pretty steep ladder 
up which everybody must climb by honest sweat” and for those 
who do, “the reward will be good, possibly even surprisingly 
good.”77  
 
3.2.5 – Post-War II: The Ministry of Defence 
 
The year that Brundrett assumed his post as Chief RNSS saw the 
creation of the Defence Research Policy Committee, of which he 
became an ex officio member. The Admiralty was also represented 
by the Controller of the Navy, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff 
and Deputy Controller (R&D), who was Dr (later Sir) John Carroll 
for the duration of the Committee‟s existence. As his career so far 
indicates, Brundrett was not one to shy away from administrative 
responsibilities and quickly assumed a dominant role in the DRPC, 
becoming Deputy Chairman in 195078 and assuming the 
Chairmanship in 1954, until his retirement from public service in 
1960.  
The rise in the hierarchy of the Ministry of Defence was not 
as straightforward as it might appear at first. The crucial step took 
place in 1950, when the Chairman of the DRPC, Sir Henry Tizard, 
decided he wanted to move towards retirement. Tizard‟s choice for 
                                                                                                                                            
acoustics, before joining the Admiralty Experimental Station in 1915. He rose to become its Chief 
Scientist in 1921 and Superintending Scientist in 1943. With the incorporation of the infrared 
section of ARL in SERL with the end of the war Wood became Deputy Director of Physical 
Research. See JRNSS, Vol.20, No. 4 (July 1965), Memorial Number on A. B. Wood, OBE, passim. 
Brundrett‟s note referred explicitly to Wood being „not at his best in an administrative capacity.‟ (p. 
191). 
77
  JRNSS, Vol. 2, No. 3, (May 1947), pp.126-7. 
78
   At this point he relinquished his position as Chief and was replaced by William Cook, the man who 
clearly had won his trust and appreciation during his years as DPR. This move of course brought 
Cook to the DRPC as a member. 
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his replacement was Sir John Cockcroft, the Director of the Atomic 
Energy Research Establishment (AERE).79 The choice is not 
surprising in many ways, since Cockcroft shared a number of 
similarities in background and experiences with Tizard and the two 
knew well each other from the war years.80 On the other hand, of 
course, it may seem odd since Cockcroft had excelled himself in 
research and administration of a large scientific-technological 
project, but never had much experience in policy making.81 In fact 
he was not an official member of the DRPC, although he was in 
contact with a number of its members, mainly through the DRPC 
Atomic Energy Subcommittee.82  
Tizard appears to have considered Brundrett for the top post, 
but was reluctant, since, although Brundrett “has been acting as 
Chairman of the DRP Staff all this year, in addition to his normal 
duties [as CRNSS]… [He] is 55 years of age,” and Tizard judged 
“that he does not wish to continue in the Government Service 
after…60.”83 Thus if he assumed the position two years later he 
would, according to Tizard‟s thinking, retire less than three years in 
his post. Tizard‟s trust in Brundrett and his abilities are obvious, 
since the latter was in Tizard‟s mind as the person to carry through 
the transition to the new chairman, a fact which also points to 
Brundrett‟s already central position in the Committee. Tizard 
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   T 213/85, Tizard to Minister [of Defence?], 18/10/1949. 
80
   See earlier, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
81
   Hartcup and Allibone, Cockcroft and the Atom. 
82
   See AB 16/600, for the meetings until 1950, when Tizard was at the chair. The subcommittee‟s 
membership included members of the DRPC (scientists and Vice Chiefs) and Cockcroft as AERE‟s 
Director and William Penney, the head of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment. More on 
this Committee and the DRPC and nuclear matters in Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.5. 
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   T 213/85, Tizard to Minister, 18/10/1949; This would mean that Brundrett was due to retire in 1955, 
which suggests that the reason he stayed longer in the end was the fact that he had assumed the 
Chairmanship of the DRPC. Unfortunately, I haven‟t been able to locate an equally detailed file for 
Brundrett‟s assumption of the Chairmanship. See later, note 71. Another possible reason for not 
proposing Brundrett could be that he was tipped to replace Carroll as Deputy Controller (R&D) in 
the Admiralty. See T 213/85, Parker to Padmore, 7/3/1950. 
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proposed for him to take the position of Deputy Chairman, thus 
taking some of the load from Tizard and passing control to 
Cockcroft two years later.84  
In the end, Cockcroft‟s chairmanship was not successful. He 
did not give up his post as Director of AERE, so he was in effect a 
part-time chairman, and in addition, according to his biographers, 
he was not able to be effective as a convincer in decision-
making.85 This was to prove decisive. First, the experience 
Brundrett had acquired in the Committee since 1947, second the 
fact that he had been full time in the Ministry of Defence two whole 
years before Cockcroft assumed his position in 1952 and, third, the 
further two years of close involvement during Cockcroft‟s part-time 
Chairmanship put him in place to be able to control much of the 
Committee‟s business.86 As early as February 1953 he was 
described as being “constantly under extreme pressure to provide 
scientific advice for the Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint 
Planning Staffs”, so much so that he needed an assistant.87 When 
in 1954, it was realised that Cockcroft could not perform as 
Chairman, the Minister of Defence since 1952, Lord Alexander, 
was clear in his mind when writing to the Prime Minister: “in 
practice…Sir Frederick has been acting as my Scientific Adviser 
since I became Minister… [and I] have formed a very high opinion 
of the way in which he has carried out a difficult task, calling for 
rather special qualifications.”88 
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   T 213/85, Tizard to Minister, 18/10/1949. 
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   See Hartcup and Allibone, Cockcroft and the Atom, pp. 117-8. 
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   See chapter 4, sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3-5. 
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   T213/455, Brown to Rae, 11/2/1953. According to the Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List for 
1954, the post appears to have been filled by Archie Potts. More on this in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5. 
88
  PREM 11/621, Alexander to PM, 14/5/1954. Unfortunately this file which deals with Cockcroft‟s 
succession is not as full as the one by the Treasury on Tizard. 
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3.2.6 – Retirement 
 
Upon his retirement from the Ministry of Defence, Brundrett 
replaced Sir Charles Snow as Civil Service Commissioner for 
Science and later for Science and Engineering, as well as being 
head of the Air Traffic Control Board. Unlike many defence 
scientists it doesn‟t appear that he was involved in any position in 
industry, a consultancy or directorship, a fact which is probably 
explained by the private business he had developed in 
collaboration with one of his brothers.89 Brundrett was also an 
important figure in the agricultural co-operative movement, being 
the Chairman of the Agricultural Central Co-operative 
Association.90 
 
 
3.3 – Sir William Cook 
 
3.3.1 – Introduction 
 
A treatment of Cook‟s life and work appears in the 
Biographical Memoirs of the Fellows of the Royal Society.91 With 
some minor mistakes it is broadly accurate, but there are 
significant omissions especially regarding Cook‟s centrality in 
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  He had developed one of the largest pedigree poultry breeding establishments in the UK, according 
to a biographical note in the JRNSS, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1947), pp. 128. 
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  See for example Farmers Weekly, 7/8/1964, p. 41. Brundrett‟s preoccupation with farming and 
agriculture could produce an awkward impression to other officials. For example: “The lasting 
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Naval Constructor. (Penzance: Periscope Publishing, 2004), pp. 104-5. 
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Whitehall politics.  
Despite his impressive career, Cook has enjoyed little 
attention in the historiography of British government. Exceptions 
are works which discuss specific government R&D projects. As the 
Deputy Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, 
in Aldermaston, with exclusive responsibility for the H-bomb, he is 
mentioned extensively in the official history of the development of 
the British hydrogen bomb.92 He is recognised as one of the 
fathers of the British „Super‟ and we learn about his role in the 
scientific directorship of the Grapple test series, the central role he 
played in the following negotiations of the US-UK Agreement of 
195893; and also his skills as a project manager, his actual role in 
the AWRE and even his views about the significance and the role 
that nuclear weapons would continue to play in the international 
strategic scene.94 He also appears in works on rockets during and 
immediately after the Second World War95 and on the development 
of nuclear reactors while serving at the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority.96 
Yet Cook is strikingly absent in works concerned with 
„science policy‟, even those which concentrate on the defence 
sector. His role in policy-making, though, is hinted at, although 
hardly developed further. Spinardi attributes to him the momentum 
of the Chevaline programme during his term at the Ministry of 
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  Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 2001). 
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Defence,97 and in a study of the Defence Research Policy 
Committee, Agar and Balmer refer to Cook as one of the scientists 
whose long-serving careers offered them „lasting influence on 
British defence science‟, but do not follow the point further.98 The 
only work that stresses Cook‟s importance is Warfare State, which 
places him as one of the influential scientific advisers at the 
Ministry of Defence, and as an instance of the importance of in-
house experts in the British government.99 
The case of Sir William Cook has a double importance. He 
had senior management and policy roles, and proved to be a 
successful negotiator in the political, local and international level. 
 
3.3.2 – Early Life 
 
William Richard Joseph Cook‟s was born on 10 April 1905 in the 
prosperous town of Trowbridge, Wiltshire in South West England. 
Cook‟s own background was modest. His father John being a 
railway inspector and having two other children, William attended 
the school nearest his home, the Trinity School of Trowbridge, 
founded as a Church of England school, and went on to the 
Trowbridge Boys‟ High School.100 In 1922, he gained a University 
Scholarship by the Wiltshire County Council, because of his 
Distinction grades in Group III mathematics in his High School 
Certificate, which enabled him to study at the university which was 
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closest to home, the University of Bristol.101 
Cook‟s course of studies at the University of Bristol is 
unknown. Certainly his degree included both pure and applied 
mathematics courses and there is reason to believe that, given a 
student‟s willingness and aptitude, attention was paid in order to 
pursue more rigorous training in mathematics.102 Cook gained his 
BSc in 1925, with first class honours in mathematics and a 
specialisation in applied mathematics. After obtaining a Diploma in 
Education the next year, he continued his education earning an 
MSc degree in 1927 and starting to work as a research assistant to 
Professor H. R. Hasse and doing some lecturing.103 At this point he 
established a professional relationship with John Lennard-Jones, 
who was working on the determination of intermolecular fields and 
equations of state in gaseous mixtures.104 Cook showed significant 
ability in academic research and this is confirmed by the fact that 
he added his name in three papers he participated as a junior 
researcher and were published in the Proceedings of the Royal 
Society.105 Nevertheless, he chose a more secure path than an 
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academic career, applying first for a teaching post, but finally 
choosing to follow the career of a scientific civil servant. He was 
appointed to the Ballistics Section of the Research Department of 
Woolwich Arsenal on 2 July 1928. 
 
3.3.3 – Early Career I: the „Cook Camera‟ 
 
The Director of Ballistic Research at the time was A. D. (later Sir 
Alwyn) Crow. One of the fields that his department was working on 
at the time was the photography of shells exiting small guns, work 
which had been suspended due to lack of staff, only to be resumed 
in the year that Cook was appointed to the Department, as a Junior 
Assistant.106 It is safe to assume that he started research on this 
field, in which “a start [had] been made with the design of the 
apparatus required for experimental work to be carried out…at 
Shoeburyness,” as was stated in the department‟s report.107 In 
1929 research on the field had started to gain momentum, 
although progress in the design of a new camera that would 
incorporate the best features of the existing Rumpff and Duda 
cameras was slow. In the Director‟s mind, the data obtained 
showed it might be used in measuring Muzzle Velocity under field 
conditions.108 
In 1930, the young researcher had already reached the 
position of Assistant, Grade I and the camera he was developing 
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had reached approval state for construction and shipboard trial. In 
July 1932, Cambridge Instruments Company Ltd made the first 
model of the „Cook camera‟, as it was referred to, although it 
showed some defects and it was to be corrected by the 
manufacturers. A year later the camera was functioning well 
enough to be sent to at Shoeburyness and Grain to be tested on 
board HMS Iron Duke and HMS Rodney.109 In 1936, Cook‟s 
Director was confident enough in the quality of the new apparatus 
that he was able to report that it should be redesigned with 
extended capabilities and incorporating new principles for use by 
the Naval and Land Services.110 
 
3.3.4 – Early Career II: Rockets 
 
By 1934, the Army was interested in furthering research on 
rockets. With the insistence of Sir Hugh Elles, the Master General 
of Ordnance,111 and given German activity the Germans on the 
field, Crow formed a group around him consisting of Dr Harold 
Poole, a chemist, and Cook to investigate rocket propulsion, 
starting in May 1935. Within a year Crow was able to report that 
rockets could be considered for war purposes, using what was 
known as Cordite SC (Solventless Cordite). In May 1936, the Sub-
Committee on Air Defence Research, with Winston Churchill as a 
member, decided that “top priority would be placed on anti-aircraft 
rockets”, known as Un-rotated Projectiles (U. P.), as a substitute 
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for heavy anti-aircraft guns.112 According to Robert Rankin, the 
eminent mathematician, “the first theoretical work on rockets” in 
Britain and “a considerable quantity of work on the theory of motion 
of rockets and on methods of trajectory calculation was done” by a 
team under Cook at about this time.113 The development of a 
suitable rocket with parallel performance to the 3.7-inch anti-
aircraft gun was duly followed by Crow‟s team, but ran into 
technical difficulties at the first stages of development, while in 
1937 the Air Defence Committee requested research to be 
performed into a 3-inch type of rocket, which was to take 
precedence over the previous model.114 
With the beginning of the Second World War the 
development of rockets took a high degree of priority. Winston 
Churchill himself, now Prime Minister, took a personal interest in 
work on this field;115 in fact, it was recognised in official circles that 
“the PM holds Dr Crow personally responsible for Development 
and Production of UP Weapons,”116 having written personally to 
Herbert Morrison, the Minister of Supply, in August 1940, that Crow 
was to be given every possible help on his work.117 Crow had 
already in mind the structure that the organisation which was to 
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work on rockets would take. The Projectile Development 
Directorate was to be divided in four branches. Cook was made 
responsible for the branch responsible for the planning, which was 
to keep in touch with the Chief of Staff Committee. He would be 
responsible for the design, experiment and general co-ordination of 
weapons, with the position of an Assistant Director, and given a 
salary of a Deputy Director, R&D. Poole was to head the third 
branch, responsible for explosives, holding the same rank as 
Cook.118 
The organisation which was responsible for work on 
rockets119 was under both the Ministry of Supply, which 
represented the interests of the Army on the issue, as well as the 
Admiralty. Although the work on rockets has been associated with 
the 3-inch anti-aircraft projectile, which was used successfully to 
bring down enemy aeroplanes under Churchill‟s son-in-law – and 
later Minister of Supply and Defence – Duncan Sandys,120 it should 
not be forgotten that research on rockets originated from both the 
Admiralty and War Office. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
GAP Committee,121 the main inter-service coordinating committee 
on rockets was under the direction of the Admiralty scientist 
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Charles (later Sir Charles) Goodeve with Crow being a member.122 
In fact the issue for the first requirement for an anti-aircraft rocket 
originated from the Admiralty.123 A close co-ordination between the 
two departments on the issue appears to have been in place 
therefore during the war.124 
Within 12 years of his first appointment as a scientific civil 
servant and with the help by the urgency that the war demanded, 
Cook found himself heading a most important subsection of a 
government research project. His duties, as we saw involved the 
planning of the research into the weapons, an experience which 
was to cultivate his organisational skills and shape his career in 
later days. During the war Cook continued to work on finding and 
developing new applications for rockets, one of which was firing 
them from high-speed aircraft.125 Other work concentrated on 
finding methods of guiding rockets, much of which was based on 
the test vehicle LOP/GAP.126  
The British work on rockets is important for another reason: 
the role that the British rocket experts played in the assessment of 
the German rocket threat and in which Cook also played an 
important role.127 Cook‟s supervisor, Crow, had been involved from 
very early on in assessing the intelligence reports regarding 
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German rockets and Cook himself started working on this, as 
Crow‟s deputy, at the end of April 1943.128 David Irving‟s judgement 
of the British efforts to correctly identify the level of the German 
rocket threat places the blame for failing to correctly identify the 
German capabilities with Alwyn Crow, “the director of all official 
rocket research in the United Kingdom” (and by consequence his 
team), since their preference for cordite-powered rockets blinded 
them to the possibility of the use of liquid fuel, which was chosen 
by the German experts.129 
 
3.3.5 – Post-War I: The Guided Projectile Establishment at 
Westcott 
 
Organisational complexity and lack of proper coordination in 
decision making on rockets had as a result with the end of the war 
the appointment of Alwyn Crow to the post of Director of Guided 
Projectiles in the Ministry of Supply.130 At the same time it was 
judged that inadequate facilities existed for the development of 
Guided Projectiles and therefore a new establishment was needed 
for this stage of the work.131 The new establishment was to be 
located at Westcott in Buckinghamshire and William Cook was 
appointed as its first director, with the grade of Chief 
Superintendent. This appointment placed him in his first directorial 
position of a defence establishment and in charge of everything 
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that had to do with the “development, assembly and testing of 
projectiles and weapons.”132 
Cook started work immediately setting up and organising the 
completion of work for the new Guided Projectiles Establishment 
(G.P.E.) and reporting on the situation of existing projects. During a 
visit by the Guided Projectiles Progress Committee to the 
Establishment, chaired by Vice Admiral Sir Harold Brown, he was 
able to report on the status of research on G.A.P., the Sea Slug, 
the Heathen, the „Menace‟ and ram jet development. His staff at 
the time of the visit numbered 370, of which 64 were scientific and 
experimental officers, a number below the planned level, and a fact 
which, as he reported, was delaying the programme, especially 
work on LOC/GAP.133  
To direct the Establishment, Cook set up the G.P.E. Technical 
Board, which was comprised of him in the chair and the rest of the 
Superintendents, “to review and progress the technical work” of the 
Establishment.134 The minutes of the Board demonstrate the 
qualities that were to become one of Cook‟s characteristics in the 
future: a strong grip of the programmes under his responsibility 
and a firm directorial guidance of his subordinates. The 
Superintendents were expected to report in full on the status of the 
projects at the beginning of every meeting and they rarely failed to 
do so.135 As the Chief Superintendent of G.P.E. he sat at the G.P. 
Working Committee, chaired by the Director of Guided Projectiles, 
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which reviewed the work done by the Establishments concerned 
with rockets.136 
But Cook‟s days at Westcott were not to develop 
harmoniously. Even though he was promoted in the beginning of 
1946 to the grade of Deputy Chief Scientific Officer, the new 
structure of work on rockets did not satisfy either the Army or the 
Admiralty. With the reorganisation of the Ministry of Supply after 
the end of the war and the transfer of work on G.P. under the 
Controller of Supplies (Air), a battle started between the existing 
Establishments and especially the Royal Aircraft Establishment 
(RAE) and Westcott, for the main control of research on rockets. 
The battle took place in the deliberations of a Working Party, set up 
under the Director of Scientific Research (Air) of the Ministry of 
Supply, Sir Ben Lockspeiser, which was to make recommendations 
on a satisfactory organisation.137 The fight was quite strong, as the 
minutes of the proceedings show, and one gets the feeling that 
there was a bias on behalf of the chairman towards the decision 
that was finally reached, a decision which significantly reduced the 
importance of the newly formed Westcott establishment and its 
director. Cook dissented from the report of the working party, which 
was recommending that R&D on rockets was to be concentrated at 
the RAE under a Deputy Director (Dr W. Cawood, a member of the 
working party and former Deputy Director of Armament Research), 
on the grounds that the transfer of work to the RAE would cause 
serious delay and that the criterion for choice should be the 
appropriate site for the work and not the laboratories, which could 
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be built anywhere.138 But the decision was made in RAE‟s favour 
and Westcott was to be renamed as the Rocket Propulsion 
Establishment, with Cook as its Senior Superintendent, and 
concentrate on propulsion work as an Outstation to the Royal 
Aircraft Establishment. The overall direction of the research would 
come from the Guided Weapons Headquarters at the Ministry of 
Supply, with G. W. H. Gardner as its Director.139 
All this must have been rather disappointing for Cook. As 
soon as he attained a post of greater responsibility than ever 
before, he had to see the building of Westcott turning into an 
important, but nevertheless secondary outstation to the main work, 
which was being developed out of his reach.140 It is indicative that 
the new Director of RAE‟s Guided Weapons Department had 
under him more than triple the number of staff that Cook had at 
Westcott.141 There is little doubt that this was a setback in his, until 
that moment, uninterrupted advancement in the hierarchy, but it 
was also to be the only one. The comment that “Cook‟s time as 
Director of Westcott was not a happy one”, which Penney and 
Macklen make, seems fair enough. What seems less accurate is 
the assumption that these feelings derived from the fact that his 
advice “on the best choice of motors… [which] was largely ignored” 
was the reason.142 It is more likely that it was the defeat in the 
committee game which he experienced which caused frustration 
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and disappointment.  
One can only speculate about the reasons for the direction of 
the working party‟s final recommendation, but two things seem to 
have played a role. Firstly, the party‟s chairman, Sir Ben 
Lockspeiser supported almost openly the case of the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment‟s priority for the work on rockets during the 
deliberations.143 Cook seems to have had a very unfavourable 
opinion of Lockspeiser saying that that “[h]e was an aircraft man 
who didn‟t understand the difference between planes and rockets, 
and wrongly thought that the design work was just the same.”144 
Second, the man who had supported Cook from the beginning of 
his career, Sir Alwyn Crow, had left the Ministry of Supply scene as 
Director of Guided Projectiles, for a liaison post in Washington.145 It 
seems that Cook had to fight with few if no allies, against an RAE 
lobby. 
 
3.3.6 – Post-War II: Royal Naval Scientific Service 
 
This setback was not to last for long, because Frederick Brundrett, 
the newly appointed Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service 
(RNSS) came to Cook‟s rescue and arranged for him to join him at 
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the RNSS.146 The post of Director of Physical Research (DPR) had 
opened in April 1947 and Cook duly submitted his application for 
the post and was appointed in late 1947.147 Cook‟s work for the 
Navy concentrated mainly around the detection of submarines and 
underwater warfare technology.148 But the importance of this 
appointment lies elsewhere. There are indications that Brundrett 
kept Cook close to him during his post at the RNSS149 and of 
course the strongest indication for this is the move of Cook to 
Brundrett‟s position as Chief, when the latter took the position of 
Deputy Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee.150 
Becoming Chief of the RNSS, in July 1950, Cook immediately had 
a chair in the Defence Research Policy Committee, attending his 
first meeting on 11 August 1950, thus starting his involvement in 
the formulation of British defence research and development 
policy.151 
 
3.3.7 – Nuclear Knight I: The H-Bomb 
 
Of course, William Cook left his mark on British science and 
technology, as one of the main figures involved in the development 
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of the British hydrogen bomb. How he was appointed to the 
position of Deputy Director of the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment (AWRE) in Aldermaston, under Sir William Penney, 
remains unclear. In the Royal Society memoir, Penney and 
Macklen state clearly that during the search “to find somebody able 
to share the load with Penney of running the weapons work” it was 
Penney himself who wanted Cook, with Brundrett agreeing to the 
transfer.152 Macklen himself in his Independent obituary of Cook 
stresses primarily Brundrett‟s role in persuading Cook to move to 
Aldermaston, a remark that does not necessarily contradict the 
previous history.153 In the official history of the development of the 
British H-bomb, Lorna Arnold makes again clear that the initiative 
for the appointment was Penney‟s and therefore Cook hadn‟t been 
imposed on him by Whitehall.154 What is certain from available 
archival material is that Penney was still undecided, in fact “at a 
loss to see a real possibility” for the post of Deputy Director of 
AWRE, as late as the final days of 1953 and that by March 1954 
the appointment of Cook had been settled.155 
Since the archival material concerning the development of 
the H-bomb is not available and is likely to remain so for a while, 
the only certain conclusion that can be derived from Arnold‟s 
extensive research of this material is that Cook was indeed of 
decisive importance to the making of the bomb, being primarily 
responsible for the design of the weapon.156 It is clear from the 
                                                 
152
   Cook Bio. Mem., p. 50. 
153
   The Independent (29/9/1987). John Challens, also at AWRE at the time does not even mention 
Penney when he talks about Cook and his work at Aldermaston. See Challens „Cook‟, p. 131. 
154
   Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H bomb, pp. 59 and 77, n.16. The convenience of the term Whitehall 
saves Arnold from making clear whether the imposition came from the political or official level.  
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   The best man that Penney was thinking at the time was the Cambridge metallurgist, Dr F. P. 
Bowden (FRS) and his second choice was Professor M. Pryce of Oxford, both academics. NA, ES 
1/84, Penney to Sir Donald Parrot, 23/12/1953. 
156
   Cook Bio. Mem., p. 50. 
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official history that as time went by Cook was getting a stronger 
grip on the project, transforming the organisation and its working 
methods and chairing the Weapons Development Policy 
Committee, set up by him to oversee the work and plan the all 
important series of tests that were to take place in 1957-8.157 
The importance of the series of thermonuclear tests that the 
UK performed in Australia between mid 1957 and mid 1958 has 
been strongly stressed as one of the main factors that convinced 
the United States to resume nuclear collaboration with Britain.158 
Although scholars of international relations and the „special 
relationship‟ would stress other reasons for this development in the 
Anglo-American relations and are sceptical of the benefits deriving 
from it, it is clear that it was central to British thinking at the time.159 
William Cook was essential not only in scientifically directing the 
Grapple test series, which proved Britain‟s nuclear capabilities to 
the world and to the Americans in particular, but also in negotiating 
the Atomic Energy Agreement of September 1958, being the 
British signatory.160 1958 was the year of formal recognition for 
Cook, when, for his services to British science and government, he 
was knighted. 
 
3.3.8 – Nuclear Knight II: The United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority 
 
The Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) was part of 
the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, formed in 1954, 
                                                 
157
   See Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, pp. 80-2 and 255, n. 31; and Cook Bio. Mem., p. 50. 
158
   „It was the major, if not the only, factor…‟ Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, ch 14, at p. 195. 
159
   See Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, ch. 3, especially pp. 104-6. 
160
   See Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb. p. 211. 
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which had three separate groups. The Industrial Group headed by 
Sir Christopher Hinton, was responsible for reactor development, 
the Research Group under Sir John Cockcroft was responsible for 
nuclear research and the Weapons Group was responsible for the 
AWRE and led by Sir William Penney. In September 1957 Hinton 
left the Authority for the Central Electricity Generating Board and 
after a few months of an interregnum Sir William Cook filled the 
position of Member for Engineering and Production at the 
beginning of 1958.161 The reasons for Cook‟s choice to leave the 
defence field and move to the civilian section of the UKAEA are not 
known, but one reason for this move might have been the need for 
a strong managerial hand to head the Authority‟s Industrial side, 
following the first nuclear accident that took place at Windscale in 
1957 and the recommendations of the Fleck Committee.162 Cook‟s 
experience in handling large projects, demonstrated in the best 
way at Aldermaston, made him a very suitable candidate for the 
job. 
Following two reorganisations in 1959 and 1961, Cook 
undertook the Development and Engineering Group and the 
Reactor Group, respectively, thus remaining responsible for the 
design and development of nuclear reactors.163 He stayed with the 
Authority for a total of 6 years, which makes it the longest 
continuous period that Cook served in a single post. The difference 
with the past is that his job had more to do with the public domain 
and it is characteristic that it is only during these years that he 
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   See Roger Williams, The Nuclear Power Decisions: British Policies, 1953-78. pp. 21-22. 
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   Ibid, p. 22 and Cook Bio. Mem., p. 52. Although the Fleck Committee did not recommend a split of 
the Industrial Group, their indications regarding difficulties at its senior levels suggested a change. 
163
   Williams, Nuclear Power Decisions, p. 22. 
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produced papers for public consumption.164 
Not surprisingly, Cook‟s grip while at the UKAEA Board was 
firm, especially with everything that had to do with reactor 
development. He chaired the Reactor Development Policy 
Committee, whose exhaustive deliberations are evident from the 
minutes and noted by Penney and Macklen.165 During his term of 
office he was instrumental in the development of the Advanced 
Gas-cooled Reactor, and the Steam Generating Heavy-Water 
Reactor. 
 
3.3.9 – Ministry of Defence 
 
In 1960 Sir Solly Zuckerman became the chairman of the Defence 
Research Policy Committee and the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) 
to the Minister of Defence. At this point the Services were 
institutionally separate from each other, but the activities of 
Zuckerman, Mountbatten (Chief of the Defence Staff), Duncan 
Sandys (Minister of Defence) and other officials led to the effort of 
unification of the defence field under a single Secretary of State for 
Defence, a process which took shape in the period 1963-4.166 
These changes affected the defence scientific sector as well. The 
DRPC was succeeded by the Defence Research Committee, the 
Weapons Development Committee and the Operational 
Requirements Committee. The CSA remained the overall head of 
this new organisation, but now with two deputy CSA‟s, the more 
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   See his articles in Atom, the journal of the UKAEA: 1957(No. 27), 1959(No.33), 1962(No63), 
1963(Nos. 78 and 86); in the New Scientist 1964(No. 388); and the Electrical Review (1961). 
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   AB 9/958 and Cook Bio. Mem., p. 54. 
166
   The details of this change are not of significance here. For a full treatment, see Franklyn A. 
Johnson, Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974 (London: Dackworth, 
1980). 
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important being that for operational requirements and projects. 
This post was filled by Cook, two months before the coming in 
government of the Labour Party in 1964.167 Given his career and 
the qualities he had shown during the previous years, the choice 
was not surprising. 
Zuckerman was forced to resign his post as CSA to the 
Secretary of Defence in 1966 and moved full-time to the position of 
CSA to the Government, which he had taken up in 1964.168 His 
defence responsibilities were now shared by the two deputies. In 
1968 Cook became Chief Adviser for Projects and Research (CA 
(PR)), assisted by a deputy Chief Adviser for Research and 
Studies (CA (RS)) and an Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser 
(Studies and Nuclear).169 During his tenure of office at the Ministry 
of Defence, Cook was the man behind a number of projects, most 
notably the Chevaline (Polaris missiles improvement system), the 
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (Tornado), the Rapier anti-aircraft 
system and helped re-organise the NATO Armaments 
organisation.170 
 
3.3.10 – Retirement 
 
One of the last contributions Cook made in the public service was 
his participation in a Committee set up in 1971 to review the future 
of the Rolls-Royce RB211 engine, following the company‟s 
bankruptcy earlier in the year. The committee comprised of Cook, 
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   See Cook Bio. Mem., p. 56. The second post was filled by Sir Allan Cottrell, an academic. 
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   This post followed an initial refusal by Zuckerman to become a Minister in the government of 
Harold Wilson, who in his eagerness to keep Zuckerman close to him created the new post. See 
Solly Zuckerman, Monkeys, Men and Missiles. (New York and London: Norton & Co., 1989). pp. 
366-372 
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   CAB 168/242, Office Memorandum (General) on Scientific Organisation, 14 February 1968. 
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   See Cook Bio. Mem., pp. 57-59. 
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Sir St John Elstub and Professor D. W. Holder of Oxford.171 Their 
conclusions were reached quickly and were in favour of the 
continuation of the project. Following the formation of the new 
state-owned Rolls Royce Ltd later that year, Cook and the other 
two became Directors in the company‟s board, where Cook 
concentrated on the engineering effort. In the private sector he 
became a director on the GEC Marconi Electronics Ltd board 
(1972-1979); he was chairman of the Marconi International Marine 
Co board; (1971-1975) and he was a consultant to British 
Telecommunications on management organisation in the early 
80‟s.172 
 
3.4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
Brundrett and Cook both reached the highest possible positions 
that were available to scientists in the Whitehall hierarchy; they 
became the senior scientists in the Ministry of Defence, the former 
for the best part of the 1950‟s and the latter from 1966 to 1970. 
These roles mark them as a small, high-level elite duo among the 
rest of the elite defence scientists who were analysed in the 
previous chapter. 
What seems to have been a common thread in both 
Brundrett‟s and Cook‟s capabilities as government scientists was 
their excellent skills in administration, or what we would call today 
management, though again in different levels. Cook excelled in 
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   Elstub was a University of Manchester graduate, at the time the managing director of Imperial 
Metal Industries, with a war record in the RAF and, under Cook, research on rockets. He later 
became president of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers. Holder was an Imperial College man, 
who had been head of the National Physical Laboratory‟s High Speed Lab, before becoming 
Professor of Engineering at Oxford. See, Anon., “RB211‟s judges”, New Scientist and Science 
Journal, 25 February 1971. 
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technological research management, an ability which became 
apparent during the war with the rocket programme, continued in 
the post-war period with his stint in the Royal Naval Scientific 
Service, but, more obviously and with much more important 
consequences for him and his country, during his involvement with 
Britain‟s nuclear programmes. He was brought in to run the 
development of the H-bomb project and directed the all important 
nuclear tests – an achievement for which he gained a knighthood – 
and immediately thereafter became responsible for the direction of 
the engineering effort in Britain‟s civil nuclear programme. The war 
was much more important for Brundrett, who was a decade older 
where he demonstrated his apparently excellent skills in the crucial 
field of co-ordination of scientific and technological endeavours 
between different branches of the defence establishment and 
contributed in the recruitment of scientific and technical personnel 
for the war effort.  
Both men‟s careers also show the importance of having a 
„patron‟ in the Whitehall scene. It is obvious that Alwyn Crow 
played such a role in Cook‟s earlier career, and this is 
demonstrated by the fact that the only slow period in the latter‟s 
career took place when Crow was not in the London scene any 
more.173 From then on Brundrett took Cook under his wing and 
brought him to the Navy, leaving him as his successor in the post 
of Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service and probably pushing 
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   It should not be forgotten that Crow himself and the rocket programme enjoyed Churchill‟s 
protection and support during the war, something which obviously eclipsed with the ascent of the 
Labour Government in the immediate post-war period. The fact that Lockspeiser, the man mainly 
responsible, as we saw, for Cook‟s and his establishment‟s fortunes after the war, was a member of 
the Labour Party from a young age does not appear to have been a factor at this level of Whitehall 
politics. Lockspeiser‟s “active” membership of the Labour Party is cited in A. P. J. Edwards, “Ben 
Lockspeiser”, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society, Vol. 39 (Feb, 1994), pp. 246-
261, at p. 247. 
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for him to become the Deputy Director of Aldermaston during the 
crucial period of the H-bomb development.174 For Brundrett it was 
similar. During his early career at the Signal School the record 
does not show whether he was helped in a similar way to Cook‟s, 
but after he moved to the Headquarters of the DSRE his 
supervisor‟s patronage and trust proved indispensable, since he 
actually designated Brundrett as his successor at the post of Chief 
RNSS. Whether the relationship was at the same level is difficult to 
know, and it doesn‟t appear to have been, but certainly Brundrett‟s 
later career in the Ministry of Defence owed much to the fact that 
Tizard requested him to be his Deputy CSA at the Ministry. The 
existence of such patrons does not in any way undermine the 
considerable skills of both these government scientists, but it does 
point to the fact that sheer ability in research and management of 
technological projects is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for rise in the hierarchy. All the other elite defence scientists had 
similar capabilities and many more had an exceptional capability in 
scientific and technological research.175  
There is no doubt that for all of the elite defence scientists the 
war offered an opportunity to prove themselves as individuals, but 
the war also offered to the scientific branch of the civil service, 
what Edgerton calls the “research corps”, to demonstrate the level 
of importance of their work in the government machinery.176 It 
should not be forgotten that even the scientific contributions which 
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  There is an indication that Brundrett groomed Cook to become his successor in the Ministry of 
Defence, though, since there is no indication in the official record, this should be treated with 
caution. An anonymous writer in The New Scientist, (3/12/1959), pp. 1126-1127 stated that 
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Frederick Brundrett as Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee that he was groomed;” 
Instead Cook went to the UKAEA in 1958. 
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   As the case of A. B. Wood, mentioned earlier, demonstrates.  
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   Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 114-116. 
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became famous after the war as achievements of the academics 
temporarily recruited had started well inside the pre-existing 
government machinery.177 At the individual level, the careers of 
both Cook and Brundrett demonstrate very clearly the difference 
that the war made, when we take into account that with the 
beginning of the war they had found themselves in positions of the 
same rank as other capable scientists, Harold Poole and John 
Buckingham respectively. Cook left the war heading his own 
research establishment and Brundrett being Chief RNSS, while the 
latter remained in their positions. 
The careers of Brundrett and Cook analysed in detail in this 
chapter exemplify the contrasts between career government 
scientists and outsiders, especially regarding career patterns and 
professional experience. Of the two important outsiders, Tizard and 
Zuckerman, only the first had some hands-on government R&D 
experience and neither had headed an R&D establishment. For 
Tizard and Zuckerman government service was one of the 
activities they had engaged before they assumed positions in the 
MoD. It is with the contrasts between these individuals in mind that 
this thesis will now turn to evaluate their roles as scientists in 
government and their influence in defence and nuclear policy. 
 
  
                                                 
177
   I use the term scientific contributions so that I can include Operational Research, which was often 
cited in the post-war period as one of the most important contributions in the war effort, and as we 
saw in the introduction, it is still treated this way in the literature. 
Chapter IV 
 
The Defence Research Policy Committee  
and the Ministry of Defence in the 1950‟s 
 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 
The Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) has been 
studied only by historians looking for a science interest.1 It has yet 
to be studied within the context of defence politics, or its role in 
R&D policy and general defence policy analysed.2 This chapter will 
argue that the DRP Committee was in fact the main channel 
through which the Ministry of Defence exercised its influence within 
Whitehall during the early Cold War period, not only in matters of 
defence research and development, but defence policy in general.3 
As I show in the next chapter it was here that the 1957 White 
Paper on Defence found one of its main sources of support in the 
defence establishment, by advocating the replacement of aircraft, 
which were supported by the Ministry of Supply, with missiles. In 
this chapter I will concentrate on how the committee developed 
and how it came to challenge the power of the Ministry of Supply 
                                                 
1
  Jon Agar and Brian Balmer, “British Scientists and the Cold War: The Defence Research Policy 
Committee and information networks, 1947-1963.” HSPS, 28:2 (1998), pp. 209-252, at p. 209-210. 
Characteristically, the only historiographic reference to a non-history-of-science literature is a 
general-popular account of British post-war defence policy (Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 
1945, Oxford: 1988). 
2
  The standard account on the Ministry of Defence remains Franklyn Johnson, Defence by Ministry: 
the British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974. (London: Duckworth, 1980); on the concentration on 
its abolition see especially pp. 80-81 and 120-1. It is characteristic that the longest serving DRPC 
chairman and longest serving high official at the Ministry of Defence (Sir Frederick Brundrett) 
doesn‟t have an index entry. See also the standard politics literature, where the DRPC appears in 
passing with no substantiating whatsoever: Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic 
Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British 
Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Ian Clarke, Nuclear Diplomacy and the 
Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962, (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
UP, 1994). 
3
  Brundrett‟s influence can of course be seen to be extended to DRP Committee itself and vice-versa.  
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by wrestling control of missile policy and developing crucial roles in 
nuclear matters. Although it has been branded as an advisory 
committee, and its inception was conceived this way, it should not 
be treated as such. In the mid-1950‟s the committee had risen in 
importance, controlling missile R&D policy, something which 
coincided, or, more accurately, happened in parallel, with 
Brundrett‟s closer involvement and enhanced control over 
committee business. 
This chapter will establish both the novelty and the continuity 
represented by the DPRC. The fact that there was an independent 
chairman – and a scientist at that – of a permanent 
interdepartmental committee at the core of the warfare state was 
indeed something novel. So too was the fact that a powerful 
scientific body should be established, with a strong staff, 
independently of the performers of R&D in the Ministry of Supply 
and the Admiralty. However, there were important, but so far 
neglected, continuities with wartime arrangements for the 
coordination of research and development efforts, resting with the 
Services‟ Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee.  
 
4.2 - The Committee 
 
4.2.1 - Origins and Place in the Ministry of Defence: 
Continuity and Channels of Authority 
 
It is generally accepted that the Defence Research Policy 
Committee was constituted in 1947, after a report on the 
132 
 
centralisation of British scientific effort by Sir Henry Tizard in 1945.4  
According to the standard accounts, the plan was to have a body 
which would formulate a coherent research policy for defence 
matters, constituted by the Services‟ members responsible for or 
related to research and a chairman who would be part of the 
Ministry of Defence as Chief Scientific Adviser and advise the 
Minister and the Chiefs of Staff on matters of research and 
allocation of scientific effort.5 In fact, the creation of the DRPC was 
not such a straightforward affair. 
The first potentially misleading aspect of the standard story is 
that, initially at least, though this would change later, the DRPC 
had no direct responsibility for the setting-up and direct 
administration of R&D programmes, which remained the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty.6 Rather it 
was responsible for reviewing the technical merits of and set the 
priorities between projects, outlining the broad patterns and, 
through comprehensive reviews, giving policy direction for defence 
research and development.7 Second, it was not the case, as is 
suggested by the literature, that the DRPC was a wholly new 
creation suggested by Tizard.8 There was, in fact, and Tizard knew 
                                                 
4
  See Gummett, Scientists, pp. 31-33 and Agar and Balmer, „DRPC‟, pp. 212-3. Tizard was at this 
time president of Magdalen College, Oxford. 
5
  Agar and Balmer, „DRPC‟, pp. 213-5.  
6
   On the significance of the MoS in the immediate post-war period see David Edgerton, “Whatever 
happened to the British Warfare State? The Ministry of Supply, 1945-1951”, in Helen Mercer et al, 
(eds), The Labour Government 1945-51 and the Private Industry: the experience of 1945-1951 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1992), pp. 91-116. 
7
   AVIA 65/516 „Origin and Functions of the DRP Committee and its Staff‟, memorandum by US(R), 
June 1953.  
8
   Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”, pp. 212-213. I have to note at this point that R. V. Jones has indicated (in 
R. V. Jones and William Ferren, “Sir Henry Tizard”, Biographical Memoirs of the Fellows of the 
Royal Society, Vol., 7 (Nov. 1961), pp. 313-348 the existence of an interim committee which was 
the successor of the DCOS Committee and the predecessor of the DRPC, which was chaired by 
Lindemann. Whether the committee ever deliberated or was even formed is not obvious from my 
archival research, so it could be the case that it was intended to be formed and the plan never 
actually materialised before the 1945 election which saw Churchill, and therefore Lindemann, out 
of the picture. 
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this well, already machinery for the central co-ordination in matters 
of R&D, resting with the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee.9 In fact 
the membership of that Committee was almost identical to what 
eventually became the DRPC; the participation of the members of 
the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee did not even require new 
invitations.10 As it was recognised later, when the issue of the 
Controllers joining arose: “The D.R.P. Committee was in effect a 
transmutation of the D.C.O.S. Committee, with an independent 
Chairman and expanded terms of reference..., apart from the 
chairman, all the members had been members of the D.C.O.S. 
Committee.”11  
Further, Tizard‟s recommendations were not taken up in full. 
In fact, what became the DRPC had little to do with what Tizard 
had proposed in October 1945. His memorandum, a personal 
document rather than a report produced after consultation with 
interested parties, stressed the increasing importance of science in 
the period that would follow the war.12 Tizard exemplified this role 
by mentioning the atomic bomb, “which has vividly impressed upon 
us all the tremendous influence of scientific progress on every 
aspect of national and international life.”13 Although he believed 
that in the UK the war had obliged the Services to realise the 
significance of science, unfortunately there was no “adequate 
machinery for real central direction of scientific effort.”14 What 
                                                 
9
   DEFE 7/269, C.O.S. (45) 611 (0), 12/10/1945, „The Central Direction of the Scientific Effort‟, 
memorandum by Sir Henry Tizard (from here on Tizard memorandum). The existence of the Deputy 
Chiefs of Staff Committee is noted in a footnote in Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British 
Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942-1947. (London: The Sherwood Press, 
1988), p. 193, n. 36. 
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   DEFE 7/269, J. M. to Mrs Foster, 4/10/1948. 
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   Ibid.  
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  As is noted by Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”, p. 213. 
13
  DEFE 7/269, Tizard memorandum 
14
  Ibid, my emphasis. 
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Tizard had in mind is obvious by his references to what had 
recently been proposed by Vannevar Bush in the United States, 
the National Research Foundation. However, where Bush 
envisioned a branch that would place some long-range military 
R&D under civilian control, Tizard made clear that the UK should 
avoid giving the relevant organisation he was proposing similar 
authority.15 The individual executive responsibility of each Service 
department had to be retained. Tizard was unfavourably impressed 
by the continued existence of a separate Ministry of Supply. This 
separation of the RAF and Army R&D functions from their parent 
departments, he thought, kept at an unproductive distance the 
people doing the research on weapons from the eventual users of 
the weapons. 
But what was Tizard proposing? Citing a recent effort by him 
to produce a report on the future trends of methods and weapons 
of war, he deplored the fact that there was no single central 
authority to provide him and his colleagues with the information 
they needed. What he wanted, therefore, was a „central scientific 
authority‟ with a dual function: first it would provide “the policy 
direction of defence research and development”; secondly it would 
be an agency of collecting and disseminating information about 
science, which it would then pass on, on the one hand to the 
Chiefs of Staff for their consideration of the implications it could 
have on strategy and, on the other, to the government as a whole 
to direct its policies in relation to science and relate the 
                                                 
15
 DEFE 7/269, Tizard memorandum. By far the best exposition of post-war American policy towards 
science and technology is David M. Hart, Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic 
Policy in the United States, 1921-1953, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), who 
argues that the National Science Foundation ended up being nothing remotely close to what it was 
intended by Bush.  
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implications of its decisions regarding scientific matters.16 Tizard 
wanted a „Scientific Adviser to the Government‟ with special 
emphasis on defence matters and not a person to co-ordinate 
defence research and development.17  
Proposals similar to Tizard‟s for a central direction of the 
nation‟s scientific effort were very popular among scientists in the 
inter-war period, especially those on the Left.18 As early as July 
1938, Tizard had himself submitted a similar proposal to the 
government, calling for a “Central Scientific Committee under the 
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence.”19 These efforts 
culminated with proposals put forward by the Royal Society a year 
or so later, which are perceived to have led to the setting up of the 
Scientific Advisory Committee to the War Cabinet (SAC), which 
itself evolved into the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy (ACSP) 
in the post-war period.20 The value of that organisation is obvious 
by the fact that Tizard himself, as suggested by his sympathetic 
biographer, considered the SAC as “really very ineffective” with the 
main deficiency being its lack of connection “with the needs of the 
fighting Services.”21  
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   DEFE 7/269, Tizard memorandum. 
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   Ibid. It should be noted that Tizard also became chairman of the Advisory Council on Scientific 
Policy (ACSP), so there is reason to think of him as the nominally central figure of scientific advice 
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   See McGucken, Social Relations of Science. 
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   See Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, pp. 29-30.  
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   The ACSP is considered to be the „civil‟ brethren of the DRPC. The fact that Tizard became 
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Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”, p. 212. 
 On the setting up of the SAC and the its evolution to the ACSP see William McGucken, “The Royal 
Society and the Genesis of the Scientific Advisory Committee to Britain‟s War Cabinet”, Notes and 
Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 33, No. 1 (August 1978), pp. 87-115. 
21
   R. W. Clark, Tizard, (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 274-5.  
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It is not at all clear what Tizard‟s „direction‟ would mean in 
practice and the Chiefs of Staff were quick to point out that the 
proposed adviser and his Committee were not to direct anything 
and, thus, introduced a number of qualifications to the proposals 
put forward by Tizard. In one of the revisions of the proposal, the 
Committee on Defence Research Policy would be there, in their 
words, to “advise on the objectives for defence research, the 
required overall scale of effort in terms of men and money and on 
priorities between principal projects.”22 This survived in the wording 
of the first terms of reference of the new committee: “to advise the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee and where appropriate the Defence 
Committee on matters connected with the formulation of scientific 
policy in the defence field.”23 
 
Chart 4. 1 - Initial Position of Chief Scientific Adviser and DRPC in Hierarchy 
 
 
The creation of a new Ministry of Defence in 1946 
complicated matters further. Whereas Tizard had made little or no 
suggestion regarding to whom the committee would be 
accountable, the Chiefs of Staff were eager to establish this 
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   DEFE 7/269, C.O.S. (46) 29 (0), 4/2/1946, Central Direction of Scientific Effort, Report by the 
Chiefs of Staff, Appendix, my emphasis 
23
   Ibid., D.O. (46) 82, 2/7/1946, Central Direction of Scientific Effort, Report by the Chiefs of Staff, 
Appendix 
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clearly. The following revision of the terms of reference, taking into 
account the creation of the Ministry of Defence, stated that the 
Committee would “advise the Minister of Defence on the framing of 
policy to govern scientific research and development undertaken 
by or on behalf of the armed forces of the Crown.”24 But the 
placement of the DRPC under the Minister of Defence would have 
wider implications in terms of authority. As Sir Henry Wilson Smith, 
the first Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, 
recognised in a letter to the Secretary to the Cabinet, “the status of 
the Committee has been raised; the Chairman of the Committee 
will be directly responsible to the Minister of Defence, and not to 
the Chiefs of Staff, as was the original intention.”25  
 
Chart 4. 2 - First Revised Position of Chief Scientific Adviser and DRPC in Hierarchy, 
with the Creation of the MoD 
 
. 
Predictably, this was not acceptable to the Chiefs of Staff. 
When the issue came up for discussion in their Committee, on 1 
                                                 
24
   Ibid, undated and unsigned document, titled „Defence Research Policy Committee‟, c. November 
1946. 
25
   DEFE 7/269, Wilson Smith to Bridges and Brook, 4/12/1946. The attached letter is addressed to 
both Sir Edward Bridges and Sir Norman Brook, since this was the time when the latter was 
succeeding the former as a sole occupant of the position of Secretary to the Cabinet. The drafting of 
the letter came from R. R Powell, later Sir Richard Powell, who was later to become Permanent 
Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. 
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January 1947, the reaction of the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Viscount Montgomery was shared by the rest of the Chiefs.26 
According to the minutes he stated that “it was essential that the 
Chiefs of Staff should be aware of all developments in the research 
and development field in view of its relation to strategy…” He 
therefore recommended that it should be suggested to the Minister 
of Defence, that he might wish to direct that all Defence Research 
Policy papers should be forwarded to him through the Chiefs of 
Staff in order to give them an opportunity of forwarding their 
comments.”27 
What was at issue was made clear to Wilson Smith by the 
Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Major-General Sir 
Leslie Hollis. The Chiefs were afraid that “they, as a Committee, 
would be bye-passed (sic) regarding certain scientific matters on 
which they ought to be kept informed.” Although they did not intend 
to “approve all the Policy committee‟s paper[s]”, “they regard[ed]  
themselves as responsible for advising…[the government] on 
strategical [sic] matters, and as all aspects of scientific 
developments have a bearing on these matters, they think they 
should be kept informed at all stages.” Hollis admitted that 
“although it is perhaps not quite clear in the minutes… they 
directed me to put forward [the] suggestion direct to the Minister [of 
Defence]…that all Defence Research Policy Committee papers 
were forwarded through them.”28 Three days later, and after a 
meeting between Hollis and Wilson Smith, the issue was resolved 
by placing “the Chiefs of Staff…on the official circulation list of all 
papers prepared for and by the Defence Research Policy 
                                                 
26
  Chief of the Imperial General Staff was the Chief of the Army. 
27
   DEFE 7/269, C.O.S. (47) 1
st
 meeting, 1/1/1947, my emphasis. 
28
   Ibid, Hollis to Wilson-Smith, 4/1/1947.  
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Committee… [including] papers forming material during the course 
of the preparation of a Report.”29 Tizard‟s opinion and stance 
towards the matter, if any, is not obvious from the record, the only 
hint coming from the minutes of the first meeting of the DRPC on 
14 January 1947, which present him as saying that “although the 
formal relationship between the [DRP] Committee and the Chiefs 
of Staff had not yet been defined, he thought [that] there could be 
no disagreement with the principle that the Committee should work 
in the closest touch with the Chiefs of Staff.”30  
The situation was finally resolved in a following meeting of 
the Chiefs of Staff, with all the concerned parties present. It was 
again Montgomery who raised the issue and Tizard reaffirmed that 
“naturally the Defence Research Policy Committee would have to 
obtain the views of the Chiefs of Staff on all important matters” and 
thought that the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, who were members of the 
DRPC, could bring to the attention of the Committee when a report 
should be forwarded to the Chiefs for consultation or comment. 
Thus the revised, and final, terms of reference were amended 
accordingly: “To advise the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of 
Staff on matters connected with the formulation of scientific 
policy.”31 
The issue was more than a simple game of words in the 
terms of reference. A hypothetical, and somewhat crude, example 
could make this clear. If the Chiefs of Staff were to issue a 
requirement for a specific weapon, thus initiating research on the 
matter, this would be their desire according to the strategy of the 
country as perceived by them. When the matter came to the 
                                                 
29
   Ibid, Hollis to CAS, First Sea Lord and CIGS, 7/1/1947. 
30
   Ibid, DRP(47), 1
st
 meeting, 14/1/1947. 
31
   Ibid, C.O.S. (47), 11
th
 meeting, 15/1/1947 (my emphasis). 
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attention of the DRPC for consultation, then the Committee might 
have judged, following the terms of reference and advising the 
Minister, that the weapon was not feasible technically, or, worse, 
not desirable. If this recommendation reached the Minister of 
Defence or the Defence Committee without the comments of the 
Chiefs of Staff, then the Ministers would face, instead of a report 
which would incorporate the merits and disadvantages of the new 
weapon (technical and not), two separate reports, which would 
carry the two authorities of the Scientific Adviser (and his 
Committee) and the military advisers. This would no doubt be a 
most undesirable situation for the Chiefs, who would be 
relinquishing a field which had hitherto been their responsibility as 
military advisers to the government, creating, thus, a new centre of 
authority within the Whitehall defence machinery for decision 
making. At the same time, the strong insistence on behalf of the 
Chiefs of Staff points to the seriousness of the government 
establishment regarding matters of organisation and authority and 
the generality, and one is tempted to say aloofness, of Tizard‟s 
proposals. 
Chart 4. 3 - Final Position of Chief Scientific Adviser and DRPC in MoD. The CSA has 
direct access to the Minister of Defence, but the Chiefs of Staff would not be 
superseded 
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The fact that the DRPC as a committee was not created in a 
vacuum and its function had a direct precedent in the government 
machinery is also indicated by the issue of the creation of the 
Defence Research Policy Staff.32 The DRP Staff were to be 
assigned to help the DRPC in the preparation of its reports, 
resembling the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff. It was 
initiated at the same time as the DRPC as the „Joint Inter-Service 
Civil and Scientific Staff‟ which would be responsible for reviewing 
in detail R&D programmes for the Chiefs of Staff. The DCOS 
discussed the matter in a report they produced in August 1946. 
There they pointed out the origins of the DRP Staff making clear 
that they originated from a report by the Chiefs of Staff which had 
nothing to do with the Tizard recommendations for the new Policy 
Committee.33 In fact they were eager to form the Staff even before 
the appointment of a Chairman for the DRPC, since they wanted it 
to serve their own Committee in the preparation for the 1947/1948 
Defence Estimates.34  
When the DRPC came formally into existence it was decided 
that the Staff would combine this function with giving support to the 
Committee, its members being nominated by the DRPC members 
(except for the Secretary of the DSIR) and attached full-time to the 
Ministry of Defence. It was not until 1948 that this dual role was 
„corrected‟ and the Joint Inter-Service Civil and Scientific Staff took 
the form of a working-party as the Defence Research Policy Staff 
with its own Chairman. The function of the Chairman of the DRP 
                                                 
32
   The existence of the Defence Research Policy Staff is virtually unnoticed in the literature and their 
significance will be discussed in more detail later. 
33
   AVIA 54/952, D.C.O.S. (46) 151 (FINAL), 2/8/1946. The report was on „Future Developments in 
Weapons and Methods of War‟; it was produced by the Joint Technical Warfare Committee and 
Tizard had been involved only in the latter‟s scientific sub-committee. On this issue see section 
4.3.3 
34
   AVIA 54/952, D.C.O.S (46) 181, 17/9/1946. 
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Staff would be to give direction to the Staff‟s activities, organise the 
required investigations that the Staff would undertake and, even, to 
advise the Minister of Defence when the Chief Scientific Adviser 
was absent.35 
 
4.2.2 - Composition 
 
As we have already seen, Sir Frederick Brundrett became a 
member of the DRPC in his capacity as Chief of the Royal Naval 
Scientific Service. He was one of the four members representing 
the Navy, more than any of the other Services, the others being the 
Controller of the Navy (Third Sea Lord), the Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff (Fifth Sea Lord), and the Deputy Controller (R&D) and 
Scientific Adviser to the Board of the Admiralty.36 The other 
members of the DRPC were the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the other 
two Services, the Scientific Advisers to the other two Service 
Ministries and the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Supply, along 
with the Controllers of the Ministry.37 
Initially the Controllers were not members of the Committee; 
this happened about a year after it started its functions, when 
issues of development inevitably became part of the Committee‟s 
agenda. A history of the DRPC by the Ministry of Supply noted in 
later years that this was done after some resistance on the part of 
the Ministry of Defence;38 although this seems broadly accurate 
                                                 
35
   DEFE 7/1963, DRP(47)173, 5/12/1947, Note by the DRPC chairman. The issue of the DRP Staff is 
of central importance and will be analysed later. 
36
   See Agar and Balmer “DRPC”, pp. 214-5. The last position was held throughout the existence of 
the Committee by Dr (later Sir) John Carroll. On Carroll see Who‟s Who entry. Carroll was also a 
Sydney Sussex, Cambridge man. 
37
   The holders of scientific and procurement positions during the period 1946-1964 are to be found in 
Appendix I. 
38
   AVIA 65/516, „Origin and Functions‟. 
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the resistance should not be overstated. Tizard‟s initial scepticism 
came from his desire to keep the DRPC small in numbers, with 
himself staying in informal touch with the three Controllers, noting 
that the Controllers, responsible for the immediate running of R&D 
programmes, were preoccupied with short term problems, whereas 
the DRPC would be there to “deal with long-term problems of 
policy.”39 In typical Whitehall minutes language, he said that 
“although the three Controllers were not full members of the 
Committee it was nevertheless important [that they] be kept in 
close touch with [its]...work.”40 As he recognised later, this was not 
working in practice and therefore requested to make the three 
Controllers full members of the Defence Research Policy 
Committee.41  
 
4.2.3 – The Defence Research Policy Staff 
 
As we saw earlier, the DRPC had the support of a staff. The 
intention was that the staff would function in a way similar to that of 
the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, their role 
being formalised in 1948. An internal Ministry of Supply 
memorandum on the origins of the DRPC, described the formation 
of the Staff side of the main Committee as a pretty much 
straightforward matter: the creation of the DRPC in 1946 led to the 
transmutation of a proposed Inter-Service Civil and Scientific Staff, 
which would have been serving the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to a 
technical body that would serve the newly formed DRP Committee. 
                                                 
39
   DEFE 7/269, DRPC 1
st
 meeting, 14/1/1947. 
40
   DEFE 7/269, Ibid. 
41
   DEFE 7/270, Tizard to Minister, 30/9/1948. 
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The Staff‟s membership would consist of representatives of all the 
DRPC members, with the exception of the secretary of the DSIR, 
and they would perform mainly two functions, preparing: 
 
1. Forward-looking studies of defence research policy 
in relation to strategy. 
2. The collation and presentation of information of 
research and development programmes, and the 
formulation of recommendations, e.g. on priorities 
about these programmes.42 
 
It is also explicitly noted that the members of the DRP Staff, 
although coming from different departments had “not generally 
been thought as representing their Departments…, but rather as 
forming a body of thinkers with the necessary understanding of 
research and development and departmental problems to 
undertake the studies required.”43Although the memorandum gives 
an accurate broad view, a number of important variables need to 
be pointed out.  
In the first instance, the initiative for the formation of the Staff 
side of the DRPC came from the same body that, as we have 
seen, was the precursor of the DRPC, namely the Deputy Chiefs of 
Staff Committee (DCOS). Even before the chairman of the new 
Committee had been formally decided, never mind appointed, the 
Deputy Chiefs went ahead with planning the Staff that would 
support the DRPC.44 They proposed for the Staff to be composed 
of as small a number of people as possible, allowing for flexibility, 
                                                 
42
   AVIA 65/516, “Origin and Functions.” 
43
   Ibid. 
44
   AVIA 54/952, “Central Direction of Scientific Effort – Proposals for the composition of the 
planning staff”, D.C.O.S. (46) 151 (final), 2/8/1946. 
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and thought it was “necessary for its activities to be guided on 
behalf of the Defence Research Policy Committee… by an 
independent leader, who would act as Head of the Technical 
Staff.”45 Given the importance of this appointment, the position 
needed to wait to be decided in consultation with whoever was 
appointed chairman of the DRPC.  
In the DCOS Committee meeting that followed, the proposed 
Head of the Technical Staff could act as “Chief of Staff of the 
Chairman of the [DRP] Committee.”46 The military/political analogy 
is very strong and it was even stronger in the first report proposing 
the creation of the Staff. Its author, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, suggested that “it might be convenient to call them 
„Directors of Research Planning‟…on the analogy of the Directors 
of Plans…who form part of the Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee.”47 
A final important aspect to note is the reason why the Deputy 
Chiefs were in a hurry to appoint the Staff before the Chairman of 
the DRP Committee – whom the Staff were intended to serve – 
was appointed. In the words of the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee, Major-General Hollis, “the decision has become further 
complicated by the instructions which the Prime Minister issued… 
to the Chiefs of Staff to prepare an agreed inter-Service 
programme for defence research and development for the year 
1947/1948.”48 This shows very clearly that the business of 
government had to continue, whether the chairman of the DRPC 
                                                 
45
   Ibid. 
46
   AVIA 54/952, Extract of meeting, no date but judging from position in file, c. August 1946.  
47
   AVIA 54/952, “Central Direction of Scientific Effort – Proposals for the composition of the 
planning staff”, D.C.O.S. (46) 145, 20/7/1946. 
48
   And he continued that “unless the joint civil and service scientific staffs can be appointed in the 
very near future, there seems little hope of the Deputy Chiefs producing their report in time.” AVIA 
54/952, Hollis to Bridges, 20/9/1946. 
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had been appointed or not. In other words, Whitehall did not have 
to wait for Tizard and could proceed with its business concerning 
research and development without him.  
The appointment of the DRP Staff is significant and should 
not be overlooked, as the literature has done so far, since it was 
their job to do the large amount of supporting work for the DRPC, 
both clerical and, more importantly, analytical and increased the 
latter‟s chances of becoming an effective and well functioning 
body. It shows that an adequate mechanism for the evaluation of 
defence research and development was set in place before the 
formation of the DRPC. This should not be taken to suggest that 
the DRPC and the appointment of a full time independent 
chairman were of no importance, quite the contrary as this chapter 
will show later; but the matter of continuity is important to note and 
be kept in mind when assessing the significance of a new 
committee and its chairmen. 
 
4.2.4 – Function 
 
Agar and Balmer have argued that “an interest analysis…in the 
case of the DRPC…is unsustainable and flawed.”49 This interest is 
taken to be a „science interest‟, which, in turn, is taken to include 
John Krige‟s argument about British physicists acting as “product 
champions” in the case of British membership to CERN.50 But to 
look for a „science interest‟ at all in the way that the two authors 
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   Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”, p. 210. 
50
   Ibid, p. 210. Krige‟s argument is in John Krige, “Scientists as policymakers: British Physicists 
„advice‟ to their government on membership to CERN (1951-2),” in Tore Frangsmyr, Solomon’s 
House Revisited: the Organisation and Institutionalisation of Science, (Cantor, MA: Science 
History Publications, 1990), pp. 270-291, quoted in ibid., p. 210. 
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imply, is to a large extent to miss the point about the role that the 
DRPC was there to play.51 
As we have seen for the case of the Royal Navy, and to a 
large extent this was the case for the other Service Departments 
and the Ministry of Supply after the war, the role of the Chief 
Scientist/Scientific Adviser was not primarily to run projects or head 
establishments. He was there to run and to be responsible for the 
organisation and allocation of the scientific personnel; to carry out 
in the establishments that he did run such research as it was 
required/requested by the rest of the establishments according to 
the needs of the Service; and to be able to coordinate efforts in 
research between the different establishments and offer advice on 
the course to be taken.52 His work was supplemented by that of the 
Deputy Controller (R&D) who was there to oversee the link 
between research and development, the later being the 
responsibility of the Controller of the Navy and the various 
Directors under him.  
In many ways the role that the DRPC and the Chief Scientific 
Adviser as its Chairman were intended to play was to be 
analogous to that of the Chief Scientist/Scientific Adviser for the 
total of the defence R&D field. As we have seen, at the beginning 
of its function the Controllers were not included as members and 
the role of the Committee was to “formulate a coherent scientific 
policy covering the whole range of research, paying due 
consideration to the priorities to be observed in research and the 
                                                 
51
   Furthermore, as we will see later, some scientists were indeed acting as „product champions‟ in 
certain instances. Their interest, of course, was not science, but one or another line of research 
towards a specific technological project, which they thought would best serve their country‟s needs. 
52
   See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4. 
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effort to be devoted to each objective.”53 Since it is obvious that 
this separation between research and development is difficult if not 
impossible to sustain, the Controllers duly became members of the 
Committee, but at the same time the DRPC did not expand to the 
all encompassing role that Tizard had intended for it, namely that 
of a „central scientific authority‟, given the heightened role of 
science in the post-war period.54 The DRPC was to assume the 
responsibility and role, which would combine the roles of Chief 
Scientist/Scientific Adviser, and some of the functions of the 
Controller, for the whole of the defence R&D field. 
It is crucial to remember that this „heightened role of science,‟ 
to use Tizard‟s terminology, had already been recognised and 
acted upon from the inter-war period, with the establishment of the 
scientific and technical pools in the Admiralty, the appointment of 
Scientific Advisers in all the Service Ministries before the beginning 
of the Second World War and even, it could be argued, the 
creation of a unified Ministry of Supply after the war. In a post-war 
period with the greater demands for coordination of the defence 
effort, the all important aspect of research and development on 
new weapons and materiel for the Services was the first one to be 
put into „coordinating practice.‟ It is not by chance that the Garrod 
Committee on the Organisation and Work of the Scientific 
Branches of the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty had 
recognised this and recommended that the DRPC should be the 
main spearhead of the coordinating role of the Ministry of 
Defence.55 This was the initial thought behind the initiation of the 
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   Quoted in Agar and Balmer, “DRPC,” p. 213, my emphasis. 
54
   Quoted in ibid. See also Clark, Tizard, pp. 375-376. 
55
   The Garrod Committee was an ad hoc Committee, constituted at the initiative of PM Attlee himself 
and started work in the middle of 1950 and delivered its report in April 1951; it can be found in 
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Defence Research Policy Committee and its placement under the 
new Ministry and the role attributed to it should be seen within this 
framework.  
Therefore, even if the DRPC should not be seen as a unified 
voice for science, whatever this may be taken to mean, its 
scientific credentials and expertise were of crucial importance. In 
many ways it can be seen as the culmination of the process of the 
rising status of the scientist within the state (defence) machinery 
which had started from the early years of the inter-war period. 
Moreover, and contrary to the perceived wisdom on the matter,56 
the scientific credentials of the DRPC and its chairman and 
members should be seen as what gave it the central position it 
acquired within the Whitehall machinery of decision making.57 
Thus, the Ministry of Defence was in the peculiar situation of 
having the advice of two senior civilian officials of an equal status; 
one was the traditional Civil Service administrator, the Permanent 
Secretary, and the other the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister. 
The equal status of the two is highlighted by the fact that, after the 
period of the exceptional chairmanships of Tizard and Cockcroft,58  
the Chief Scientific Adviser and Chairman of the DRPC, Sir 
Frederick Brundrett, a career scientific civil servant, received the 
same salary as the then Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, Sir 
                                                                                                                                            
PREM 8/1358. See also the MoS files AVIA 54/1460 and AVIA 54/1464. 
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   Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, Hilary Rose and Stephen Rose, Science and Society, (London: 
Allen Lane, 1969), Franklyn Johnson, Defence by Ministry, and implicitly Agar and Balmer, 
“DRPC”. 
57
   As we shall see later, this central position was not given to the DRPC and its chairmen as a carte 
blanche, but it took hard work on their behalf and considerable manoeuvring to establish it. 
58
   Exceptional in that they were in effect part-time in their positions since they held other 
appointments as well. Tizard also chaired the ACSP, considered the civil brethren of the DRPC, and 
for that he was taking a combined salary considerably higher than normal. The same was the case 
for Cockcroft who was in practice part-time chairman of the DRPC, since he held his position as 
Director of the AERE, Harwell. 
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Harold Parker.59 To this extent it is certainly misleading to suggest 
that it was not until 1960 that the Chief Scientific Adviser and the 
Permanent Secretary ranked together under the Minister of 
Defence.60 
The accumulation of supervising and controlling power in the 
hands of the DRPC did not take place overnight.61 It actually took a 
number of years, a fact which has led to the misleading, common 
perception that the MoD's scientific organisation was at its most 
powerful position after 1964 (though now with a different name and 
structure) with the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence and 
the subordination of the Service Departments and the Ministry of 
Aviation (successor to the MoS) to the Ministry of Defence, and 
through the efforts of the Chief of the Defence Staff Lord 
Mountbatten and Sir Solly Zuckerman, the then Chief Scientific 
Adviser.62 What will be demonstrated in the next section is that this 
process of the concentration of power in the DRPC and the 
Ministry of Defence took place during the years when Sir Frederick 
Brundrett took the reins of the Committee, namely almost all of the 
1950‟s. The main rival to this centralised role was the Ministry of 
Supply.  
 
 
 
                                                 
59
   The pay was at £4500. See the Imperial Calendar and Civil Service List for the year 1955.  
60
   Johnson, Defence by Ministry. In fact, in 1964, Zuckerman‟s salary was lower than that of Sir 
Henry Hardman, the Permanent Under-Secretary of the reorganised Ministry of Defence (£8200 and 
£8625 respectively). During this period the most senior official at the MoD in terms of salary was 
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Calendar and Civil Service List for the year 1964. 
61
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62
   See Johnson, Defence by Ministry, p. 67;  
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4.3 – Concentrating Influence in the Ministry of 
Defence  
 
As Franklyn Johnson has recognised, “the Ministry of Supply had 
considerably longer tradition than [the Ministry of] Defence.”63 This 
stemmed from the fact that about all of its constituent departments 
and personnel were coming from the Service Ministries, with their 
long tradition, authority and independence and gave it an 
autonomous existence. In Johnson‟s words again, “Tizard, as [the 
first] chairman of the DRPC and also as Chief Scientific Adviser 
agreed [with that] and operated accordingly.”64 This can be 
explained by two different factors. The first is the obvious fact that 
a new Committee within Whitehall, as probably every new body 
within an established, functioning machinery, could not claim right 
away the authority to overcome long traditions of seniority and 
independence. The constitution of the DRPC, with its members 
coming from the very Departments which the new Committee was 
intended to supervise, was not necessarily helpful.65 
Another reason that could be put forward, though, is the 
position and person of the first chairman of the DRPC himself. 
Despite his pre-war and war experience, or even because of it, 
Tizard obviously needed some time to familiarise himself with the 
work done in Departments and defence research establishments of 
which he had no experience or possibly even hadn‟t heard of when 
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   Ibid, p. 32 
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   Ibid. 
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   This is the standard reason presented for the weakness of the DRPC as a body. See Johnson, 
Defence by Ministry, p. 31 and Agar and Balmer, “DRPC”, p. 244-5. The perception was common 
in Whitehall as well: see indicatively the MoS file AVIA 54/1460 and also DEFE 7/1393 „The 
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he assumed his duties.66 To a large extent the power of a 
Committee is carried through by the power, influence and respect 
that its chairman enjoys67 and although Tizard was a very 
respected member of the establishment, as Phillip Chaston has 
very convincingly shown,68 this very fact can be interpreted as a 
reason for him not to be very pushy in his dealings with the very 
establishment that accepted him and gave him the position which 
he held; or even that he was not in a position to deal with 
Whitehall.69  
This of course does not mean that Tizard did not try to extend 
his and his Committee‟s powers. He did this in relation to the 
crucial field of nuclear weapons, an issue from which he had been 
excluded from the war period. His efforts were initially supported 
and later continued and augmented in a much more successful 
way by Brundrett, who made the Ministry of Defence a centre point 
for a number of important defence projects. This is a process 
which has not been identified in the literature, but which was of 
crucial importance for the dynamics of the defence politics of the 
1950‟s. 
 
4.3.1 – Institutional Control: The Importance of the 
Defence Research Policy Staff and the Chairman of the 
Staff. 
 
The formation of the Staff side of the DRPC was an issue that 
caused problems from very early on. An early objection to the idea 
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   Tizard was involved mainly with aeronautical research for most of the inter-war and war periods. 
See Clark, Tizard, passim. 
67
   And vice versa. 
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   Phillip Chaston, “Gentlemanly professionals within the civil service: scientists as insiders during 
the interwar period” Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Kent, 1997. 
69
   Clark, Tizard, p. 387 notes Tizard‟s frustration that he was forced to work “through the proper 
channels” and that he felt “cabined, cribbed, confined by Civil Servants.” 
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came from the Ministry of Supply, or at least from some quarters in 
the Ministry, making clear in the summer of 1947 that “we should 
object strongly to one aspect of the proposals [for the setting up of 
the DRPC machinery] which have now been accepted by the 
Defence Committee, namely the creation of a permanent staff 
attached to an Interdepartmental Committee.”70 The same official 
explained a couple of weeks later that “[i]f an interdepartmental 
Committee has a substantial staff there is a danger that it will try to 
do work which the Departments should do and can do more 
efficiently” instead of performing the function which should be its 
purview, namely “to co-ordinate the work of different Departments, 
to resolve their conflicts of interest and take decisions which 
individual Departments cannot take for themselves.”71 For the 
Assistant Secretary (Air 2) the fact that the title „Planning Staff‟ was 
replaced with „Technical Staff‟ was a good thing, but warned that 
“the activities of the new staff will want careful watching.”72 
Indeed, by early 1951, and in response to the Garrod 
Committee‟s recommendations, the Ministry of Supply felt that the 
DRP Staff was intruding into matters that were the purview of their 
Ministry. According to the in-house history of the DRPC and its 
functions cited earlier, “sections of the Ministry of Defence were 
trying to run the Ministry of Supply from the outside” to a bad effect 
for the British research and development efforts, since they didn‟t 
have “proper understanding of the issues involved.”73 The Ministry 
went as far as to recommend “that the DRP Staff should be 
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   The issue was more important than this, since it appears that the Air side of the Ministry of Supply 
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   Ibid. 
73
   AVIA 65/516, “Origin and Functions” 
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abolished „at any rate in its present form.‟”74 The Ministry of Supply 
was dissatisfied with the Staff on two grounds. On the one hand 
they were not administratively oriented enough and therefore could 
not appreciate the way the Departments were run and operated; 
on the other they were not technically expert enough to be well 
informed on every aspect of the research and development field 
and by consequence had to turn too often to the Departments for 
explanation and information.75 
Even if the above criticism was accurate, the issue 
concerning the Staff was not just one of how its members were 
„equipped.‟ The Staff were there to prepare the papers, reports etc. 
that would be discussed in the main Committee. Although, of 
course the agenda of the Committee was set by its Chairman and 
members, the basis for the discussion that would follow was set by 
what was prepared by the DRP Staff.76 The Committee‟s most 
important function, the annual reports on, and various reviews of, 
research and development, were not prepared by DRP Committee 
members, who were, in the end, full time official in other Ministries, 
but by the DRP Staff. Obviously, the instructions concerning the 
reports-reviews were given by the Chairman of the DRPC and the 
Staff were guided by their own Chairman. So the interaction 
between the Chairman of the DRPC and the Chairman of the DRP 
Staff was of crucial importance, since the latter was in effect the 
person who would act as the Chief Scientific Adviser‟s „Chief of 
Staff‟.77  
Although Tizard made it look like the idea of a DRP Staff 
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   Ibid. This was at the time of the workings of the Garrod Committee, so before April 1951. 
75
   Ibid.  
76
   This was not to be a procedure exclusive to the DRPC. 
77
   A term which as we have seen was in fact used by officials. 
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chairman was his own initiative, in an effort to render the function 
of his one year-old Committee more effective,78 in fact, as we have 
seen, it was in the plans even before he was appointed at his post 
in the Ministry of Defence.  
 
Chart 4. 4 – Chairmen of the Defence Research Policy Staff 
 
 
Tizard‟s choice for the first Chairman of the Staff side of the 
DRPC was Dr (later Sir) Owen Wansbrough-Jones, the Scientific 
Adviser to the Army Council and a member of the DRPC; the 
Minister of Defence wrote to his counterpart at the War Office to 
seek permission for the appointment, which was to be on a part-
time basis;79 Wansbrough-Jones, as well as all his successors, 
would of course retain their official positions in their parent 
departments. According to DRPC minutes, the role for the 
Chairman of the DRP Staff was to give direction to their activities 
(e.g. on the writing and drafting of reports and memoranda for the 
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   DEFE 7/1963, DRP (47) 173, 5/12/1947, Note by the DRPC Chairman. 
79
   DEFE 7/1963, Alexander to Shinwell, 27/11/1947. 
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DRPC), to organise the investigations that the Staff would be 
required to undertake, and, even, advise the Minister of Defence, 
when the Chief Scientific Adviser was absent.80 A little later, 
though, this last arrangement created problems, since “some of the 
members of the [DRP] Committee are doubtful about… [its] 
wisdom.”81 At issue was the obvious fact that it would not be 
appropriate for the Scientific Adviser to a Service Ministry to give 
advice personally to the Minister of Defence. Why and how 
Wansbrough-Jones was chosen to be Chairman is not clear from 
the available record, neither is the issue of how the change in the 
Chairmanship would take place later on and what criteria would 
apply.  
 The next Chairman of the Staff was Sir Frederick Brundrett, 
who served from January 1949 to November 1952. Tizard wrote to 
that effect to Lt.-General Sir Kenneth Crawford, Deputy Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, in September 1948, having proposed 
“to the Minister [of Defence] that Mr Brundrett should take over the 
Chairmanship of the Working Staff” explaining to him that the latter 
would be “very willing to undertake the work.”82 About ten months 
into Brundrett‟s appointment and when Tizard was making plans 
for his retirement, we have seen that the latter suggested as his 
replacement as DRPC chairman Sir John Cockcroft.83 What is 
significant is that Tizard arranged for a Deputy Chairman to be 
appointed, who would take some load of work from him and see to 
a smooth handover to Cockcroft.84 This position Tizard intended for 
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   DEFE 7/1963, DRP (74) 173, 5/12/1947, Note by the DRPC Chairman. 
81
   AVIA 54/952, Tizard to Minister, 17/12/1947. 
82
   Ibid., Tizard to Crawford, 7/9/1948. The announcement of the appointment is in DRP(48)155, 
1/11/1948 and was to take effect from 1 January 1949. 
83
   See the section on Brundrett. 
84
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Brundrett: “He has been acting as Chairman of the DRP Staff all 
this year, in addition to his normal duties [as CRNSS at the 
Admiralty]. Mr Brundrett is 55 years of age. I believe that he does 
not wish to continue in Government Service after…60.”85 Unlike 
Wansbrough-Jones, Brundrett stayed as chairman of the Staff for a 
total of almost four years, from January 1949 to November 1952, 
well into Cockcroft‟s assumption of the Chairmanship of the DRPC. 
Thus under his responsibility fell the entire preparation of the bulk 
of papers and reports that went to the DRPC for discussion and 
approval. This should be seen not simply as carrying out the 
transition between the two Chairmen of the DRP Committee, but a 
tightening of control of the information that reached the Committee. 
Thus in mid 1952, when Cockcroft assumed the Chairmanship of 
the DRPC, Brundrett was by far the most knowledgeable of the 
members of the committee and with a strong grip over its 
procedures and agenda. It is not surprising, therefore, that when in 
1954 Cockcroft decided to return full time to the Atomic Energy 
Research Establishment, Brundrett was the designated Chairman 
of the main Committee.86  
The almost four years that Brundrett spent supervising the 
work of the Staff must have created grievances within the 
Committee; compared to his predecessor from the War Office it 
lasted markedly longer. The man to replace him as Chairman of 
the DRP Staff was Dr (later Sir) Robert Cockburn, taking charge in 
December 1952. His capacity at the time was Scientific Adviser to 
                                                                                                                                            
DRPC and was filled by the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Brundrett was additionally 
appointed Deputy Scientific Advisers, a new post, which indicates the heightened role that the 
appointment would have. 
85
   T 213/85, Tizard to Minister, 18/10/1949. 
86
   The Minister of Defence wrote to the Prime Minister that “In practice…Sir Frederick Brundrett has 
been acting as my Chief Scientific Adviser since I became Minister.” DEFE 11/261, Alexander to 
PM, 14/5/1954. 
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the Air Ministry, thus suggesting an agreement that the position 
would rotate between the scientific advisers of each of the three 
services, especially given that Cook, at this point Chief of the 
Royal Naval Scientific Service, appears to have been somewhat 
disappointed not to take the position himself.87 
It is from around this time that the issue of the DRP Staff 
chairmanship was definitely regarded as more important than 
hitherto. A letter in March 1954 from the DCIGS, Lieutenant-
General Sir Dudley Ward, to Brundrett makes this clear.88 Ward 
stated that he was “more than ever convinced that the Chairman at 
any one time should be found from the permanent members of the 
Staff.”89 The explanation he gave for this belief sheds light to 
exactly what the role of the Chairman of the Staff meant at this 
time: “I believe [that] if a Chairman…is appointed from the DRPC, 
he is, in fact, exercising the power of direction of the staff that 
should be exercised by the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman of 
the DRPC.”90 In other words, if the Chairman of the Staff was a 
DRPC member from, say, the Air Ministry, then the Staff would be 
susceptible to be influenced towards an Air Ministry line.91  
Keeping this in mind, the appointment of William Cook to the 
Chairmanship of the DRP Staff in April 1954 is a strong indication 
that Brundrett was attempting to keep a firmer control of the Staff 
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   Wansbrough-Jones from the Army, Brundrett from the Admiralty and Cockburn from the Air 
Ministry. Cook wrote: “I am quite happy about the proposal that Dr Cockburn should succeed Sir 
Frederick Brundrett as Chairman of the DRP Staff and have no further comments to make.” AVIA 
54/952, Cook to Joint Secretaries, 21/11/1952 (my emphasis). He would have been the second in a 
row Chairman of the Staff to come from the Admiralty. 
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   The fact that he sends the letter to Brundrett and not to Cockcroft, at this time still Chairman of the 
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   AVIA 54/952, Ward to Brundrett, 12 March 1954. 
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   Ibid. 
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   Ward was quick to point out that his views were not coloured by personality, but rather that it was a 
matter of correct organisation. In a very „technocratic‟ line he added that “it is entirely wrong to 
organise for personalities” and the issue of who takes a post should be decided after an organisation 
should be formatted, according to what it is best. Ibid. 
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than his predecessors had done. We have seen already that the 
relationship between Brundrett and Cook was close.92 A further 
indication of their close relationship is an acknowledgement by 
Brundrett himself, when, as is customary, he wrote to Cook to 
thank him for his tenure as Chairman of the Staff:  
 
…the Committee wish me, and in any case I certainly wish 
myself, to express to you our very sincere thanks for the work 
you have done in your capacity as Chairman of the Staff. This 
has been very valuable to the Committee and even more 
valuable to me personally. You succeeded during your relatively 
short period of work in the appointment in bringing a very 
valuable influence to bear and the work of the Staff improved 
accordingly under your guidance to a considerable extent.93 
 
Indeed, during Cook‟s tenure the Staff produced some of their 
most comprehensive papers regarding defence strategy and its 
relation to R&D policy.94 
Equally important was the appointment of Cook‟s successor 
as DRP Staff Chairman in the person of Eric C. Williams in 
December 1954. In the first instance it doesn‟t appear that he was 
in anyway related to Brundrett, but on a closer look, Williams‟ 
career strongly suggests otherwise.95 He had served on 
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   The latter brought the former to the Admiralty as Director of Physical Research and later designated 
him as his successor to the position of Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific Service, despite Cook‟s 
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   AVIA 54/952, Brundrett to Cook, 25/11/1954, my emphasis. 
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   See the papers in DEFE 10/74 and Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 of this thesis. Cook‟s tenure as 
Chairman of the Staff was particularly brief, from April to November 1954, when Cook left to 
become Deputy Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, with special 
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operational research matters throughout the war96 and in the post-
war period, after a year at the Imperial Defence College, he ended 
up as Assistant Scientific Adviser at the Air Ministry, a position 
which introduced him to the DRP Staff.97 Crucially, Williams left the 
Air Ministry in 1949 to become Director of Operational Research in 
the Admiralty thus reporting to William Cook who at the time was 
Director of Physical Research. When the latter became Chief of 
the Royal Naval Scientific Service (1950) Williams remained the 
Admiralty representative to the DRP Staff, making him the longest 
serving member to that body. His next post, and almost coinciding 
with his appointment as Chairman of the DRP Staff, is of crucial 
importance. He was transferred to the Ministry of Defence with a 
permanent post, becoming, in 1955, Scientific Adviser on 
Intelligence, a post created by Brundrett and was, thus, the first 
chairman of the Staff who held a position within the Ministry of 
Defence organisation. In all but name, Williams became 
Brundrett‟s deputy in the MoD, assisting him as Chairman of the 
Staff and on matters of nuclear intelligence.98 
Brundrett‟s placement of people of his confidence as 
chairmen of the Staff is not surprising and it was definitely dictated 
by his own experience.  His own appointment to the chair of the 
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  In fact the very term „Operational Research‟ was coined by A. P. Rowe in connection with the work 
done by a small team under Williams. Air Ministry, The Origins and Development of Operational 
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Staff was how Brundrett had managed to acquire control over the 
main Committee‟s business, gradually transforming him from an 
Admiralty man to a Ministry of Defence scientist. As Chief Scientific 
Adviser, from 1954 onwards, he must have been determined to 
keep the organisation under his responsibility as close to him and 
as independent from Service influence as possible. Thus, his first 
choice was his close collaborator, Cook, and then the latter‟s 
deputy from the Admiralty, Williams, now with a permanent position 
at the MoD. It is evident that Brundrett was gradually creating a 
new focus of scientific expertise outside the traditional Services 
channels. 
 
4.3.2 - DRPC Vs Ministry of Supply 
 
This section will focus on the transfer of balance of power within 
Whitehall, between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 
Supply, which occurred in the 1950‟s and which has been 
neglected by scholars. This process was described, a little less 
than a year after the publication of the 1957 Defence White Paper, 
by Sir Frederick Brundrett, now Chief Scientific Adviser in the 
Ministry of Defence, who wrote to his Minister, Duncan Sandys, 
about the balance of power which prevailed in the field of defence 
research and development: “in the early stages we progressed 
only slowly because the DRP Committee, and indeed the Ministry 
of Defence, had far less influence on the Ministry of Supply than on 
Service Departments.”99 This was, in his opinion, clearly 
exemplified by the existence of both the Victor and Vulcan nuclear 
bombers in Britain‟s forces, which Brundrett believed to be 
                                                 
99
  DEFE 7/1421, Brundrett to Minister [of Defence], 2/1/1958. 
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unnecessary. He went on to make the point clear that the situation 
had changed and that with time the Ministry of Supply had in fact 
shown full cooperation on the drafting of the latest Defence 
Research Policy Review. But Brundrett was clear that although “I 
have been attempting during the past three years in particular, to 
get emphasis shifted from the manned aircraft to the unmanned 
missile,” he complained that there still too much money was being 
spent on the aeroplanes. In the CSA‟s opinion, the savings that the 
Treasury was pushing for in defence-related R&D should come 
from the half of the R&D budget connected with the aircraft 
business.100 In the next chapter I will show how the MoD scientists 
advocated successfully the replacement of the aeroplane by the 
missile. In this section I will show how the relationship between the 
Defence Research Policy Committee and the Ministry of Supply 
evolved up until the late 1950‟s in order to get a perspective on 
Brundrett‟s and in general the MoD‟s influence on the 1957 White 
Paper. 
On 1 May 1950 a new body came into existence, the 
„Research and Development Board‟ (R&D Board) of the Ministry of 
Supply and its Chairman, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, 
Sir Archibald Rowlands, as is customary in new high level 
committees in Whitehall, put on record the reasons behind the 
formulation and the role of the new body. On the one hand the 
Board‟s functions were aimed within the Ministry of Supply itself; it 
would settle internal disputes within the Ministry, a function 
reasonable enough given the Ministry‟s diverse and more often 
than not conflicting interests.101 But the second reason had to do 
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not only with the Ministry itself but with its policy towards the rest of 
Whitehall and “particularly with the DRPC.”102 The Chairman 
stressed that when “controversial matters were coming from the 
DRPC” then the Board would hold a special meeting.103 
If one thinks about it from an organisational point of view, the 
Board can be seen as an equivalent to the DRPC for the internal 
workings of the Ministry of Supply. The Chairman was the most 
senior official of the Ministry, and the members included the Chief 
Scientist, the Controllers and other senior administrative officials 
responsible for R&D. Of course, the overlap between the DRPC 
and the R&D Board was significant, and this should be borne in 
mind, but compared to the DRPC the latter had more 
administrative staff in its composition.104  
The institution of the R&D Board in the Ministry of Supply 
was a tactically important move on behalf of the department. Given 
the reductions in R&D that followed the end of rearmament for the 
Korean War, the Ministry would need an effective policy to 
preserve its sovereignty.105 In fact this was quickly realised within 
the Ministry of Supply itself. In a letter to the secretary of the R&D 
Board, D. W. Bartington, enquiring on why the Ministry of Supply 
had to submit to the DRPC for approval of capital expenditure, the 
Deputy Secretary (C), Cyril Musgrave, wondered why this 
weakening of the Ministry‟s authority was taking place.106 In reply, 
Bartington produced a memo entitled „History and functions of the 
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 AVIA 65/516, Musgrave to Bartington, 2/2/1953. Musgrave would be the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Supply, from 1956 until its abolition in 1959. See his Who‟s Who entry. 
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DRP Committee and its Staff'107 in which he outlined the 
relationship of the DRPC and the Ministry of Supply.108 According 
to him, the crucial period appears to have been April 1951, when a 
significant concession towards the DRPC, and the Ministry of 
Defence in general, was put forward by the report of the Garrod 
Committee on the Organisation and Work of the Scientific 
Branches of the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty. The 
Committee explicitly suggested that the Ministry of Defence “take 
firmer control both over research and development policy and, 
without becoming improperly involved in detail, of the allocation of 
resources and co-ordination of inter-Service programmes.”109 After 
the change of government in 1951 and some qualifications on the 
role of the DRPC,110 the issue was satisfactorily settled. The DRPC 
was to be assessing technical merits and priorities between 
projects, establish the broader patterns to be followed and, through 
comprehensive reviews, formulate an implicit policy direction.  
One problem though was still there. The DRPC kept intruding 
in matters of the Ministry of Supply, at least according to the latter, 
a fact which Bartington judged was due to lack of sufficient MoS 
representation in the Committee, but also due to the „hostility of 
certain personalities‟ towards the Ministry of Supply.111 Another 
problem, probably of equal significance, was also arising. The end 
of the Korean rearmament and the economic difficulties of Britain, 
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made financial concerns much more of a factor than they used to 
be and the Treasury, the final arbiter, considered the DRPC as 
authoritative on research and development matters. Bartington put 
weight on this point to make a recommendation for an increase in 
Ministry of Supply representation in the DRPC. In his words: “…the 
reliance of the Treasury on the recommendations of the [DRP] 
Committee makes it very desirable…for the Accounting Officer [of 
the Ministry of Supply] to be directly represented.”112 This would 
combine the strengthening of the Ministry of Supply with an 
improvement in the DRP Committee itself. Bartington judged that 
one of the current weaknesses of the DRPC in dealing with 
financial matters came from the Staff supporting the main body, 
who were not appropriately chosen for administrative 
considerations. The Ministry of Supply offered two possible 
resolutions: either abolish the Staff altogether or reconstitute its 
membership.113  
Both of the above solutions considered inside the MoS in 
mid-1953 would have a direct impact on the influence of the DRPC 
and the Ministry of Defence in general. Take for example the 
matter of adding administrative staff in the composition of the DRP 
Staff. What this could mean, can be assumed by an incident that 
took place a few years later, when Solly Zuckerman became Chief 
Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence and was looking for an 
extra deputy in his staff at the Ministry. The Ministry of Aviation‟s 
(i.e. the successor of the MoS) reaction to this request sheds light 
into the thinking of placing an administrator within an organisation 
with mostly scientific credentials. An internal MoA letter about who 
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could be Zuckerman‟s second Chief Scientific Officer made this 
clear: “…an administrator would probably be less dangerous from 
a [Ministry of Aviation] departmental point of view, as he would be 
unable to make a contribution to scientific policy.”114 Thus, any 
introduction of administrative personnel in the support staff of the 
DRPC would be intended to undermine the Committee‟s scientific 
credentials and such a suggestion can be seen as a hostile move 
towards the Ministry of Defence‟s exercise of influence in the R&D 
field. 
The other recommendation that Bartington put forward, 
namely to abolish the Staff of the DRPC altogether, would be an 
even more direct blow to the level of influence that the DRPC could 
exert in the defence field inside Whitehall. This is obvious if one 
considers the Staff‟s function. This consisted in preparing the 
matters which the Committee would discuss in its meetings; but, 
even more importantly, the Staff also prepared the annual reviews 
that the DRPC was producing almost every year. In many respects 
it was in these reviews that the influence and authority of the 
DRPC was demonstrated since in them the Committee analysed 
and set the broad lines of the research and development 
programme for the Services. Any abolition of the Staff would 
therefore immediately decrease the capacity of the DRPC to 
produce its comprehensive reviews and thus to a large extent limit 
the Committee‟s scope and reason for existence. As we have 
already seen, the Staff were in fact representatives of the 
members of the DRPC, which meant in effect that they were 
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officially members of their parent departments, but the fact that 
they were attached to the Ministry of Defence can be considered 
as a factor of relative independence. Given a strong and influential 
figure as chairman of the DRPC and a Ministry of Defence official 
as their own chairman, such as Williams, the Staff would feel 
obliged to follow a DRPC-MoD line on matters and dissociate 
themselves, as much as possible, from any obligations they might 
have felt towards their parent departments. 
The efforts on behalf of Ministry of Supply officials to put the 
DRP Staff under control had started even earlier and were 
consistent throughout the 1950‟s. When in 1952 Tizard initiated 
what became the 1954 DRPC review, the R&D Board of the 
Ministry of Supply made clear its intentions to keep the DRP Staff 
on the rails so that they do not draw their own conclusions; instead 
the Staff should consult the Ministry of Supply, since it was the 
latter that should establish the long term scientific trends and not 
the Staff.115 In the view of the DRPC this was an essential part of 
the Committee‟s role. As the Deputy Chairman (Brundrett) told the 
scientific representatives of the MoS and the Admiralty, although it 
would be a difficult task “…unless the Committee attempted it [the 
review], they would not be doing their job.”116 As a result Sir Harry 
Garner, the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Supply, instructed his 
own staff to start preparing for the review and especially its section 
on the long term planning, since the Admiralty had already started 
its own; he also met with William Cook (at the time CRNSS) to 
discuss things.117 
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 In the R&D Board‟s meeting of the 30 June 1952, the 
attitude of the Ministry of Supply was clearly demonstrated. Sir 
Harry Garner, the Chief Scientist, made clear that, although the 
Board had been consistently critical of them, he supported the 
existence both of the DRPC and its Staff and suggested that 
Ministry of Supply representation in the Staff should be increased. 
But the Deputy Secretary (A) was not as supportive. He suggested 
that the Ministry should work with the DRPC, but added also that it 
should make sure that they don‟t “go too far into fields” where they 
can‟t make a useful contribution. The Controller of Guided 
Weapons and Electronics stated clearly that the Ministry‟s 
research programme was its own affair and “hoped [that] there 
would be no question of the [DRP] Committee‟s approving the 
programme” and therefore “exert some sort of control over it.” In 
the end, the Board agreed with its Chairman (the Permanent 
Secretary) that there would be no more MoS members in the DRP 
Staff and that if the Ministry of Defence needed information it 
should ask for it from the experts of the Ministry of Supply.118  
What appears to have been at play was the balance of power 
between the two departments. If the Ministry of Supply passed its 
experts on to the Ministry of Defence it would lose its control over 
general planning and the DRPC‟s directives would be even more 
powerful and authoritative, since they would contain an implied 
approval by the Ministry of Supply. By retaining them, it appeared 
to hold its control over the information and the expertise of the 
Ministry. The rationale behind Garner‟s siding with Brundrett and 
the DRPC on this issue is not clear. Whether he believed that by 
having more members in the DRPC the MoS would influence the 
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DRPC line more or whether he believed that more expertise and 
power should pass on to the DRPC by adding more MoS staff, are 
equally plausible explanations of his behaviour.119 In the end, at 
this point, this is secondary. What matters for assessing the rise in 
influence of the DRPC is the obvious overall hostile reaction of the 
Ministry of Supply towards the Defence Research Policy 
Committee. 
It is important to note at this point that the DRPC had an 
equally hostile attitude towards the Ministry of Supply. Even if all its 
members did not share this kind of attitude, given of course that a 
number of them were coming from the MoS, it is certainly clear that 
the main personality within the Committee, Sir Frederick Brundrett, 
did not hide his feelings. Before we turn to that, one should recall 
that Brundrett was coming from the Admiralty which had retained 
its own procurement and R&D functions, during and after the war 
and had been a central figure in the reorganisations which took 
place within the Admiralty concerning R&D, as Assistant Chief 
(Reconstruction) and then as Chief of the Royal Naval Scientific 
Service. On top of that Brundrett was practically the first senior 
scientific civil servant in the Ministry of Defence, from 1950. 
Brundrett did not shy away from making his views known and 
had a tendency to be more vocal than other members of the Civil 
Service. True to form he didn‟t hesitate to make his views about 
the Ministry of Supply widely known, when he gave a talk on „The 
Scientist and the Services‟ at the exercise “Guardian” in August 
1958. Elaborating on the relationship between the experimental 
establishments and the Services, he again complimented the 
Admiralty and directed his arrows towards the Army and RAF who 
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“depend entirely for the development of their equipment on the 
Ministry of Supply.” According to Brundrett, “this [was] an 
absolutely tragic mistake because it separate[d] the user from the 
people who are trying to meet his requirements and anything 
towards this…is absolutely wrong.”120 Thus, “representatives of the 
Army and the Air Force inside the Ministry of Supply, however 
good they may be, cannot achieve the same result [as the Navy] 
so easily because of the different Ministerial channels of 
responsibility. This is particularly so when, as in the case of the 
Ministry of Supply, the Ministry has other responsibilities and 
objects to serve.”121 This was not only a critique of the issue of a 
separate Ministry of Supply, but of the very functions of the Ministry 
itself. 
There should be little doubt that his views were influenced by 
his experiences in the Admiralty, the post-war organisation of the 
R&D institutions of which he had helped shape. This is obvious 
from a letter he wrote in November 1957 to a member of the 
Minister of Defence‟s office:  
 
When I was CRNSS, I used to have regular meetings with 
the Controller…and the DCNS…and decisions taken at those 
meetings were actually executive decisions… In the organisation 
which I set up I worked on the principle that it was always wise to 
set a thief to catch a thief and the financial control of [a] 
programme…is in detail handled completely by a scientific 
                                                 
120
  The speech is in Churchill Archives, BRUN 1/4; the quote from p. 8 
121
  Ibid. p, 9. What exactly Brundrett means by saying “other…objects to serve” I haven‟t been able to 
establish. It should be noted here that, as was noted earlier, in Section 4.2.1, Tizard‟s view was the 
same as Brundrett‟s, from as early as the Ministry of Supply was announced. Whether he influenced 
Brundrett‟s thinking on the matter is open to discussion, although there is little reason to doubt that 
Brundrett‟s opinion of the Ministry of Supply was developed independently. He was, after all, an 
Admiralty man. 
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organisation under the CRNSS.”122 
 
The result according to Brundrett was that the DRPC was always 
getting the best information from the Admiralty.123 He went on to 
suggest that changes towards these lines should take place within 
the Ministry of Supply, of course with some elaboration, but added 
that “this could only be tinkering with the problem of the Ministry of 
Supply: very much more radical remedies are, I believe, 
necessary.”124 
This obvious hostility between the Defence Research Policy 
Committee and the Ministry of Supply should be seen as a clear 
indication of the importance of the former regarding the R&D 
efforts of the United Kingdom during the post-war period. It was 
only natural when a new force within an established bureaucratic 
environment made its appearance that the older ones would try to 
keep it from 'going into fields' where it couldn't make a useful 
contribution. Of course this was the whole point of the argument; 
who was to be considered in Whitehall the authoritative figure in 
matters relating to R&D policy. Both the Ministry of Supply and the 
Defence Research Policy Committee could claim what would 
conventionally be called expertise. Both bodies had in their ranks 
experienced scientists in both the running of R&D programmes 
and the coordinating of such programmes. But the new Committee, 
situated in a new ministry, was there to perform a new all-
embracing function which in the years before the war had not 
                                                 
122
  This would be the Director of Research Programmes and Planning. See DEFE 7/1421, Brundrett to 
Ward, 18/11/1957. 
123
  Another explanation could be the fact that Brundrett as Deputy and Chairman and then Chairman 
of the DRPC had good relations with the Admiralty. But even if this is the case this confirms that 
the MoS had a hostile attitude towards the DRPC. 
124
  DEFE 7/1421, Brundrett to Ward, 18/11/1957. 
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existed to the extent that was attempted to be done in the post-war 
period, that of the co-ordination of R&D efforts between all three 
Services and their procurement agencies. Thus, the issue of 
expertise being one matter to which both bodies could have equal 
claim being one battlefield, other methods were also followed, 
associated in our minds more with the administrative branch of the 
civil service, to achieve the aim of overseeing control of the 
research and development effort. The control of the DRP Staff we 
have already examined; but the DRPC chairmen, and especially 
Brundrett, sought to expand their influence through extra channels 
which are the subject of the next section. 
 
4.3.3 – The Ministry of Defence, the Bomb and Guided 
Weapons. 
 
The exclusion of the DRPC from nuclear matters has been seen 
as one reason for the Committee‟s lack of power in the Whitehall 
machinery.125 Agar and Balmer use this to explain the level of 
priority the Committee attached to research on biological and 
chemical weapons research, an argument which dominates the 
bulk of their analysis.126 This line of analysis derives from the 
story of Tizard‟s struggle over nuclear weapons, which has been 
extensively described by Margaret Gowing and has become 
commonplace.127 However, a different reading is preferable: the 
relationship of the DRPC with nuclear matters can be seen as the 
                                                 
125
   See for example, Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, p. 33. The argument is already there in the 
official history of the atomic bomb project. See Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: 
Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, Vol.1. 
126
   Agar and Balmer, “DRPC.” pp. 211 for the argument and 215-224 for the story. 
127
   See Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence. pp. 224-233.  
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first phase of a battle that the chairmen of the Committee fought 
inside Whitehall; this was a battle over priorities in the defence 
research and development budget and one which by the end of 
the decade had placed the position of the Chief Scientific Adviser 
and the DRPC at the very centre of decision-making. Seen within 
this new framework, the story of the DRPC and nuclear weapons 
can be interpreted in a new, more informative light, which brings 
out a picture in which guided weapons were most important. 
To put matters in perspective, we should remember that the 
primary responsibility of the DRPC lay with the general 
supervision of the R&D effort, the allocation and coordination of 
scientific personnel and the setting of priorities between different 
projects in accordance with “the operational requirements 
formulated by the Chiefs of Staff.”128 The atomic energy project 
was under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister and was 
given from the very beginning the highest degree of priority. The 
responsibility for the implementation of the programme rested 
with the Ministry of Supply and its Department of Atomic Energy, 
headed by the Controller of Production, Atomic Energy a position 
held by Lord Portal.129 It is very important to note that Portal, 
though nominally part of the hierarchy of the Ministry of Supply, 
was responsible not to his immediate Minister, but directly to the 
Prime Minister.130 The initial arrangement for the DRPC‟s and 
Tizard‟s involvement with the project was a sub-committee to the 
DRPC, namely the Atomic Energy (Defence Research) 
                                                 
128
   Quoted in Agar and Balmer, “DRPC” p. 214. 
129
   Lord Portal was the war time Chief of the Air Staff. On Portal see Denis Richards, Portal of 
Hungerford: the life of Marshall of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal of Hungerford. (London : 
Heinemann, 1977). 
130
   Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1, p. 40-1. Gowing notes that he “saw his function as 
strictly related to production and flatly refused to extend them” (p.41). 
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Committee, established at the end of 1947.131 
Tizard, and the DRPC, were kept initially out of the nuclear 
club in the strict sense of having control over the programme. 
This was not at all peculiar and there are two principal 
explanations for it. The first is the nominal role that the DRPC 
had: it was supposed to be a co-ordinating body and not an 
executive one. The second, and equally important, is Tizard‟s 
own attitude towards the matter of nuclear weapons. His proposal 
for the constitution of a body that turned out to be the DRPC 
came after he was asked to preside over a scientific sub-
committee of the Joint Technical Warfare Committee (JTWC). 
The JTWC was established at the end of 1943 to “co-ordinate 
and direct the technical study of… operational projects and 
problems.”132 The Tizard (sub-) Committee, which began 
investigations in the beginning of 1945, was comprised only of 
scientists with official positions in the Services and was supposed 
“to review the position and to forecast to the best of their ability 
developments in weapons and methods in each important field of 
warfare during the next 10 years, having regard both to 
theoretical possibilities and also to the practical limitations at 
present foreseeable.”133 It was excluded from consideration of 
atomic matters and Julian Lewis notes that this was probably 
because of Tizard‟s own initial scepticism on the matter, but also 
because of the level of secrecy that was deemed desirable to 
surround the issue. Churchill himself had given the relevant 
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   Ibid, pp. 35-36. 
132
   Quoted in Lewis, Changing Direction, p. 179. 
133
   Quoted in ibid, p. 180-1. The other members of the (sub-) Committee were the existing Scientific 
Advisers: J. D. Bernal (Combined operations), P. M. S. Blackett (Admiralty), Charles (soon to be 
Sir Charles) Ellis (War Office) and Sir George Thomson (Air Ministry). They were all academics 
recruited during the war and left soon afterwards. 
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directive, noting that “one must always realise that for every one 
of these scientists who is informed there is a little group around 
him who also hears the news.”134 
Given this shortcoming, the (sub-) Committee‟s findings 
were bound to be, if not flawed, at least inadequate. But 
problems with its work had begun to surface before the bombs in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki made the secret of the possibility of 
atomic bombs public. It was deemed necessary for the report to 
be revised and to take into consideration the opinion of the 
Services, which Tizard had tried to keep out of involvement from 
the outset.135 After strong criticism by the Air Staff for exclusion of 
their Service input in the relevant considerations of the Tizard 
(sub-) Committee‟s report, even though the information that the 
committee had used originated from the Services, and the 
obvious disadvantage of lack of up-to-date consideration of 
atomic matters in the report,136 a compromise was sought. The 
Chiefs of Staff approved the issuing of a new, revised report by 
the official body which was supposed to advise them in these 
matters, namely the Joint Technical Warfare Committee, under 
the temporary chairmanship of Tizard himself and with full access 
to atomic information, provided by the newly constituted Advisory 
Committee on Atomic Energy.137 
                                                 
134
   Ibid, p. 181. The quote is taken from Clark, Tizard, p. 365. The quote from Churchill does not 
seem to indicate that the „redness‟ of Blackett and Bernal who were members of the Committee was 
an issue. Whether Lindemann was behind this exclusion is again difficult to establish and in many 
ways irrelevant, although it should not be excluded as a possibility. If the expression „these 
scientists‟ refers to the members of  Tizard‟s sub-committee it is a clear indication of how 
academics with official positions were seen in some quarters. 
135
   Lewis, Changing Direction, pp. 187-89 notes that Tizard tried to bypass the JTWC to which his 
sub-committee had to report its findings. 
136
   It should be noted that despite the lack of information on atomic developments Tizard and his 
committee delved deliberately into atomic matters. 
137
   Lewis, Changing Direction, p. 190-1. The Advisory Committee on Atomic energy was the main 
body advising the PM on atomic matters for the first 15 months after the war. It was chaired by Sir 
John Anderson, the man responsible for atomic energy during the war as Lord President and later as 
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It is very important that at this point Tizard refused to 
participate in the revision of his own report. Lewis notes as 
reasons only the ones offered by Tizard‟s sympathetic 
biographer, although one is tempted to explain his refusal in 
terms of his “prickly character.”138 The fact that his encounter with 
the Chiefs of Staff after his refusal to take on the task was a 
cordial one and the one in which the foundation of the Defence 
Research Policy Committee were laid suggests that Clark‟s 
explanation and insistence that Tizard was reluctant to get 
involved with Whitehall politics again, because of the intrigues he 
encountered therein, are open to serious doubt.139 
Gowing notes how Tizard‟s Atomic Energy (Defence 
Research) Committee did not give Tizard any “control” over the 
atomic energy programme.140 As we saw above, though, this can 
be explained by Tizard‟s own refusal to get involved with atomic 
matters in September 1945. Thus, the fact that he was not a 
member of Anderson‟s Atomic Energy Committee is enough to 
explain only Tizard‟s grudge over the matter, though certainly not 
the position of the DRPC within the general defence R&D 
organisation. Besides, by the time the DRPC was constituted as 
a body and started its functions, Anderson‟s Committee had 
ceased to function, since it had already completed its task, 
namely “to advise the Government [on] what steps should be 
taken for… [atomic energy] development in this country for 
                                                                                                                                            
Chancellor of the Exchequer. See Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Vol. 1, pp. 24-7 and 
especially 25. 
138
   See Lewis, Changing Direction, p. 191 for his refusal and pp. 179-180 for the characterisation. 
139
   See Clark, Tizard, pp, 365-366. The fact that Lindemann was largely out of the picture by this time 
excludes this factor as one which would provoke Tizard‟s feelings. 
140
   Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, vol.1, p. 36. 
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military and industrial purposes.”141 It should not be forgotten that 
the initial Tizard (sub-) Committee‟s responsibility, and that of the 
DRPC afterwards, was to overview the scientific effort in general 
and not to make specific plans on how programmes should be 
constituted and run. The responsibility for this laid elsewhere, in 
the R&D departments of the Service and Supply Ministries.  If 
one keeps in mind the fact that the atomic programme ended up 
having virtually a carte blanche, a fact decided by the Prime 
Minister himself, it is not surprising that Tizard‟s committee ended 
up preoccupying itself mainly with the allocation of scientific and 
technical personnel for the atomic energy programme.142  
If seen in this light, Tizard‟s later efforts to „control‟ the 
atomic energy programme can be interpreted somewhat 
differently.143 During the first half of 1949, a number of 
deliberations took place in order to reassess the priority of the 
atomic programme in the light of serious, as Tizard judged, 
problems in the rest of the R&D efforts of the country. This led 
Tizard to argue even for the suspension of the atomic programme 
and for the United Kingdom to rely solely on the United States for 
the nuclear capability of the West and for Britain to concentrate 
on conventional war and the defence of the island. According to 
Gowing there appears to have been serious consideration of this 
idea, but the detonation of the Russian atomic bomb and the 
arrest of Klaus Fuchs for espionage quickly turned the climate 
towards full continuation of the atomic energy programme. 
Although Tizard‟s ideas appeared to have had some support 
within the Ministry of Defence, the overall climate was never 
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   Quoted in Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, p. 25. 
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   Ibid, p. 225. 
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seriously on his side.144 Characteristically, Sir John Cockcroft 
wrote to him that “as [the] leader of Western Europe and the 
Commonwealth we ought to have some independent power.”145 
The most serious opposition appears to have been that of the 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.146 
One should not forget that this continued scepticism which 
Tizard showed towards the nuclear weapons programme, would 
probably have created embarrassment for the British 
establishment. Patrick Blackett, who was at least as respected a 
scientist as Tizard, had been excluded from any important 
Whitehall work on defence matters because of his rejection of 
nuclear weapons.147 Another issue to keep in mind is that Tizard 
started thinking about his retirement from about October 1949. By 
1950 he was chairing the DRPC on a part time basis, a lot of the 
work being passed to Brundrett, who had now moved full time to 
the Ministry of Defence as Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser and 
Deputy Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee. 
Gowing‟s conclusion that Lord Portal had in effect won the 
argument about the priority of the atomic energy programme 
seems to miss the important fact that, as Clarke and Wheeler 
rightly note, the nature of the struggle between Portal and Tizard 
was on the one hand about which should be the appropriate 
general strategy and corresponding R&D effort and on the other it 
was “an internal bureaucratic struggle involving Tizard and 
Portal.”148 On the strategic side, Tizard‟s concern was the issue of 
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   Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, pp. 230-1. 
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   Ibid, p. 231.  
146
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   His politics of course did not help either. See Nye, Blackett. 
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whether there was a point even in developing the atomic bomb, 
after the Soviet atomic test in the summer of 1949. In his opinion 
the lack of an atomic bomb on the part of Britain at this time, 
while the Soviet Union possessed one, only stressed even further 
the need to develop guided weapons for the defence of the 
United Kingdom.149 Regarding this, he was expressing a valid 
argument, but certainly a most unconventional view at the heart 
of the defence establishment;150 it was this establishment as a 
whole, and not only Portal, which had won against Tizard. 
Concerning the institutional setting, it is crucial to ask what Tizard 
was trying to achieve. If it was control over the atomic energy 
programme, as Gowing suggests, he certainly did not achieve 
anything approaching such a goal. In any case something like 
this would be outside his and his committee‟s terms of reference 
and supposed role and if Tizard was against such a programme 
in the first place, he would be the last person to be considered to 
undertake such a task. If what he wanted was to play his role as 
coordinator of the defence research and development effort, 
arguing that there should be “no further drain of effort from the 
atomic field… without weighing the consequences to non-atomic 
projects”,151 then he very much succeeded, by managing to place 
guided weapons and the means of delivery of nuclear weapons 
to the same degree of priority as the production of bombs.152 This 
appears to be the first instance in which the DRPC tried to 
establish its authority as the R&D regulator inside the Whitehall 
defence machinery, especially against the Ministry of Supply – 
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and not Portal individually –  which until then was the undoubted 
„regulator‟ of defence R&D programmes, and had won the 
argument. 
Indeed the subsequent institutional setting of the guided 
weapons project demonstrates that Tizard‟s efforts were 
successfully taken advantage of by the Ministry of Defence and 
especially by Brundrett, the Deputy CSA and later Chief Scientific 
Adviser in the Ministry. A struggle concerning the development of 
guided weapons for the air defence of the United Kingdom had 
begun as early as August 1947, when the DRPC report attacked 
the Ministry of Supply on how it handled guided weapons 
research. The complaints seem to have originated from the 
Admiralty.153 As a result the DRPC set up a Sub-Committee on 
Guided Weapons in April 1950. The membership was wide and 
included all interested parties at various levels, including the 
Scientific Advisers of the Air Ministry (Cockburn) and War Office 
(Wansbrough-Jones), Cook as Chief RNSS and Garner as Chief 
Scientist at the MoS and the two important technical officials 
related to guided weapons development: Gardner (Director of 
Guided Weapons R&D, MoS) and W. G. Perring (Director of 
RAE).154 In August 1951, the Ministry of Supply dissolved its 
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   Sir John Carroll, as we have seen the Deputy Controller (R&D) in the Admiralty, had complained 
to Tizard about MoS policy, specifically stressing the fact that the Ministry‟s Chief Scientist, Sir 
Ben Lockspeiser, was putting too much emphasis on research and not development. We have seen 
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seen developed jointly during the war, but under exclusive MoS direction in the immediate post-war 
period. See  Stephen Twigge, The Early Development of Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom, 
1940-1960 (Chur, Switzerland; Philadelphia: Harwood Academic, 1993), pp. 85-86 for the DRPC 
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Physical Laboratory he turned to aerodynamics as a junior scientific officer at the RAE in 1925. He 
became superintendent of scientific research in 1941 and deputy director in 1941. In 1946 he 
became director of the RAE a position he held until he died in 1951 of a heart attack. John K. 
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Guided Weapons Progress Committee and all policy matters 
were passed to the DRPC‟s sub-committee. Another year later, it 
was realised that the level of policy direction that the sub-
committee exercised was very important and after a 
recommendation by the Air Defence Committee, the Chiefs of 
Staff suggested to the DRPC that the sub-committee should 
reform.155 As a result, the Sub-Committee on Guided Weapons 
was reconstituted as “a much smaller high level body” with 
Brundrett as Chairman and including only the Deputy Chiefs of 
the three Services and the Controller of Guided Weapons and 
Electronics.156  
The dates in this struggle between the DRPC and the 
Ministry of Supply are very important to correlate with the 
involvement of individuals and the corresponding alliances in 
defence R&D policy which we saw earlier. The formation of the 
DRPC sub-committee on guided weapons coincided with 
Brundrett‟s assumption of the post of Deputy CSA and his 
strengthening of his control of the DRPC business. Within two 
years and while Tizard was slowly leaving the scene and 
Cockcroft was coming in as part-time chairman, the DRPC 
expanded its control over guided weapons; Brundrett managed to 
switch the committee‟s role from being an overseer of the 
programme to being the de facto formulator of research and 
development policy in matters related to guided weapons. Thus 
the Ministry of Defence, through Brundrett, was exercising direct 
control over a research and development programme, something 
                                                                                                                                            
Bradley, „Perring, William George Arthur (1898–1951)‟, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
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which Tizard had never achieved. This development in the early 
1950‟s is most significant and should not be overlooked. This 
transfer of control of policy regarding an R&D project outside the 
traditional channels of authority of the Services is the first 
instance when, despite its terms of reference, the DRPC took the 
most significant step from being an overseeing „advisory‟ body, to 
being a body with direct responsibility over a project. 
The importance of this is even greater if one takes into 
account what exactly the project of guided weapons consisted of. 
Until the end of 1953 R&D on guided weapons focused on the 
defence side, but, that is when the first studies for Blue Streak – 
Britain‟s indigenous effort towards a ballistic missile – started, an 
aspect whose full significance will be seen in the next chapter. 
Here it needs to be pointed out that in mid 1954, a group of 
scientists with specific attachments held key posts which were 
very significant in relation to guided missiles: Brundrett, who was 
CSA at the MoD, was one of the initiators of Blue Streak and, as 
Chairman of the DRPC sub-committee on guided weapons, 
responsible for R&D on guided missiles; Cook, a man who had 
made his name during the war as a guided rockets scientist157 
and with strong grievances against the Ministry of Supply‟s RAE 
lobby which had grabbed responsibility for rocket R&D from his 
hands and placed it at the hands of aircraft people,158 was the 
chairman of the MoD‟s DRP Staff; Cockburn, Cook‟s predecessor 
as chairman of the DRP Staff, was Principal Director of Scientific 
Research responsible for guided weapons and was soon to 
                                                 
157
  Anon. “New Appointments in Atomic Energy”, The Guardian (13/8/1954), p. 12, recognised Cook 
as “one of Britain‟s leading scientists in rocket research... [who had] much to do with the 
development of the modern guided projectile.” 
158
  See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.5. 
183 
 
become Deputy and then Controller of Guided Weapons and 
Electronics (1956) in the Ministry of Supply; and Garner, whom 
we saw in the previous section supporting the DRPC and its 
function, was Cockburn‟s predecessor as Principal Director for 
guided weapons research and now his boss in the Ministry of 
Supply, as Chief Scientist. These individuals, with Brundrett as 
their nominal and de facto head, constituted a scientific-missile 
team at the heart of the British military-industrial-scientific 
complex. 
Whether Tizard‟s doubts over the wisdom of the nuclear 
weapons programme were sincere or just an effort on his part to 
establish the guided weapons programme in at a higher level of 
priority is a question which would be difficult to answer. What is 
important for our purposes here is the fact that Brundrett, as we 
will observe later, was definitely a supporter of the nuclear 
weapons programme and there is a good chance that he 
consciously used Tizard‟s efforts in order to establish control over 
guided weapons research policy. And in this he succeeded. The 
second important thing to keep from this section is the scientific-
missile team which had at its centre the Ministry of Defence and 
its Chief Scientific Adviser. By 1955, the Ministry of Supply had 
lost, not only “its responsibilities for civil industry to the Board of 
Trade,”159 as Edgerton has noted, but policy control of a key 
defence R&D programme to a new group of scientists 
independent from the traditional channels of authority and any 
Service commitment. 
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4.3.4 – Control of Committees 
 
Brundrett extended his influence by controlling, to the extent 
possible, bodies subordinate to the DRPC. The most important of 
these was, as we have seen, the DRP Staff. This was important 
because he could control the flow of information that passed to the 
main Committee, as well as the terms of reference of the debate 
that would take place. DRPC discussions were based on papers 
that the DRP Staff produced, and this was especially the case with 
the DRPC‟s annual reviews, and were limited to the terms defined 
by the DRP Staff, in accordance with the direction given to them by 
their own Chairman and, of course, the Chairman of the DRPC. 
A second important subordinate body was the so-called 
Programmes Sub-Committee, or as the official name was, Sub-
Committee on Research and Development Programmes.160 This 
was initiated in 1951, when cuts after the Korean rearmament 
period were to be imposed on the R&D budget and thus clearer 
priorities and concentration on the most essential projects was to 
be followed. Brundrett chaired the Sub-Committee from its 
inception in 1952 until 1956 when it ceased to function. It is no 
coincidence that the papers which were produced by the DRP Staff 
during Cook‟s period as their Chairman, were to be referred to this 
Sub-Committee and not directly to the DRPC.161 The input of all 
this was incorporated in the following DRPC Review, which was 
the one immediately preceding the 1957 Defence White Paper.162 
At the same time Brundrett was also chairing the DRPC 
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Working Party on the Operational Use of Atomic Weapons and, 
outside the mechanism of the DRPC, the Air Defence Committee 
and the Maritime Air Defence Committee. 
 
4.3.5 – The Ministry of Defence and Nuclear Intelligence 
 
Certainly a most important indication of Brundrett‟s importance in 
the mid-1950‟s was the issue which becomes evident by the 
appointment of a scientist as his assistant in February 1953. The 
person selected for the job was Archie Potts, who was appointed in 
the MoD as a Senior Principal Scientific Officer.163 He was 
supposed to “provide scientific guidance for Joint Staff teams 
concerned with the Air Defence Committee, the Maritime Air 
Defence Committee and the D.R.P.C. Working Party on the 
operational use of atomic weapons….”164 But, as is hinted in a later 
exchange between the MoD and the Treasury regarding the post, 
Brundrett‟s “volume of work has grown…, especially on the atomic 
side.”165 By this time, 1955, the Imperial Calendar and Civil Service 
List confirms that Potts is no longer at his post, but has been 
replaced in the MoD by two other scientists, E. C. Williams as 
Scientific Adviser on Intelligence, at a higher level, equivalent to 
that of Assistant Secretary in the administrative class, and Victor 
Macklen as Principal Scientific Officer.166 Williams‟ role is obvious 
from the title of his post; a closer look of the later careers of both 
Potts and Macklen point to a very significant angle of the work 
concentrated in the Ministry of Defence and of which Brundrett was 
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again the key figure. The former returned in the MoD in 1957 to 
become Deputy Director of Atomic Energy at the Joint Intelligence 
Bureau, while Macklen went on to have a nuclear career initially at 
the Reactor Group of the Atomic Energy Authority and later in the 
Ministry of Defence from 1967 until 1979 when he retired.167 The 
nuclear and intelligence angle of the work done in the Ministry of 
Defence in the mid 1950‟s is obvious.   
From its inception, nuclear intelligence was a separated 
entity from both general service intelligence168 and foreign and 
domestic intelligence.169 It was also separate from general 
scientific intelligence. It had a separate organisation within the 
Ministry of Supply, an overt side, and at the same time in the MI6 
organisation, a covert existence. The covert side was responsible 
for the collection of evidence, mainly through RAF stations for the 
collection of radioactive material from the atmosphere and the 
overt side was responsible for the collation of the evidence, and a 
number of scientists were involved in this, including Penney and 
Cockcroft.170 How much Brundrett was involved up to this level is 
not clear, although Michael Goodman‟s comment that the DRPC 
was “designed to bridge the gap between intelligence and 
research and development”, even if not accurate, is an indication 
that there was definitely a strong connection between the two 
bodies from an early stage; the same is suggested by the 
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appointments of initially Potts and later Williams and Macklen.171 
The connecting link was Sir Frederick Brundrett, the Ministry of 
Defence‟s Chief Scientific Adviser.172 
The close relationship was certainly strong during the mid 
1950‟s, starting at the end of 1953. In December, retired Admiral 
Daniel was asked by the Chiefs of Staff to review both the nature 
and the composition of atomic intelligence.173 As the senior 
government defence scientist, Brundrett‟s opinion was sought, and 
he recommended that the organisation of collection and collation 
should remain largely intact, but he pressed the case that there 
should be some overseeing of the main personality in nuclear 
intelligence matters through a committee in the Ministry of 
Defence.174 The Daniel Report took almost at face value the advice 
by Brundrett and the similar one by the Controller of Atomic Energy 
and its author proposed a new committee which would oversee 
atomic intelligence matters to control the functions of the Atomic 
Energy Intelligence Unit and keep a close contact with the rest of 
the intelligence community. This new committee was to be chaired 
by Brundrett in the Ministry of Defence and would include the 
chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Directors of 
AWRE and AERE.175 The Atomic Intelligence Committee (AIC) was 
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to have, and this is crucial in terms of control of information, an 
extra sub-committee to perform “the necessary scientific and 
technical assessment”; a scientific sub-committee. This was to 
have Brundrett as its chairman and Penney, Cockcroft, C. W. 
Wright176 and Cherwell as members,177 and was supposed to give 
“…no details of how [its] conclusions were reached [when 
information] would be passed to the larger body.”178 Thus Brundrett 
was not only to chair an oversight committee, a position which it 
might be argued would not necessarily have substantial power, but 
he was also to chair the very committee which would be there to 
assess the raw technical information arriving from the field and 
control in an absolute manner what would be passed on to the 
main overseeing committee. He was to be the main figure in the all 
important nuclear intelligence machinery in Whitehall.  
The transfer of the Atomic Energy Intelligence Unit to the 
Ministry of Defence took place in May 1954. After a 
recommendation by the Chiefs of Staff, the position of a Scientific 
Adviser on Intelligence was also created in November 1954.179 
This position was, as we have seen, filled by E. C. Williams. The 
suggestion for the post originated from Brundrett who had 
suggested this to the Chiefs of Staff in March 1954 proposing that 
the new adviser would obtain “his guidance on scientific aspects 
from the DRPC” (i.e. from Brundrett himself).180 Given the fact that 
he was at the same time Chairman of the DRP Staff, it is safe to 
                                                                                                                                            
Intelligence was not to be included in the Committee.  
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assume that Williams was Brundrett‟s de facto deputy in the 
Ministry of Defence, taking work from and doing work for the latter, 
especially on the nuclear intelligence angle. 
This organisation lasted for about three years and by mid 
1957, it was deemed necessary to re-organise further.181 Atomic 
Intelligence passed under the control of the Joint Intelligence 
Bureau (JIB), under a new Division, and Brundrett‟s Sub-
Committee182 was reformed to include intelligence on weapons 
systems, as well as nuclear weapons.183 The new body was to be 
chaired by a lower level official, Archie Potts, who now returned in 
the MoD as Deputy Director of Scientific Intelligence at the JIB.184 
By mid-1958, and crucially after the US-UK agreement for 
cooperation in nuclear matters, there was to be further integration 
of the bodies responsible for Scientific and Atomic Intelligence and 
Brundrett and Dean recommended to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee to assign Eric Williams to make recommendations and 
“to transform them into a practical reality with the assistance of 
Press and Potts.”185 Williams‟ moves resulted in the concentration 
of even the covert bodies of atomic energy intelligence in the 
Ministry of Defence. These changes took place in January 1959. 
Brundrett, therefore, was not only the Chairman of the DRPC 
and the Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, but also the 
main person relating to atomic intelligence for the better part of the 
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1950‟s. The importance of nuclear intelligence has recently been 
pointed out by Goodman as the main channel of co-operation 
between the US and Britain before the establishment of the 
nuclear „special relationship‟ in 1958, and one which paved the 
path for the latter. Although Goodman reproduces the established 
view that “[r]emarkably, as Attlee‟s leading scientific adviser and 
chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee…, Tizard 
was purposefully excluded from atomic discussion”, in order to 
stress the importance of nuclear information and “just how secret 
atomic information was in the British government”, it should be 
noted that this should not have any reflection on the DRPC or 
government scientists in general; rather on Tizard personally.186 
Thus when Brundrett nominally became the senior and most 
important government (defence) scientist, there was no problem 
concentrating atomic intelligence on him and the Ministry of 
Defence.  
 
4.4 – Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter showed how the new institutional setting regarding 
defence R&D developed in the post-war period. Whether this 
system was effective, in terms of limiting duplication, waste of 
resources and achieving a level of cooperation between the three 
Services regarding R&D is not a question which it sought to 
answer. It would require a different kind of research to establish 
this and it is not immediately relevant to this thesis. What is of 
interest here is how some government scientists managed to 
establish themselves inside the Whitehall defence machinery in the 
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post-war period as a new force, based in a new Ministry (of 
Defence). It was the first time in a non-emergency situation that 
there was an entity independent of the services yet well inside the 
bureaucratic network, which would deal exclusively with matters of 
R&D.  
The fact that this entity was new should not in any case lead 
one to think that there was no continuity with the old machinery. As 
this chapter showed clearly, the Defence Research Policy 
Committee was a direct descendant of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff 
Committee. The novelty was that there was a new chairman to 
head the coordinating efforts of the R&D establishment – and this 
chairman was a scientist. As we saw, the first chairman was an 
outsider in the person of Sir Henry Tizard. He was succeeded by 
another part-timer and, more importantly, an outsider in matters of 
policy formulation, Sir John Cockcroft. Things changed, though, 
when a career government scientist, Sir Frederick Brundrett, 
became institutionally and therefore more closely involved with the 
Ministry of Defence and defence R&D. The nominally advisory role 
of the Chief Scientific Adviser, though it remained in the terms of 
reference, began to change, as is evident from the reactions of the 
officials of the Ministry of Supply and the expansion of Brundrett‟s 
control, especially in the field of guided weapons.187 Thus, the CSA 
was in the mid 1950‟s a permanent member of the government 
machinery, with long experience in government defence research 
and development and of an equal status to the Permanent 
Secretary of his Ministry; he had under his control a number of 
committees and the all important nuclear intelligence network and, 
what is more, he was the first government scientific official who 
                                                 
187
  Which he took from the MoS. 
192 
 
was not part of any Service.188  
In this sense, the Chief Scientific Adviser and his staff in the 
Ministry of Defence became a powerful new element in the 
defence machinery and a new force in Whitehall related to matters 
of R&D; the novelty rested with the fact that they were situated 
outside the traditional Service R&D machinery, until now 
concentrated in the Ministry of Supply and the Admiralty. By 
January 1960, when Sir Solly Zuckerman replaced Brundrett in the 
Ministry of Defence, he would have under his control the network 
of people and committees which his predecessor had put in place 
and which included two areas of crucial importance: nuclear 
intelligence and guided weapons. Chief Scientific Adviser and 
Chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee meant very 
different things in 1960 than they did in the late 1940‟s and, 
contrary to Agar and Balmer‟s claim, the chairman of the DRPC 
had strong interests indeed in the R&D politics of the 1950‟s, 
regarding both the control of the defence R&D budget and, as we 
will see in the next chapter, general defence policy priorities.189 He 
wanted and managed to make his committee the forum for R&D 
decisions and policy formulation, thus placing the committee and 
himself at a crucial crossroads of the defence politics bureaucracy. 
With this conclusion in mind, the next two chapters will concentrate 
on the role that Brundrett and Cook played in the formulation of 
British defence policy and the making of corresponding nuclear 
weapons systems decisions and, in assessing this, the scientific-
missile team within and around the Ministry of Defence which was 
identified earlier was crucial. 
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Chapter V 
 
Scientists and Defence Policy in the 1950‟s 
 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 
 
The 1957 Defence White Paper, while important as a landmark, 
was not a radical reinterpretation of British strategy. Rather, it was 
the culmination of thinking about strategy and defence that had 
started much earlier in the decade.190 It was a clear expression of 
what has been characterised as Britain‟s „liberal militarist‟ way of 
warfare.191 As George Peden put it, the Paper “embodied both 
nuclear and economic arguments… [When] scientific advances 
had fundamentally altered the basis of military planning… Britain‟s 
military power and influence in the world depended „first and 
foremost‟ on the health of its economy.”192 The way to achieve this 
would be to keep the defence budget as low a level as possible, by 
concentrating on the highest available technology as the 
cornerstone of the country's defence posture. Hydrogen bombs 
fitted onto ballistic missiles would be the status-enhancing, 
financially sound, spearhead of Britain‟s military strength.193  
In April 1957, when the White Paper was published, Brundrett 
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was Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, as he was 
for the whole period 1954-1960; he had been in the Ministry for 
more than seven years and, as we have seen, had placed himself 
institutionally at the centre of the defence machinery. What was 
Brundrett‟s and his MoD scientific officials‟ role in the shaping of 
defence policy during the 1950‟s? 
There are different answers in the available record. One was 
given by the other long serving official in the Ministry of Defence 
during the 1950‟s, the Permanent Secretary from 1956, Sir Richard 
Powell.194 In an oral history seminar in 1988, answering to the 
question by Professor Lawrence Friedman “Was the Chief 
Scientific Adviser involved [in the drafting of the Paper]?” Powell 
replied: “Oh yes he was involved. He did not get involved in the 
abrasiveness to anything like the same extent”;195 after this he 
returned to the subject of the bickering surrounding the drafting. 
The official record indeed gives little indication that Brundrett was 
involved in the actual drafting of the Paper. But this should not be 
taken to mean that he was not influential in the shaping of the 
Paper‟s philosophy. One should not forget that the job of drafting 
and redrafting of official documents is ultimately the traditional 
responsibility of the administrators of a department.  
The second view comes from Laurence Martin, an American 
scholar, who noted Brundrett‟s influence in the Ministry of Defence 
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in general and the 1957 Paper in particular. Writing in 1962 he 
remarked that “the Permanent Secretary and his staff, and 
particularly the Chief Scientist, were frequently the actual decision 
makers at the margin.”196 After noting the indecision of the Services 
to reach agreement over strategy and the corresponding allocation 
of resources, Martin observed that “senior civil servants in the 
Ministry of Defence had been playing a more positive role as the 
arbitrators of inter-service disputes. The Chief Scientist proved 
particularly useful for settling issues, ostensibly on technical 
grounds but frequently merely to secure a decision.”197 Brundrett is 
presented to have been considered by his contemporaries as “the 
representative of professionalism untainted by service prejudice” 
and as one of the few officials who had Sandys‟ ear: “Such advice 
as the Minister did employ… came largely from senior officials of 
his Ministry, particularly the Chief Scientist....”198  
As Simon Ball has noted, Martin‟s study was based almost 
exclusively on personal interviews which he conducted with key 
actors of the period.199 As every historian knows all too well, this 
has its drawbacks. But Ball‟s conclusion to the opposite effect, that 
“Brundrett and Post were certainly active during the drafting of the 
White Paper but do not seem to have had the significant influence 
one of [Martin‟s] sources obviously suggested to [him]” seems also 
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to be flawed and for two reasons.200 The first is that his own source 
for the conclusion is no other than Richard Powell, also an involved 
contemporary, giving evidence to the Oral History seminar quoted 
above; there is no reason to take his word over that of Brundrett, if 
indeed it was the latter who overplayed his contribution to Martin.201 
Second, and more important, is the correlation between active 
participation during the drafting of the Paper on the one hand and 
influence on its overall content on the other. Ball offers another 
explanation for the origins of the 1957 White Paper, namely that it 
“was produced by the more traditional combination of an activist 
minister [Sandys] supported by the senior civil servants in his 
department.” Mistakenly, Ball excludes the CSA when he refers to 
„senior civil servants.‟202 
This chapter will not simply try to judge whether the 
Powell/Ball or the Martin view is correct, but seek to answer a 
more significant question: what was the role of scientists in 
shaping not the 1957 White Paper itself but the philosophy behind 
it? In other words, even if Sir Richard Powell was correct in 
excluding Brundrett from the bickering surrounding the drafting of 
the Paper, this should not be taken to mean that he was not 
important.203 Regarding this it is crucial to keep in mind that 
Brundrett, as we saw in the previous chapter, was not alone in the 
Ministry of Defence. He had created a network of committees and 
sub-committees, he had placed key individuals in key posts and 
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had formed alliances with important scientists outside the MoD 
machinery. Even though by 1957 Brundrett was the most important 
scientist in government he should not be studied in isolation from 
the network of people and committees he had established in and 
around the Ministry of Defence.  
At the same time it should be stressed that this chapter does 
not intend to establish any causal link between government 
scientists and the White Paper. Very rarely can influence be 
identified in such a direct way. Neither is the intention here to 
suggest that government scientists were distinctive in their 
opinions among their civilian and military colleagues in the 
Whitehall defence scene. In fact, it is part of the argument that I put 
forward that government scientists were very much part of the 
establishment and its liberal-militarist ideology and in this they 
should be seen as elements of continuity in Whitehall. What this 
chapter will demonstrate, however, is the crucial point that, during 
the 1950‟s, government scientists, and Sir Frederick Brundrett in 
particular, uniquely placed in the defence establishment as the 
previous chapter showed, were key agents regarding the 
formulation of British defence policy in general and the specific 
form it took in the 1957 Defence White Paper in particular. Along 
with a number of other Whitehall agents, they were promoting the 
primacy of a strong economy and the reliance on high technology, 
while managing to register their particular views, which stressed 
the importance of a particularly strong R&D effort and reliance on 
ballistic missiles and atomic weapons as the cornerstones of the 
country‟s defence posture.  
This chapter, therefore, will offer two important points. First, it 
will identify a key group of important agents who so far have 
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eluded the attention of the relevant literature. Second, and more 
generally regarding the 1950‟s, it will show scientists in a role, not 
as promoters of an abstract notion of „science‟, but as shapers of a 
particular defence policy, a crucial aspect of which was a very 
specific technology: guided missiles.204 
 
5.2 – Defence Policy in the 1950‟s 
 
In 1952 the Chiefs of Staff gathered in Chequers to produce what 
became known as the Global Strategy Paper. The paper 
“recognised that too much expenditure on defence by Britain and 
her allies would undermine their economies”, stressing the 
importance of research and development in a Cold War 
environment and focusing on “a strategy of nuclear deterrence 
[which] offered security at a sustainable cost.”205 Brundrett, though 
still the Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser at this point, appears to 
have been one of the few civilians discussing the paper with the 
Chiefs of Staff, as their “trusted chief scientific adviser.”206 Not 
satisfied with the economic savings in the Global Strategy Paper, a 
Radical Review sub-committee of the Cabinet issued the June 
(1953) Directive which, under the guidance of Duncan Sandys, at 
this point Minister of Supply, urged for further cuts in the defence 
budget making it “the first occasion in the nuclear age when senior 
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Ministers had initiated changes in strategic doctrine without prior 
consultations with their military advisers.”207 The Directive put a 
spark on the underlying disputes between the Service Chiefs about 
relative priorities in strategy and therefore in the defence budget, 
disputes which until 1957 were not settled, despite efforts by the 
Swinton Committee (November 1954)208  and Selwyn Lloyd‟s 
(MoD) Long Term Defence Programme (April-November 1955).209  
By this time both the United States and the Soviet Union had 
successfully tested thermonuclear devices and Churchill had 
decided in March-July 1954 for the UK to do the same. Two 
primary issues of general policy were never in doubt: the need for 
economy to be derived from the defence budget and the primacy 
of thermonuclear weapons and their delivery systems.210 The 
issues of dispute were the best possible way to achieve the 
primary objectives and what other priorities would be placed under 
them. Every decision regarding these would have repercussions 
for the role and importance of each of the three Services and 
consequently their eventual size and budget. The Services were 
united when they were resisting urges for further cuts in their total 
budget, but were very much against each other when the issue of 
their individual roles was concerned, a fact which has led scholars 
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to concentrate on a framework of inter-service rivalry when 
discussing defence policy.211 In this framework, the Ministry of 
Supply is seen as resting firmly on the side of the Air Ministry and 
the Royal Air Force, strongly supporting the V-bomber nuclear 
striking force under development at the time,212 ignoring that even 
within this traditional research and development unit within the 
defence machinery there were different allegiances; and, of 
course, it ignores the role played by Brundrett and a group of 
scientists around the Ministry of Defence. 
 
5.3 – Brundrett and the MoD scientist lobby in the 
1950‟s. 
 
5.3.1 – Research and Development Priorities and Harold 
Macmillan 
 
Brundrett was very clearly a proponent of the concept of the 
deterrent. In a public lecture to the Royal United Services 
Institution, in March 1960, he was very clear about what he 
thought. Exploring the doubts that arose concerning the validity of 
deterrence theory when Russia had developed nuclear weapons, 
he stated unequivocally that “I would like to make it plain 
immediately that I have never shared these doubts, nor do I 
today.”213 He was also specific and clear about the best available 
form that the deterrent should take. He was adamant that the 
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ballistic missile was the only viable option, since it would erase any 
possibility that an enemy might believe that there was a possibility 
of defence against a nuclear weapon.214 A couple of years earlier, 
again in public, he had declared himself “a very genuine believer in 
the deterrent theory.”215 For Brundrett there was a very clear 
provision, though. Britain could not compete with the two 
superpowers “over the whole field of research and development in 
military weapons and equipment... [but] the real trouble... [was] 
that, while quite a number of people accepted this, most of them 
are not prepared to accept the logical consequences....”216 
Recognising the primacy of a strong economy, he stated that 
“probably the quickest way in which to let the Russians get what 
they want is to ruin ourselves economically.”217 
These views were shared by the scientists who found 
themselves under Brundrett in the Ministry of Defence during the 
1950‟s. William Cook, while chairman of the Defence Research 
Policy Staff, argued in May 1954 that the first major „weapon‟ for 
Britain would be to “maintain a satisfactory economy and standard 
of living in the UK. This would be helped by a substantial decrease 
in expenditure on defence.”218 For him, the most likely situation in 
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the international arena between the West and the USSR was “that 
the existence of H-bombs and the means of delivery will deter all 
nations from a major war.” Thus the USA and the UK would be 
obliged to fight off communist aggression in order “to honour treaty 
obligations, and to prevent aggression, and possibly to support the 
remnants of imperialism.” At the same time it would be essential for 
the UK on the one hand to “maintain its prestige and its 
participation in major world-councils…”219 and on the other to 
uphold its treaty obligations “independently of the USA.”220 
Accordingly, Cook set out a corresponding general R&D 
policy. First priority would be to “produce a stock of H-bombs and 
the means of delivery.”221 Only in this way could all the above 
considerations (prestige, Commonwealth, etc) be met. With the 
economy factor very much present in his mind, Cook warned that 
“we must… be careful to ensure that continuous and expensive 
evolution of methods of delivery is avoided.”222 Cook was adamant 
that this was very important and for this reason he stressed the 
fact that the future rested with ballistic rockets and this should be 
achieved even if Britain had to eliminate the supersonic bomber 
stage as a method of delivery between the current V-bomber force 
and the eventual rocket. Given that a bomber – and certainly later 
on a ballistic missile – would always get through, savings could be 
made from efforts on the air defence of the UK,223 on protecting the 
trade routes and focus attention on cold and small wars.224 
                                                                                                                                            
Defence Policy”, 8/5/1954. 
219
   Especially given its position as the leader of the Commonwealth and the responsibilities that this 
entails. 
220
   DEFE 10/174, DRPS/P (54)15, Appendix A, “The Impact of the H-Bomb”, 8/5/1954. All quotes in 
the paragraph are from here. 
221
   Ibid. 
222
   Ibid. 
223
  In Cook‟s words “defence against H-bomb attack is not worthwhile.” 
224
  For this it was essential for the Royal Navy to have aircraft carriers and strike aircraft. 
204 
 
Examining how to economise on defence spending, Cook 
suggested that considerable economies would come from a 
“reduction of personnel in all three services” and of a number of 
equipment intended for all three services. Cook‟s last point is worth 
quoting more extensively, because it reflects quite clearly how this 
government scientist saw his and his colleagues‟ contribution to 
Britain‟s defence to be of critical importance:  
 
It will be necessary to continue research and development in 
almost all fields… In quite a number of fields which would be 
comparatively neglected for H-bomb warfare and for the warm 
war we shall have to continue Research and Development in 
peacetime to the stage of production drawings. Fortunately the 
cost of R. and D. is not high. Priorities will require considerable 
readjustment.  
We do not know what future threats we shall have to meet. It is 
more important that we should explore the boundaries of 
possibilities than it is to exploit existing advances.225 
 
Thinking along the lines of economy first, H-bomb and 
ballistic missile as a means of delivery was common among the 
papers produced by most of the DRP Staff under Cook‟s 
chairmanship during 1954.226 Writing in January 1955, the new 
chairman of the Staff, Eric Williams, maintained that “defence 
research and development expenditure will continue to rise if we 
are to try to keep pace” with the advances made by the other major 
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powers.227 The Staff saw three solutions to this prospect: to 
increase the defence vote; to increase the percentage spent on 
R&D relative to other commitments; or to abandon the effort to 
keep up with the pace of advances. The view coming from the 
scientific staff of the Ministry of Defence was clear. Indeed cuts in 
the defence budget were necessary and should be implemented; 
but at the same time, caution should be paid that the R&D budget 
should be kept at a level that would allow the UK to maintain its 
position in the world stage.   
This line of thinking was made official at the highest level by 
the departing Minister of Defence in April 1955, Harold Macmillan. 
Before giving up his position to Selwyn Lloyd, Macmillan issued a 
directive, which sealed the DRP Committee‟s role in the defence 
machinery, while approving the priorities set by its Chairman and 
his supporting Staff the previous year. After acknowledging the 
influence of the DRPC‟s review of the previous year,228 Macmillan 
went on to affirm the relative importance of R&D and general 
spending that the scientists in his Ministry were expressing. In his 
own words, “the only items in the first level of importance are 
nuclear weapons… and their means of delivery.”229 Following in 
importance, and in order of priority, were tactical nuclear weapons 
and their means of delivery, equipment necessary for cold and 
warm wars and equipment to ensure survival of a Russian attack in 
Europe.230 After giving instructions for special attention to be given 
                                                 
227
   DEFE 10/34, DRP/P(55)3, 13/1/1955, “Defence R. and D. expenditure in relation to total defence 
expenditure”, memorandum by the DRP Staff. 
228
  “I have approved the Review by the Defence Research Policy Committee… as a basis of action by 
the Supply Departments, subject to certain qualifications.” DEFE 10/34, “Directive on Research 
and Development by the Minister of Defence.” 1/4/1955 
229
  The balance between the manned bomber and the ballistic rocket were to be decided with primary 
consideration the avoidance of a gap in the deterrent. DEFE 10/34, “Directive by the Minister.” 
230
  This included air defence and sea communications of the main base (Britain). At the last level of 
priority were provisions for the fighting of a global war by the three Services. 
206 
 
to a number of fields (for example vertical lift), Macmillan put a 
stamp on the authority of the Ministry of Defence‟s scientific body: 
“there is to be no reduction in the total effort devoted to basic 
research without reference to the Defence Research Policy 
Committee.”231 Thus Macmillan confirmed in a clear way the need 
for cuts, the corresponding priorities in the research and 
development on new weapons and the DRPC‟s authority regarding 
R&D. 
On 20 April 1955, Williams directed the DRP Staff to address 
the R&D issues of national importance and “whether [such] 
projects were progressing at a rate which fits the national 
interest.”232 The 1955 DRPC Review, produced in January 1956, 
emphasising the ministerial directive, was a crystallisation of the 
thinking evident in the minds of the scientific staff of the Ministry of 
Defence.233 The review made very clear that “an adequate 
research and development programme is essential for the fighting 
efficiency of our Services” and warned that “risks taken… will be 
felt in the long term and their effects may be very serious indeed”, 
but recognised that, given the accepted financial savings needed, 
the “programme should be prosecuted with the greatest efficiency 
and economy.”234 The review set out in detail the research and 
development priorities in absolute accordance with the above. First 
priority was the one mega-ton nuclear warhead and its means of 
delivery, means to be decided according to the country‟s 
capabilities and with one important factor in mind: to preserve the 
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continuous existence of a viable deterrent force.235 
Did this line of thinking originate from Macmillan or the 
Ministry of Defence‟s scientific body? As we saw the thinking 
concerning the priorities of the projects – with the underlying 
guiding consideration being the preservation of a strong economy 
– was well established within the body scientific before Macmillan 
went to the Ministry of Defence, in all likelihood originating from 
Brundrett, following his participation in the earliest debates about 
strategy and priorities from 1952. That the future Prime Minister‟s 
ear was a receptive one there should be little doubt; it was, after all 
the Conservative government‟s priority to pursue cuts in the budget 
and defence was a focus point for this. But, as Simon Ball has 
noted, Macmillan‟s views regarding cuts in defence were shaped 
by his stint in defence posts and for Macmillan this was during the 
period just discussed above.236 Given the brief duration of the 
appointment, from October 1954 to April 1955, it is safe to assume 
that he didn‟t initiate the R&D policy in the Ministry of Defence.237 
This is not to undermine either the importance of Macmillan‟s 
political weight in the shaping of defence policy in the late 1950‟s; 
or the Treasury‟s traditional role in insisting on the centrality of a 
sound economy around which all other policies should be based.238  
But in the post-war period, given the fact that, as George Peden 
put it, “new weapons systems” made it “difficult for the Treasury 
laymen to challenge experts in the defence departments”,239 the 
Defence Research Policy Committee and the Chief Scientific 
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Adviser and his Staff were uniquely placed to play the crucial role 
of balancing the intended extent of power of each service through 
the defence R&D budget and the corresponding priorities. 
 
5.3.2 – Active Lobbying 
 
Brundrett‟s personal role extended well beyond matters of general 
defence posture and R&D priorities. He was involved in all the 
major disputes of the 1950‟s. Since late 1952 he was a firm 
supporter of the Royal Navy‟s carrier programme; according to Eric 
Grove, “Brundrett and his associates [in the Maritime Air Defence 
Committee] came out even more in favour of carriers and their 
aircraft than Templer had done.”240 This support he continued 
throughout the decade fighting alongside the Navy to push off the 
RAF and a very hostile Minister of Supply, Duncan Sandys 
(October 1951-October 1954). Sandys, along with Nigel Birch, 
were supportive of their chairman in the deliberations of the 
Swinton Committee of 1954 when they reported against the 
concept of broken-backed warfare, which would give the Royal 
Navy a significant role.241 In February of that year Brundrett had 
fully endorsed the importance of the Navy and its carriers which, 
along with an appropriate aircraft, could very well act as an 
“ancillary deterrent”, a comment which he forwarded to his Minister 
along with a Navy planning paper.242 The Navy appears to have 
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pursued both the concept of broken-back-warfare, and the role as 
a force for tactical atomic strike, both of which necessitated the 
existence of carriers and assorted aircraft.243 
Brundrett‟s support for the Royal Navy came also in another 
respect whose importance has been overlooked in the literature, 
that of nuclear propulsion for maritime purposes. An indigenous 
programme had started as early as 1950, through a directive by 
the Defence Research Policy Committee, with some research on 
the matter taking place.244 By 1955, a strengthened Naval Section 
of the Atomic Energy Research Establishment had already worked 
out what the most suitable reactor would be for a nuclear propelled 
submarine.245 In 1956, after efforts by the DRPC (i.e. Brundrett) to 
revive the programme, the Treasury sanctioned a decision by the 
Admiralty to proceed with the development of a nuclear submarine 
and a contract was placed with Vickers Nuclear Engineering Ltd.246 
Brundrett‟s efforts to keep the programme going despite strong 
opposition from the other Services and especially the RAF is, I 
think, indicative of the importance he placed on the matter. For 
example, when in July 1957 the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Sir 
Geoffrey Tuttle tried to refer the decision to allocate 40g of 
precious U235 to the nuclear propulsion programme to the Chiefs 
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of Staff Committee, Brundrett disregarded his objections and 
passed the decision for the allocation of the Uranium by October 
1957, with Tuttle not giving his consent.247 
In parallel with his active support for the Navy‟s carrier and 
nuclear programmes, Brundrett also expressed a very hostile 
attitude towards the Ministry of Supply and the RAF‟s planned V-
bomber force. The first issue was, as we saw in chapter four, that 
he had little confidence in the Ministry of Supply‟s effectiveness 
regarding R&D, the field which was his area of expertise as CSA 
and Chairman of the DRPC.248 His criticism was very specific and 
was coming from a long career in the Admiralty and the relevant 
experience and not from a sentimental attachment to Royal 
Navy.249 But he was also very critical of the anticipated size of the 
V-bomber force, both regarding its projected size in numbers – 240 
aircraft – and the three different types of aircraft which were 
planned to be developed.250 During Selwyn Lloyd‟s Long Term 
Defence Programme (April-November 1955) he was arguing that 
“a force of 180 would be a sufficiently impressive deterrent to 
influence the Americans, and that a bigger British contribution to 
the West‟s deterrent was unnecessary. On the other hand… the 
navy and the army had to be able to meet Britain‟s Cold War 
commitments independently of the Americans.”251 Brundrett was 
also supporting the Navy in its claims that the V-bomber force was 
a “„colossal gamble‟… consider[ing] that evolving Soviet air 
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defences would face the V-bombers with a severe penetration 
problem.”252 He considered the force to be an interim solution until 
the time of the ballistic missile and therefore suggested that 
expense should be kept to minimum.253 In October 1956 he was 
even suggesting that one of the planned three types of V-bombers 
should be abandoned, having written to this effect to Sir Richard 
Powell.254 
Seen out of context, Brundrett‟s attack on the V-bombers 
could be interpreted as coming from an instinctive support for the 
Navy. But Brundrett had another agenda on his mind, which was 
very independent from the Navy at this stage. He was a firm 
supporter of the indigenous British effort to procure the ballistic 
missile Blue Streak. British interest on a ballistic missile was 
evident from 1953, with a public announcement by Duncan 
Sandys, then Minister of Supply, and relevant studies ordered at 
the RAE by the first Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics 
in the Ministry of Supply, Steuart (later Sir Steuart) Mitchell.255 In 
the spring of 1954 an agreement was signed between Sandys and 
Charles Wilson, the US Secretary of Defence on cooperating in 
ballistic missile development.256 As the initiating Minister of Supply, 
Sandys was wedded to Blue Streak and he continued to support it 
when he returned to the defence field as Minister of Defence from 
January 1957 to the end 1959.257 
                                                 
252
   Clarke and Wheeler, British Origins, p. 197;  
253
   Ball, The Bomber, pp. 126-7; See also DEFE 7/1111, Brundrett to Powell, 12/4/1955. 
254
   DEFE 7/1111, Brundrett to Powell, 8/10/1956. 
255
   Roy Dommett, “The Blue Streak Weapon”, Prospero: Proceedings from the British Rocket Oral 
History Conferences at Charterhouse, Number 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 7-33, p. 14. 
256
   Known as the Wilson-Sandys Agreement (August 1954). See Stephen Twigge, Early Development 
of Guided Weapons in the United Kingdom, 1940-1960 (Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic, 
1993), pp. 23-24 on the American dimension and pp. 52-56; Martin Navias, Nuclear Weapons and 
British Strategic Planning, 1955-1958, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) p. 119-120. 
257
   Colin Gordon, “Duncan Sandys and the Independent Nuclear Deterrent” in Ian F. W. Beckett and 
John Gooch, Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy 
212 
 
That Brundrett was a strong proponent of Blue Streak there 
is little doubt. In 1960, a couple of months after he had retired from 
the Ministry of Defence and less than a month before the 
development of the missile was cancelled, in a talk to the Royal 
United Services Institute on the subject of „Rockets, Satellites and 
Military Thinking‟, after an exposition of matters related to space 
research and possible military applications, he turned to the issue 
of deterrence and stressed that “I still believe that Blue Streak is 
the only weapon which will allow us to continue with our deterrent 
policy over the next decade.”258 Indeed he had been a strong 
supporter throughout the 1950‟s and, significantly, during the 
period when Sandys was not in the defence field.259 According to 
Ian Clark, “Brundrett and the DRPC were strongly behind the [Blue 
Streak] missile throughout this period... [and] offered an alliance of 
sorts” to the Air Ministry, “Brundrett… [being] adamant that an 
independent British ballistic missile was an essential element of 
British strategy.”260 He fought very strongly and, until he was to 
retire at the end of the decade, successfully for Blue Streak against 
a number of attacks to the project and its continuation, “believing 
that the arguments in favour… were unanswerable.”261 
During 1955 and 1956 Brundrett was the main senior figure 
supporting the project and, given his position, such a support was 
crucial. At the same time, as we have seen earlier, he had support 
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from at least one official in the Ministry of Supply at the centre of 
guided weapons research and development, Dr (later Sir) Robert 
Cockburn, who in December of 1953 was appointed Principal 
Director of Scientific Research (Guided Weapons and Electronics), 
in 1955 Deputy Controller and in 1956 Controller of Guided 
Weapons and Electronics in the Ministry of Supply.262 While the Air 
Staff‟s main concern was the V-bomber force,263 it was Cockburn 
from the Ministry of Supply and through the Air Defence Committee 
who was stressing the need for an independent UK deterrent 
based on an indigenous rocket from November 1954.264 By the 
summer of 1955 the Chiefs of Staff, with additional advice from 
Brundrett and the Foreign Office were convinced that it was 
strategically unacceptable to rely solely on the United States for 
the deterrent, the implication of this acceptance being that 
research and development on an indigenous ballistic missile 
should continue.265 This line of thinking was very much in their 
mind a year later. At their July 24 1956 meeting, the minutes show 
the Chiefs of Staff to be “strongly” supportive of Brundrett‟s views 
when he was stressing that “unless we want to become a second-
class power… the suggestion that we discontinue the development 
work on ballistic missiles and rely solely on the United States 
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would be catastrophic.”266 
 
5.3.3 – Brundrett and the Treasury 
 
There is, of course, the issue of the relationship between Brundrett 
and the DRPC and the Treasury. There is little reason to doubt that 
the relationship between the department traditionally seeking to 
economise and the scientific body of the Ministry of Defence was a 
good one. This was certainly the view from the Ministry of Supply; 
officials in that Ministry thought that the Treasury considered the 
recommendations of the DRPC as authoritative and were trying to 
find ways to be more influential.267  That the Treasury considered 
the DRPC as important in the process of finding cuts in defence 
expenditure is demonstrated by the fact that after the 1957 
Defence White Paper they sought to increase their influence in the 
Committee, seeking to participate in the deliberations about R&D 
expenditures at an earlier stage, an effort which has been 
misleadingly interpreted as an attempt to impose Treasury 
presence on a reluctant DRPC.268 Second, and more important, is 
the fact that a relationship between the Treasury and the DRPC 
was already established. As Brundrett noted to Powell, “…I [have] 
had a standing arrangement for private discussions with Peter 
Humphreys-Davies on any D. R. P. matters on a purely informal 
basis which were, in fact, very helpful.”269  
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Besides, the Treasury had attempted to get membership in 
the DRPC from as early as November 1951. At that point Tizard 
had resisted this, acknowledging that financial considerations were 
important but stressing that “a great deal of... [the DRPC‟s] 
business would be on highly technical detail”, implying that a 
Treasury person would not be able to follow, and compromised by 
letting the Treasury get the agenda of the Committee‟s business 
and arrange for a representative of the Treasury to attend if 
necessary.270 The Treasury was satisfied that this, “supplemented 
by informal contact with Sir Frederick Brundrett [Deputy CSA at the 
time] as necessary will give us all we really want.”271 The practice 
continued with Brundrett providing, in a number of instances, 
papers from the DRPC to the Treasury “under-the-counter.”272 This 
confirms fully Brundrett‟s assertion to Powell that an informal 
relationship was indeed in effect. 
Brundrett wrote to Powell in August 1958 that “I am very 
happy to” accept Treasury participation in the DRPC.273 But, little 
doubt, he had his doubts about such an arrangement and the 
reason was his fear that this would impede his Committee‟s role as 
a mediator. Nevertheless, he had developed ways to overcome 
such problems, revealing to Powell that “if, in fact, the attendance 
of the Treasury representative at Committee meetings does 
seriously impede freedom of speech by Service Department 
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representatives, and I am unable to overcome that from the Chair, I 
have always got other means of achieving our objective by holding 
private meetings with the Deputy Chiefs, which, in any case, I very 
frequently do.”274  As Brundrett reminded Powell, the initial denial 
for Treasury participation rested with the Service Departments and 
not with himself, as did the perceived hostility between the 
Treasury and the DRP Staff, the latter being the level that 
Brundrett had proposed to be the link between his Committee and 
the Treasury.275 In the end a Treasury representative started to 
attend the meetings of the DRPC as a regular member. 
Even if Brundrett appeared to be reluctant to have a 
Treasury representative in his Committee, it nevertheless wasn‟t 
something which was imposed on him and the defence 
machinery‟s main scientific body; and there are a number of 
possible explanations of why he would accept such a situation. It 
could prove useful to have a representative of the department 
which would, in any case, eventually, get involved with defence 
R&D expenditure before any final approval. Against later objections 
Brundrett could argue that the issue could/should have been raised 
in the DRPC. If he wanted to confer with the Services without 
Treasury interference, as he indicated himself, he could confer with 
them outside the DRPC mechanism. What‟s more, in relation to 
the Service Departments, the very presence of a Treasury official 
could strengthen the Committee‟s standing and, what‟s even more 
important, in some cases it would add an extra ally during the 
DRPC‟s deliberations. Finally, the arguments that the DRPC was 
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very weak regarding financial considerations, which the Ministry of 
Supply had raised in mid decade, would now have no standing.276 
Brundrett had been the mediator between the Services and the 
Treasury throughout the decade and participation of the latter in 
the DRPC would in practice make little difference, since it would 
simply formalise existing practice at Committee level. 
 
5.4 – The 1957 White Paper on Defence 
 
The White Paper on Defence of April 1957 shows clear evidence of 
congruence with the positions of the DPRC and the MoD scientists 
described above.277 From the outset, it emphasises the importance 
of the economy of Britain as the primary consideration for the 
nation to be strong and it stresses the importance of scientific 
advances.278 The deterrent posture of Britain‟s defence policy goes 
unquestioned and while the American dimension is there, the 
paper makes the point that “there is a wide measure of agreement 
that… [Britain] must possess an appreciable element of nuclear 
deterrent power of her own.”279 From the above comes the 
necessity, which as we have seen was stressed by the DRPC 
review of 1955, that “an adequate effort on research and 
development must be continuously maintained”, though the military 
programme needs to be restricted “to those projects which are 
absolutely essential.”280 The paper acknowledges that the supply 
of American rockets would be pursued, something which evolved 
to the deployment of the Thor missiles under a “dual-key” 
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formula,281 but it stressed that Britain would continue to pursue 
indigenous research and development on ballistic missiles in the 
context of the US-UK agreement and ground-to-air missiles for 
defence purposes, while discontinuing the pursuit of a supersonic 
bomber.282 The line: strong economy – and therefore defence cuts 
– and reliance on high technology is obvious. In this there is little 
doubt that there was a widespread agreement in the political and 
official spheres and Brundrett and the MoD scientists were not in 
any way unique in this. But Brundrett and the scientists around him 
seem to have added two crucial elements: the importance of 
research and development and the ballistic missile. In this last part, 
of course, Duncan Sandys was also of crucial importance. 
Brundrett‟s personal influence becomes more obvious, 
though, if one examines on matters about which Sandys had had 
very strong, and opposite to Brundrett‟s, views earlier in the 
decade. The relationship between the two must have been a 
complex one and, as we saw above, it was characterised by both 
animosities, regarding the Navy‟s carriers, and a strong alliance. 
Blue Streak was a very significant part of the defence posture 
proclaimed in the Sandys Paper and the two men were the main 
proponents of the project. It is therefore no surprise that ballistic 
missiles held such a position in the paper. But the paper also 
included aspects which a few years earlier Sandys would have 
never considered, in fact he would have bitterly opposed. The 
Paper states clearly that “in modern conditions the role of the 
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aircraft carrier, which is in effect a mobile air station, becomes 
increasingly significant.”283 According to Eric Grove, “the retention 
of the carrier force,” which Brundrett had pushed for very strongly, 
was “the main victory for which the Admiralty could congratulate 
itself.”284 At the same time, the paper stressed that “increased 
emphasis will be placed on the development of nuclear propulsion 
for maritime purposes, which has great civil as well as naval 
importance”, a fact which would prove very important in the near 
future.285 It would, of course, be impossible to determine in an 
undisputable way a hypothetical causal link between Brundrett‟s 
influence and the registering of the ideas in Sandys‟ Paper, since 
William Snyder maintains that the Navy had two important allies 
inside the Ministry of Defence.286 But there should be little doubt 
that Brundrett was the crucial one, especially given his close 
relationship with Sandys regarding Blue Streak and the fact that in 
January 1957, when Sandys arrived at the MoD, he was the 
longest serving official there. The First Sea Lord from 1955 and 
future Chief of the Defence Staff, Earl Mountbatten, recognised as 
much in September 1958, quite clearly, though not in the open, 
when he wrote that “it is largely to... [Brundrett‟s] sound and 
excellent advice to the Minister that the Navy has come out of the 
defence re-organisation and cuts better than the other two 
services…”287 
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5.5 – Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter sought to establish the level of influence that Ministry 
of Defence scientists had in the formulation of British defence 
policy in the 1950‟s. These scientists did not necessarily have a 
distinct view from the rest of Whitehall about what British general 
strategy should be – indeed the general views of Brundrett, Cook 
and Williams were widely shared in Whitehall. But in the 
environment of the post-war period Brundrett did become the man 
who, to quote Laurence Martin, “proved particularly useful for 
settling issues, ostensibly on technical grounds but frequently 
merely to secure a decision.”288 What is more, he had strong views 
of his own, deriving from his long experience in the Whitehall 
defence scene and he fought to convince his fellow government 
scientists, his civil and military service colleagues and his political 
masters as to the correctness of his views and there is little doubt 
from the above that he was successful more often than not. The 
fact that Brundrett was supportive of the role of the Navy and its 
interests should not be taken to mean that he was doing it out of a 
sense of misguided sentimentalism for the department which he 
served for most of his career. As we will observe later, when he did 
not agree with the Navy he respectfully opposed their plans and 
sought to influence them in the direction which he thought was 
best. Brundrett was an official of the Ministry of Defence, the 
longest serving one, and a most respected figure in the defence 
establishment in general, with an independent mind and strong 
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views which he had no reason to and rarely did hide.289 
A note of caution is needed to place Brundrett‟s and the rest 
of the scientists‟ importance in perspective. This chapter does not 
argue that these individuals were the deciders, or even the 
initiators of the policy and the priorities expressed in the 1957 
Defence White Paper. There should be little doubt that there was a 
wide consensus, at least in principle, in the general priorities. But 
there should be little doubt as well that a number of the specific 
forms that these priorities took was the result of the influence of 
Brundrett and the scientists around him and this for a number of 
reasons, not least of which was the central position which the MoD 
Chief Scientific Adviser had placed himself in by the middle of the 
decade, as described in the previous chapter. This allowed him to 
be the mediator between the traditional forces within Whitehall: 
first, between the Services on the one hand, and the Treasury and 
the politicians on the other; and second, between the three 
Services. The lack of a firm hand control in the MoD at a political 
level, with (mostly low impact) ministers changing very frequently 
until Sandys arrived, has been seen as a reason for the MoD‟s lack 
of influence.290 The role of Brundrett turns this argument to its head 
by showing that the lack of firm and continuous political control in 
the ministry allowed the longest serving official there to be the 
main important focus of influence from the MoD. Brundrett and the 
MoD scientist lobby were uniquely placed to be key Whitehall 
agents in the 1950‟s regarding Britain‟s defence policy. 
This investigation of the role of government scientists leads 
to two other important conclusions. First, the traditional inter-
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service rivalry context is insufficient to explain the importance and 
role of scientists. As we saw, scientists were not a united block 
within government, certainly regarding issues of defence policy. In 
this sense, there was no „science interest‟. Within the 
government‟s research institutions there were rivalries between 
scientists as to who should control the research and development 
budget and different ideas as to what should be researched and 
what should be developed. It is perfectly feasible to think of the 
rivalries in the defence scientific establishment of the 1950‟s as 
dividing between two groups. The one was concentrated in the Air 
Ministry and the Ministry of Supply and focused and stressed the 
importance of aircraft, especially regarding the deterrent, but also 
regarding the defence of the island. On the other side there was a 
missile team, revolving around Brundrett and including his team in 
the Ministry of Defence, Cockburn from the Ministry of Supply and 
Cook from the Admiralty and later the Atomic Energy Authority.291 
Indeed, while the aircraft team was very much part of the RAF side 
in an inter-service rivalry context, in the 1950‟s the missile team did 
not relate to any of the services. The centre focus for this team 
was the Ministry of Defence and its Defence Research Policy 
Committee, with Brundrett being the main figure. This was very 
clearly an MoD scientist lobby, in terms of its members‟ capacities, 
and in this sense there was a very important „science interest‟ at 
the heart of the defence establishment, independent of any service 
and one which represented the main centre of influence of the 
Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, before the arrival there of a strong 
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personality in the person of Duncan Sandys and its reconstitution 
much later.292 This lobby did not push for „science‟ in an abstract 
way, rather, it stood for the traditional liberal militarist defence 
posture with very specific characteristics and sought to establish 
this, eventually succeeding through the primacy of a strong R&D 
effort and the defence R&D priorities which were eventually 
pronounced in the 1957 Paper on Defence.293 As we have seen, 
they were not “personal advisers”, as Peden would have them;294 
they were permanent officials in Sandys‟ Ministry and the ones 
who were fighting his battles before he arrived in the Ministry of 
Defence. 
This is not to undermine the importance either Macmillan‟s or 
Sandys‟ strong political will on the matter during this process; and 
neither the Treasury and its success “in registering in the… 
Paper… its main point that Britain‟s influence… depended „first and 
foremost‟ on the health of its economy”;295 on the contrary, it 
reinforces them, by explaining how a nominally weak Ministry of 
Defence managed to impose the spending ceilings the political 
masters and the Treasury wished, providing the trust of the 
defence establishment which Brundrett undoubtedly enjoyed and 
the expertise which “Treasury laymen” lacked in their efforts “to 
challenge the experts in the defence departments.”296 The 
scientists concentrated around the Ministry of Defence were a new 
institutional force in Whitehall, untainted by the bitter history and 
reputation which the Treasury carried and which, by the mid 1950‟s 
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had gathered the momentum to play the crucial role they did. 
Given the introduction of the three year programmes in 1958 it is 
not a surprise that the Treasury sought to establish a firmer and 
more official link with the group through participation in the DRPC 
and that Brundrett accepted this.297  
A last important thing to note is that the government 
scientists studied in this thesis are in complete contrast with the 
image that the literature so far has given of British scientists in 
relation to nuclear weapons, which has a strong bias indeed to 
discuss scientists who were on the left of the political spectrum and 
opposed to nuclear weapons.298 The high level government 
scientific figures discussed here were very much in favour of the 
concept of the deterrent and the need for the continuation of R&D 
on both bombs and the best means of delivery. The debates 
centred on the best way to achieve these goals. They, therefore, 
stand in stark contrast with the well known scientific intellectuals of 
the decade, especially Nobel Prize winner (1948) Patrick Blackett, 
by far the most famous scientific analyst of defence strategy in the 
1950‟s;299 and, more importantly because of his practical 
involvement with matters of defence policy from 1960 onwards, 
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Lord Zuckerman, whose role will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
 
Chapter VI 
 
Nuclear Weapons Policy in the 1950‟s and 
1960‟s 
 
 
6.1 – Introduction: Brundrett, Cook and Zuckerman in 
1958 
 
This chapter will examine the leading roles that scientists played in 
the decisions regarding nuclear weapons delivery systems. There 
were three scientists in the forefront of the relevant Whitehall 
battles, Sir Frederick Brundrett, Sir William Cook and Sir (later 
Lord) Zuckerman. In existing accounts, Brundrett has been 
presented as a monolithic supporter of the Blue Streak ballistic 
missile;1 Cook is absent until the decision in the late 1960‟s to start 
the Chevaline programme, the British effort to improve the 
American-sourced Polaris submarine-launched missiles;2 and 
Zuckerman has been presented as very important in relation to 
Polaris and very ineffective in relation to Chevaline.3 This chapter 
will show that the literature is misleading in presenting Brundrett as 
such a myopic official and that Cook had a much more significant 
role from the late 1950‟s already and did not suddenly appear in 
issues of nuclear delivery systems procurement a decade later. It 
will also put forward a number of qualifications in relation to 
Zuckerman‟s role, by examining him in parallel with Brundrett and 
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Cook. Although these qualifications will confirm the broad image 
that Zuckerman was indeed influential in the matter of Polaris and 
ineffective in that of Chevaline, this chapter will bring out a very 
different image of the famous scientist. The main argument that 
this chapter puts forward is that specific weapons procurement 
decisions during the Cold War were influenced in important ways 
by a small group of government scientists. 
In this respect, it is important to see where the three 
scientists had found themselves in 1958, after general matters of 
policy had been established in the Sandys White Paper and after 
the signing of the „Agreement for Co-operation on the Uses of 
Atomic energy for Mutual Defence Purposes‟. Whether the 
Americans agreed to the collaboration to prevent duplication of 
effort or not, there is little doubt that the achievement of the 
independent British H-bomb was crucial in demonstrating British 
capabilities to the Americans and the Soviets.4 Sir William Cook, 
as he now was, had successfully directed the completion of the 
two thermonuclear tests in May and June of 1957. He was also 
one of the main negotiators of the practical side of the 1958 Anglo-
American bilateral agreement. He was the father of the British H-
bomb; the man who went there to get the job done and did so in 
record time. In 1958 Cook was Britain‟s foremost nuclear expert. 
Brundrett, CSA at the MoD, retained under his immediate 
supervision research and development on Britain‟s ballistic missile 
and the crucial matter of nuclear intelligence, which, according to 
Goodman, was the main channel of co-operation between the US 
and Britain before the establishment of the nuclear „special 
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relationship‟ in 1958, and one which paved the path for the latter.5 
Both Brundrett and Cook were in Washington in August 1958 to 
negotiate the Anglo-American agreement.6 While these two were 
at the forefront of matters nuclear, Zuckerman was a Professor of 
Anatomy at Birmingham and the Deputy Chairman of the Advisory 
Council on Science Policy, with an extended experience in 
Whitehall politics, albeit limited, to the civil side. 
 
6.2. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems 
 
6.2.1 – Brundrett and the Royal Navy‟s Nuclear Ambitions 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Brundrett was a strong 
supporter of Blue Streak and he continued to support the project, 
which was under constant attack, throughout the period 1957 to 
December 1959 when he retired. He was still supporting it even 
after he retired and no doubt knew about its fate in the 1960 
lecture at the Royal United Services Institute quoted earlier.7 Both 
The Times and The Guardian picked up the quote the next day: 
 
I still believe that Blue Streak is the only weapon which will allow us to 
continue with our deterrent policy over the next decade.8 
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But in the same speech Brundrett made a number of additional 
remarks which the historical literature has neglected, branding him 
instead as an unthinking supporter of an obsolete project.9  
Brundrett stressed that “at the time at which the decision was 
actually made to go ahead with the development of… [Blue 
Streak], both in America and in this country, I do not myself believe 
there was any reasonable alternative.”10 When other viable 
alternatives came in the picture, Brundrett didn‟t dismiss them, 
although he appears thoroughly critical of the Skybolt air-launched 
missile, mainly because he saw it as part of the continuation of an 
aeroplane obsession of the British defence establishment.11 For 
Polaris he said clearly that “from the long term point of view…of 
the two possible forms of mobile deterrent I consider the 
submarine launched missile preferable to the air-launched, for a 
very large variety of reasons.”12 Brundrett was clear to stress that 
his reasoning in favour of Blue Streak rested with timing and the 
continuity of the deterrent. In his words: “From the military point of 
view, Blue Streak gives us the only timely means of ensuring that 
we satisfy the Government policy of keeping our independent 
contribution to the Western deterrent continually in being.”13 
Indeed, while pushing for Blue Streak, he was tacitly, though very 
effectively, allowing, or one might even say promoting, the option 
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of a submarine launched nuclear missile. He did this on two fronts.  
First, as we saw in the previous chapter, Brundrett supported 
the Royal Navy‟s efforts for a programme of nuclear propulsion for 
submarines. He did this through the DRPC, whose backing can be 
considered as crucial given the Treasury‟s trust in the Committee. 
This is not to say that he knew from the early 1950‟s about the 
possible developments of solid-fuelled missiles launched from 
nuclear propelled submarines, but his efforts to this end intensified 
after this was known to be a possibility from the United States, as 
the argument with Sir Geoffrey Tuttle of July 1957 about the 
allocation of fissile material to the programme, described in the 
previous chapter, indicates.14 Second, the support by Brundrett 
was part of a more general and direct involvement and support for 
the Navy‟s nuclear ambitions on his part. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter he was in favour of thinking of the Royal Navy as 
an “ancillary deterrent”, a concept promoted by the First Sea Lord, 
Sir Roderick McGrigor (1951-1955), a role initially pursued as a 
way of keeping the carrier programme alive. But according to Clark 
and Wheeler the promotion of this concept of a tactical atomic 
strike force for the Navy set the scene for McGrigor‟s successor, 
Lord Mountbatten, to push for the Navy‟s nuclear role later in the 
decade.15 In the late 1950‟s the nuclear-propelled submarine and 
the role of carrier of the nuclear deterrent were very much in 
congruence and Brundrett played a key role in both directions. 
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A clear sign of the connection of the two issues and 
Brundrett‟s support for the Navy was the time around the visit of 
American Admiral Rickover in the UK during January 1958, 
concerning collaboration between the two countries in the area.16 
In a preparatory meeting to discuss Rickover‟s visit, Brundrett, as 
the official representing the Ministry of Defence, stated clearly that 
research and development in nuclear propulsion for submarines is 
“of paramount importance” to the UK and the British side should 
press Rickover that it was not enough for them to just purchase a 
system from the US, rather that it was necessary to develop an in-
house capacity in nuclear submarine know-how.17 This was 
completely in line with the Navy‟s wishes and aspirations, as had 
been expressed to Brundrett by Mountbatten himself, at the time 
1st Sea Lord, about a year earlier.18  
When collaboration was established at a level that was 
appropriate for the Navy, the second issue was for which type of 
nuclear submarine to pursue.19 There were two options: the Skate 
type and Skipjack. Initially, Brundrett voted for the first one. Stating 
his views in a second meeting he argued that it was technically 
and financially the better option and, what was more, it was an 
already proven system. An important aspect of its advantages was 
that it would be available faster and it would be politically 
advantageous for the UK to have a nuclear submarine as soon as 
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possible.20 These were the same arguments that Rickover had 
expressed, suggesting that, while he was offering both options, the 
British Navy should select Skate.21 After Sir Richard Powell, the 
Permanent Secretary, also gave his politically informed consent, 
Sandys, the Minister of Defence, wrote to the US Secretary of 
Defence that the UK would probably accept Rickover‟s offer, while 
the issue of which type of submarine they would go for remained 
an open question.22 Mountbatten was quick to thank Brundrett for 
his help with the Rickover meetings and added the grandiose note 
that “the Navy will never forget all you are doing for us.”23 
Nevertheless, there was a difference of opinion between the Navy 
and Brundrett, since the former wanted to pursue the Skipjack 
option.24 
At the same time there was another issue which was relevant 
to the considerations about which of the two options Britain would 
pursue: the alternative Skipjack system had an advantage that 
could not be overlooked. On the 26 February 1958, Brundrett 
wrote to the Controller of the Navy that he had “succeeded…in 
getting my Minister firmly committed to the nuclear submarine in 
the White Paper”, a statement that, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, was accurate.25 Expressing his scepticism about 
the Navy‟s intentions regarding Skipjack and because of some 
reaction from the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer about the cost of Skipjack, Brundrett had suggested 
that the Navy recast their own programme to ensure that the UK 
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got the best value for money from Rickover‟s offer. His intentions 
for writing that letter were that “I shall have to tell… [the Minister of 
Defence] my views and I don‟t want to run more counter to the 
Navy than I may feel I have to.”26 
Brundrett‟s worry over this issue was, as it turned out, 
unfounded. Reid (the Controller) replied to say that they were both 
thinking on the same lines, that the Admiralty wanted to take 
Rickover up on his offer and select Skipjack. A month later, in April 
1958, the First Lord of the Admiralty sent a letter to the Minister of 
Defence to get his agreement on the bid for Skipjack.27 Sandys 
referred the letter to his Chief Scientific Adviser for explanation and 
advice before replying to the First Lord. Brundrett‟s reply sheds 
light into his thinking, and that of the Admiralty‟s, about Skipjack. 
Although he had initially opted for Skate, he explained to his 
Minister that Skipjack was a bigger submarine and ideal for 
carrying the new British ASDIC system, in his words “the best in 
the world.”28 Brundrett was certain that if the Navy claimed that the 
cost of the project would be controlled and not exceed 
expectations then there was no reason to doubt this. On top of 
these considerations, Skipjack had an additional crucial advantage 
that could not be overlooked and actually made it the preferable 
choice. In Brundrett‟s words: “Admiral Rickover informed me when 
he was over here that it was intended to use the Skipjack 
machinery to propel the submarine designed to carry Polaris.”29 
This was certainly an issue which could play a decisive role. The 
ASDIC system was a factor in the decision regarding the types of 
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nuclear submarine which was valid two months earlier, when 
Brundrett was opting for Skate, but it wasn‟t enough to tip the 
balance against the politically advantageous faster delivery and the 
certainty of an already proven system. But for Brundrett, the 
Polaris factor, with its possibilities for the future, was worth the risk 
of going for the more advanced system. He wrote to his Minister: “I 
suggest you agree.”30 
It is not clear from the available record when exactly 
Brundrett changed his mind. Certainly, though, the association of 
the nuclear propelled submarine programme with Polaris seems to 
have dated even earlier than this incident and Brundrett had shown 
a keen interest. In January 1958, he had contacted the Admiralty 
representative at the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, 
Vice Admiral Sir Robert Elkins, to that effect, declaring himself 
anxious about Polaris and asking him to keep a close eye, since “if 
1500 [miles] is a genuine possibility [as the range for the Polaris 
missile], what... the chances [were] of going even higher” was a 
very important issue for the UK.31 In early 1958, the matter of most 
concern to Brundrett regarding Polaris was an evident scepticism 
about its possibilities and whether the time-scale and capabilities 
that the Americans (i.e. the US Navy) were claiming for the missile 
system was a viable scenario. He wrote along these lines to his 
Minister in February 1958 admitting that Polaris looked 
remarkable, but in no way was it the case that the project‟s 
prospects were certain and he repeated to Sandys a warning 
which Rickover had given him in private during his visit in Britain: 
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Whatever you do, don‟t undertake a development like Polaris. Our 
people have got a fantastically difficult job ahead of them and I doubt 
whether they appreciate all the troubles they are going to run into. I 
strongly advise you to let them spend the very large amount of money 
which will be necessary before they get the answer.32 
 
Despite his interest on Polaris, there should be little doubt 
that the Navy, and Mountbatten personally, were aware that 
Brundrett was an important supporter of the continuation of Blue 
Streak throughout the second half of the 1950‟s. A letter from the 
Admiralty to the Navy section of the British Joint Services Mission 
stated clearly that there is “no doubt that on these largely technical 
grounds the arguments for Blue Streak are strong and are 
supported by Brundrett and the Ministry of Supply.”33 On 25 April 
1958, while a week earlier he was advising Sandys on accepting 
the Skipjack option for the Navy, Brundrett nevertheless urged his 
Minister to be cautious about the prospects of Polaris, stressing 
that “while I am quite certain everybody will agree that the question 
whether or not we should add Polaris fitted nuclear submarines to 
our forces should be discussed, a decision is not a very simple 
one.”34 He was still sceptical about the projected capabilities of the 
submarine-launched missiles and, during a period when Blue 
Streak was under attack, he didn‟t want to scrap the project when 
an alternative option was not yet a viable one.  
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Nevertheless, Brundrett‟s mixed attitude on the matter of 
Polaris did not prevent Mountbatten from keeping in close touch 
with him on the issue of the deterrent. In September 1958, 
Mountbatten wrote to Sir Robert Elkins in Washington to inform 
him about the possibility of the cancellation of Blue Streak and that 
Polaris might be an alternative for it and continued: “the man who 
is really gripping this is Sir Frederick Brundrett, the Chief Scientific 
Adviser, and I have been in touch with him on the telephone about 
this whole subject. He is well seized with the advantage of taking 
Polaris, both for possible use on shore by the RAF and above all in 
nuclear submarines by the RN.” He finished the letter by stressing 
“how important it is that this exchange of correspondence should 
not leak” after having asked Elkins to arrange for Brundrett to see 
Admiral Burke, Chief of Naval Operations in the US Navy.35 
Mountbatten‟s relationship with Admiral Burke has been 
interpreted as one of the indicators of the Navy‟s active efforts to 
establish Polaris as a possible choice for the carrier of the British 
deterrent.36 Given the very close relationship the two men had 
during the 1950‟s and the importance that this had for the Navy‟s 
nuclear aspirations, it would be surprising if Mountbatten would let 
someone get between the two Navies and ruin it. In this light, the 
fact that the First Sea Lord sent the following letter directly to 
Burke illuminates a great deal about Brundrett‟s attitude towards 
the form of the deterrent and it is worth quoting extensively:  
 
When our Minister of Defence visits Washington next week he will 
be accompanied by his Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Frederick Brundrett. 
I believe you have met Fred Brundrett before, but I would be 
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particularly grateful if you could arrange to see him again during this 
visit. Not only is he one of my oldest friends, for we served together in 
the Signals School in 1924..., but Brundrett has been a true friend of the 
Navy all the way through. It is largely to his sound and excellent advice 
to the Minister that the Navy has come out of the defence re-
organisation and cuts better than the other two services… 
I sincerely hope that however busy you are you can spare a few 
minutes to see him.37 
 
This letter cannot of course be taken to mean that Brundrett was a 
supporter of Polaris. He was an official of the Ministry of Defence 
whose importance lay with the fact that he would be directly 
involved with any decision about the nuclear deterrent. But 
Mountbatten is not simply introducing Brundrett to Burke as an 
official. His phrases that he was „a personal friend‟ and „a friend of 
the Navy‟ are a clear indication that Mountbatten endorses 
Brundrett as a man who is open to discussion on the matter of the 
deterrent, who wants to be kept informed about the recent 
developments on the matter, who could, crucially, be trusted with 
information about the programme and even that he is positively 
inclined towards the Royal Navy‟s nuclear ambitions. Mountbatten 
would never have let someone get in between his relationship with 
Burke and put the two Navies‟ collaboration in jeopardy. In any 
case, during this period, as Richard Moore has shown, efforts 
towards Polaris were seen, even within parts of the Admiralty, as a 
project for the future and not necessarily as an immediate solution 
for the deterrent.38 In all likelihood Mountbatten wanted Burke to 
pitch Polaris to Brundrett by demonstrating its potential, assuring 
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him about the projected capabilities of the system and making 
clear that co-operation between the two Navies was and would 
continue to be strong.  
How is one to explain Brundrett‟s attitude towards the matter 
of Blue Streak and Polaris? There are a number of points which 
need to be taken into consideration: first, during 1958 and 1959 
doubts about Blue Streak were mounting; second, Brundrett knew 
very well that the other alternative to Blue Streak was a 
continuation of an aircraft carried deterrent, by prolonging the life 
of V-bomber force with either an indigenous (Blue Steel Mark I and 
Mark II), or, later, an American air-to-surface missile (Skybolt); 
third, his overall views regarding the Ministry of Supply‟s and the 
Navy‟s procurement capabilities;39 and finally, the fact that he was 
aware that his suggestions, as the government‟s scientific adviser, 
could tip the balance in a future decision.  
These considerations point to the strong likelihood that 
Brundrett was trying to cover two angles at once. On the one hand, 
he was supporting Blue Streak as much as he could, either 
because he was convinced that it was indeed the best option, or 
because it would have been very difficult for him as the Whitehall 
official effectively responsible for Blue Streak to turn against it at 
the last minute, especially since by now he and Sandys remained 
the two oldest and firmest proponents of the project and he had 
been involved with the project from its inception. In this sense, 
Young‟s comment that Brundrett was “wedded to Blue Streak” is an 
accurate one.40 On the other hand, and this is a point that Young 
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and others have missed, Brundrett wanted to make sure that, from 
the available alternatives to or successors of Blue Streak, Polaris 
would seem as the best choice, with the provision that the 
Americans would prove that its projected capabilities were feasible. 
He wrote along these lines in January 1958, stating that “I am still 
more sure today that with the development of interdependence the 
right thing to do is to let the Americans develop Polaris with us 
keeping closely in touch.”41To this end he supported the Navy‟s 
case, to the extent possible at this juncture, in his capacity as Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence. Indeed, when Blue 
Streak was eventually cancelled, The Guardian presented 
Brundrett as “saying publicly that he considers... [Polaris] to be the 
most perfect weapon of war ever conceived.”42 The question, then 
which needs explaining is why Brundrett, who knew even before 
he left the Ministry of Defence in December 1959 that Blue Streak 
would be cancelled,43 supported in his talk to RUSI a programme 
about to be scrapped. The lack of any personal papers or 
correspondence that would shed light to Brundrett‟s thinking, make 
a conclusive explanation of his motives impossible to establish.44 
This ambivalent attitude was mirrored in the matter of 
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Brundrett‟s participation in the committee set up in early 1959 to 
study the issue of the best possible carrier of Britain‟s nuclear 
warheads, the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG). 
This committee, set up by the Chiefs of Staff, was chaired by the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, Sir Richard 
Powell, and many at the time thought that it “was to be the 
principal arena in which the proponents of airborne and submarine 
deterrent forces pressed their cases.”45 According to Young, 
Powell, seeking to exclude any biased opinion in the deliberations, 
wanted to exclude both Service representation and Brundrett from 
the Study Group; Brundrett did in the end participate at the 
insistence of Sandys, who wanted Blue Streak to have a strong 
proponent included.46 But this account neglects the Chief Scientific 
Adviser‟s own ambivalence about whether to participate. On 21 
January 1959 Brundrett wrote to Mountbatten that he had 
proposed two independent scientists to Powell and that he was 
contemplating whether to participate himself.47 His logic was that “it 
would be much better for me not to join the party or to be 
represented on it because I prefer my complete freedom in order to 
give criticism.”48 It appears that feeling the tide turning against Blue 
Streak, Brundrett wanted to keep the Study Group at the level of 
an independent advisory committee and not the forum where the 
decision would effectively be taken and whose conclusion he could 
not have fought effectively; the way to do that was by excluding 
himself and Service representation in the Group and he urged 
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Mountbatten to reconsider the Vice Chiefs‟ participation.49 But 
Mountbatten, after “a great deal of careful thought and discussion” 
would disappoint the official whom he considered as „one of his 
oldest friends.‟50 He wrote to Brundrett that there was no doubt in 
anyone‟s mind that the Services should be represented, since this 
was “a Defence question first and foremost”, and that a 
combination of a permanent secretary with two outside scientists 
could not possibly arrive at the right answers.51 In other words, 
Mountbatten wanted a consensus in the cancellation of Blue 
Streak in order for the two candidate successor systems to fight it 
out, with a possible consensus between the Services concerning 
the alternative looking very doubtful at this stage.52 It seems that, 
by now, events had overcome Brundrett‟s influence. 
 
6.2.2 – Cook and Zuckerman: Polaris  
 
Thus the forum for the discussion of the decision was set up: the 
British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group. Professor Young has rightly 
identified this committee as the centre for the decision to acquire 
the Polaris missiles and has convincingly shown that this was the 
result of the well co-ordinated efforts of a „Royal Navy Polaris 
lobby.‟53 In Young‟s story, this lobby had as a key member the new 
Chief Scientific Adviser from 1960, Sir Solly Zuckerman. Here, I will 
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introduce a number of qualifications to the „Royal Navy lobby‟ 
interpretation by stressing the role, parallel to Zuckerman‟s, of Sir 
William Cook. While a Naval lobby did exist and was indeed active 
and important,  a separate group existed at the same time in 
Whitehall, one whose origins are to be found in the 1950‟s 
scientific-missile group identified in the previous chapter 
(Brundrett, Cook, Cockburn) and whose role was complementary 
but crucial to the Navy‟s efforts to establish Polaris as a viable 
option. Zuckerman, as Chief Scientific Adviser, played a leading 
role inside Whitehall as a member of this group – and not a Royal 
Navy lobby – and, crucially, worked in tandem with primarily Cook, 
and additionally Sir Robert Cockburn, members of the missile team 
since the mid-1950‟s. These two offered Zuckerman the leverage 
that the recently appointed Professor of Anatomy lacked in the 
defence machinery of Whitehall. 
In order to see this one needs to go a few years back, when 
Zuckerman and Cook first came together within another 
committee, set up, ironically enough, within the Air Ministry. The 
formation of the Air Ministry Strategic Scientific Policy Committee 
(AMSSPC) was conceived as early as 1957 from the then 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry, Sir Maurice Dean. 
Although the initial thought for a chairman was Professor Bullard, 
after consultations with Lord Todd and with the former chairman of 
the DRPC, Sir Henry Tizard, Zuckerman‟s name came to the fore; 
Dean duly contacted him and Zuckerman accepted the 
chairmanship of the AMSSPC in April 1958.54 Internal Air Ministry 
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correspondence shows that the Committee was intended to be “an 
independent advisory panel” attached to the department, created 
while doubts existed about the ministry‟s own scientific advisory 
body and the DRPC; at the same time there was a need for care 
not to disrupt the work of or hinder the Air Ministry‟s relationship 
with either the DRPC or the Ministry‟s own scientific advisory 
body.55 Regarding membership, the ministry was looking for “a 
scientist or so with good qualifications as practical engineers if any 
such are available” to leaven academic representatives.56 In this 
respect, Zuckerman was a peculiar choice for chairman, though 
the other members clearly represented a practical-engineer angle: 
Cook, the importance of whose participation in the AMSSPC has 
gone unnoticed in the literature, was undoubtedly such a man 
having just completed successfully the British H-bomb project; 57 
he was brought in to cover the atomic angle;58 William (later Sir 
William) Hawthorne (FRS, 1955) was the Hopkinson and Imperial 
Chemical Industries Professor of Applied Aerodynamics at 
Cambridge, with a war record in the development of the first jet 
engines;59 James (later Sir James) Lighthill (FRS, 1953 at the age 
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of 29) was at the time the Beyer Professor of Applied Mathematics 
at Manchester and was considered, in government circles as 
“probably the most distinguished aerodynamicist in the world.”60 
The Air Ministry Strategic Scientific Policy Committee was a 
scientific committee with members of the highest calibre, 
established to provide fresh thinking and play the role of an Air 
Ministry think-tank which would evaluate the British nuclear 
deterrent.61 It started its business in September 1958.62 
Though he was the chairman, considering the committee 
members‟ expertise Zuckerman was the odd one out. He mentions 
the committee in passing in his autobiography as his introduction 
to defence policy and this was undoubtedly true.63 Since the war 
he had had no involvement in matters of defence policy and 
certainly never had any involvement in defence R&D whatsoever. 
His biographer mentions the AMSSPC regarding a different turn 
that the committee‟s approach took while Cook had assumed the 
chairmanship for a brief while in Zuckerman‟s absence.64 This 
probably concerns the matter of tactical nuclear weapons, to which 
Zuckerman was strongly opposed. Cook, as we have already 
seen, considered the existence of tactical atomic weapons to be a 
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matter of top priority.65 But these issues are of secondary 
importance compared to the matter of Britain‟s nuclear deterrent. 
When the BNDSG started its work in mid 1959 the AMSSPC 
had already been meeting for a year. Indeed, the Study Group 
consulted a report by the Air Ministry Committee on the nuclear 
deterrent in October 1959.66 The report was highly critical of Blue 
Streak and recommended a mobile platform for the carrier of the 
deterrent, either an airborne or a submarine one, but not identifying 
which of the two options was better.67 The report was probably one 
more nail in Blue Streak‟s coffin, which the BNDSG was there to 
seal. In February 1960 the cancellation of the project was a fact 
with the „funeral‟, as The Times noted, taking place on 14 April 
1960.68 The chosen alternative as the carrier of the British 
deterrent was the American, still-in-development, aircraft-launched 
missile, Skybolt, a decision made at the highest level and with 
almost exclusively political criteria.69 
But the story of the replacement of the deterrent was not 
over, since, as Young has noted, no one outside the Air Ministry 
believed in the technical feasibility of Skybolt.70 The two interested 
services (Admiralty and Air Ministry) were each very actively 
supporting their preferred delivery systems. But, as we have seen, 
the defence scenery was not the same as, say, ten years before. 
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although AWRE had carried out the necessary research for it. On short range nuclear weapons see 
Kaoru Kikuyama, “Britain and the Procurement of Short-range Nuclear Weapons”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 539-559. 
66
  Young, „The Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby ‟, passes this fact in a footnote, at p. 83, n. 85. 
67
   DEFE 19/11, “The Nuclear Deterrent – 1970 and after”, pp. 7-8. It was forwarded to Powell by 
VCAS, who commented that it may be of assistance “particularly as it has been prepared by an 
independent panel: DEFE 19/11, VCAS to Powell, 19/10/1959. 
68
   Anon., “The End of Blue Streak”, The Times, 14/4/1960. 
69
   See Ken Young, “The Skybolt Crisis of 1962: Muddle or Mischief?”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec. 2004), pp. 614-635. 
70
   Young, “Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby ”, p. 73. 
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As the new Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, wrote in 
November 1960 “I think on the whole I would rather take first 
advice from my own three principal advisers.”71 One was the Chief 
of the Defence Staff, Mountbatten, who was quietly, in order to 
keep appearances, putting pressure on his Minister in support of 
Polaris.72 He was clearly part of the „Polaris lobby‟, indeed 
probably its head, though covertly. The minister‟s other two 
advisers, the Permanent Secretary and the Chief Scientific Adviser, 
were very much entangled in the workings of the British Nuclear 
Deterrent Study Group.  
Powell, the Permanent Secretary, was the Group‟s chairman 
and would wait for his Study Group‟s decision in order to advise his 
Minister, though he would soon leave the Ministry, with Sir Edward 
Playfair assuming for a few months and Sir Robert Scott replacing 
him eventually. These developments established the post of 
Permanent Secretary in the MoD as rather ineffective during this 
period. The CSA was also now a new man, with Zuckerman having 
replaced Brundrett in January 1960. In this capacity he was the 
main scientific figure in the Study Group. But the BNDSG had from 
its inception another scientist-member, Sir William Cook, whose 
authority in matters nuclear was unrivalled in Britain.73 In October 
1960, when Powell asked Zuckerman to present his views in the 
BNDSG, the latter had been in his position only for a few months 
and his power at this point rested with the power of the position he 
had inherited from Brundrett. Zuckerman himself had no real 
                                                 
71
   DEFE 13/617, Watkinson to Secretary, 16/11/1960, my emphasis. 
72
   Young, “Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby”, p. 75. The position of the Chief of the Defence Staff had 
been created in 1959 with Marshal of the RAF Sir William Dickson holding for a short period of 
time the post until Mountbatten succeeded him in July 1959. 
73
   DEFE 19/11 Powell to Minister, 23/3/1959; this letter shows that Lighthill had been considered as 
another scientist to be a member of the Group. The criterion for the selection of two “outside 
scientists” was to “bring in fresh and unprejudiced minds.” 
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personal authority in these matters. Thus, he deferred giving an 
answer as an individual and suggested the formation of a technical 
sub-committee to give appropriate answers to questions which he 
had “skilfully-chosen”, a sub-committee which, following a 
discussion in the next meeting, was formed in the fifth meeting of 
the BNDSG on 18 November 1960.74 Young has rightly 
characterised the formation of the sub-committee as a “tactically 
astute move” on behalf of Zuckerman but has neglected the fact 
that his motives were not only tactical, but a matter of crucial 
importance.75  
The membership of the technical sub-committee and the way 
in which the members were chosen, shows this very clearly.76 First, 
it included Sir William Cook. Second, it included the rest of their 
colleagues from the AMSSPC: Hawthorne, who after 1960 and 
Zuckerman‟s move in the MoD was the AMSSPC‟s chairman, and 
Lighthill, who by now, though, was not an outsider anymore, but 
the Director of the Royal Aircraft Establishment. The choice of the 
rest of the members was also very significant. The service 
ministries‟ representatives, Carroll (Admiralty) and Constant (Air 
Ministry) had clear allegiances. But the Ministry of Aviation 
(formerly Supply) representative, Sir Robert Cockburn, had been 
very critical of Skybolt since at least 1959 and had been a member 
of the missile lobby, as we saw in the previous chapter.77 He was a 
very close ally of Zuckerman, a fact obvious from their 
                                                 
74
   AIR 19/998, Extract from BND(SG)(60) 3
rd
 meeting, 5/10/1960; 4
th
 meeting, 10/11/1960; 5
th
 
meeting 18/11/1960; and Young, “Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby ”, p. 74 for the characterisation as 
„skilfully-chosen.‟  
75
   That Zuckerman suggested „technical‟ character of the sub-committee is significant. 
76
   DEFE 13/617. The full membership included Bowden, Brown, Bullard, Prof. Christopherson 
(Imperial College), Cockburn (MoA), Hawthorne (Cambridge), Lighthill (formerly Cambridge, 
now RAE) and Cook and Zuckerman. 
77
   Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 255 notes that Cockburn was warning in 1959 that “because of the 
technical difficulties „the Americans, after starting the project, would eventually abandon it.‟” 
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correspondence regarding outside scientists‟ participation in the 
technical sub-committee. On 22 November 1960, Zuckerman 
wrote to Cockburn to ask for his advice on the membership.78 On 
the 2nd of December Cockburn was writing that it wouldn‟t be 
prudent to try to avoid Air Ministry representation and put, “for 
intellectual calibre and authority”, Professors Christopherson and 
Brown at the top of the list. At the same time he excluded 
Hawthorne and Bowden.79 Zuckerman replied a few days later to 
thank him for his suggestions and, explaining his approach to 
Hawthorne and Bowden to participate as external members, he 
shed light on his own thinking: 
 
…I‟m afraid, without waiting to hear your views, I have also written to 
Hawthorne and Bowden. My reason for so doing is that I have a 
hunch that the advice of this sub-committee will be very much as 
you, yourself, could write the judgement at this moment, before the 
sub-committee ever met, but that we want to associate with the 
verdict a certain orchestration of authority. I hope that we are not too 
far apart here.80  
 
To this Cockburn replied that “there is no real disagreement about 
your choice of members” and “I fully appreciate your desire to 
balance the orchestra.”81 
The technical sub-committee delivered its report in June 
1961 and was strongly in favour of Polaris.82 The bickering within 
                                                 
78
   DEFE 19/87, Zuckerman to Cockburn, 22/1//1960. 
79
   DEFE 19/87, Cockburn to Zuckerman, 2/12/1960. 
80
   DEFE 19/87, Zuckerman to Cockburn, 6/12/1960 (my emphasis). Young, “Skybolt Crisis”, p. 621 
describes Hawthorne as a “Zuckerman confidante and noted enthusiast for Polaris.” 
81
   DEFE 19/87, Cockburn  to Zuckerman, 12/12/1960.  
82
  Hill, The Vertical Empire, pp. 99-100 seems to confuse this report with the one submitted by the 
AMSSPC, a fact which stresses the interweaving of the two groups and Zuckerman‟s and Cook‟s 
role in both. 
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the technical sub-committee which Young describes is easily 
explainable by Zuckerman‟s intentions as we saw them above.83 
But, as Sir Edward Playfair wrote to Zuckerman, when the latter 
asked him if he minded waiting a few days to receive some of the 
papers of the technical sub-committee, “this... [was] only for 
education.”84 In order to appease the two objectors, Lighthill and 
Constant, a separate opinion was amended to the report, in order 
to keep the appearance of a single document which would carry 
the technical sub-committee‟s weight. The alternatives would be 
for a report to be submitted without the consent of the aircraft lobby 
representatives, or, worse, for two separate reports to have been 
submitted. Though this was important, the essence of the story 
was that, in the end, Zuckerman and Cook as members of the sub-
committee took the report with them in the BNDSG arguing for the 
Polaris option, with the former, as the chairman of the sub-
committee, “discount[ing] the opposition.”85 Cook‟s strong opinion 
in favour of the missile-fitted Polaris and the close involvement of 
the two in the issue is evident when he wrote to Zuckerman from 
the UKAEA congratulating his ally for avoiding a minority report 
and could see “nothing in the various alterations likely to detract 
from our clear conclusions.”86 In November 1961, Cook was still 
arguing in the BND(SG) “that there had been no developments in 
recent months to make any alteration necessary in the report... 
[rather, any such developments] served only to strengthen the 
                                                 
83
   Young, “Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby”, pp. 75-76: Constant (Air Ministry) and Lighthill (RAE) 
were the dissenting voices. 
84
   DEFE 19/87, hand-written note by EWP in Zuckerman to Secretary, 19/1/1961. Sir Edward Playfair 
was briefly Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence in 1960. 
85
   Young, Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby”, p. 76. 
86
  It should be noted that it is not clear from the official documents whether, or rather how much, 
Cook was apprehensive of the “orchestrations” of Zuckerman. The letter is in DEFE 19/87, Cook to 
Zuckerman, 25/7/1961. It is signed Bill and addressed to „Dear Solly‟ in Cook‟s handwriting. 
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Technical Sub-Committee‟s conclusions.”87 Zuckerman may have 
been characterised as “a traitor in the Air and Aviation Ministries”88 
but for him to succeed in his aims, the standing which Cook 
enjoyed was indispensable. The influence of both is highlighted in 
the following letter from within the Air Ministry which discusses the 
appointment of a new secretary to the AMSSPC in the end of 
1962: 
 
My views are coloured by the belief that while the [AMSSP] 
Committee should obviously be given the greatest possible 
independence, it is valuable to have a Secretary in touch with them 
who can do a certain amount of keeping on the rails, and at least 
knows where the Committee‟s deliberations are likely to lead us in 
our general conduct of the battle in Whitehall. I confess that I am 
haunted by the reflection that much of the damage to the position of 
the Royal Air Force as the custodian of the independent British 
nuclear deterrent has been done by two scientists – Sir Solly 
Zuckerman and Sir William Cook – who formed their views in the Air 
Ministry Strategic Scientific Policy Committee.89 
 
In effect, when Powell had asked Zuckerman to give his 
opinion and the latter formed a technical sub-committee, the 
former, as Permanent Secretary, had deferred his power to the 
Chief Scientific Adviser; 90 and the new CSA had deferred it to a 
                                                 
87
  AIR 19/998, Extract of Meetings, BND(SG) 2
nd
 Meeting, 29/11/1961. 
88
  The characterisation comes from Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 341 coming from US official 
sources. „Traitor‟ because during the war he held RAF honorary positions. 
89
  NA, AIR 2/15147, R. C. Kent, AUS(A) to PUS (Maurice Dean), 17/12/1962 (my emphasis). The 
underlined “much” has been added by hand in the place of “most”. While the AMSSPC was 
Zuckerman‟s initiation in matters of nuclear weapons, there is no reason to think that Cook had 
waited for his participation in the Air Ministry committee to form his views. He was thinking as a 
scientific official about these matters from as early as 1954, as we have seen. 
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   It is, I think, indicative that Zuckerman considered at some point “whether this particular Sub-
Committee could not be switched from the B.N.D.(S.G.) to the D.R.P.C.” DEFE 19/87, Zuckerman 
to Dr. Touch, 28/2/1961. 
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panel of experts, which he needed in order to carry through a pro-
Polaris decision which wouldn‟t be open to doubt by other quarters. 
Whether Zuckerman‟s loyalties regarding the possible British 
deterrent might have been influenced by the person who was 
instrumental in him being appointed CSA (i.e. Mountbatten) 
remains an open question, but both Cockburn and Cook had been 
involved in this matter since the middle of the previous decade. 
Cockburn was no doubt a missile expert, but Cook was the father 
of the country‟s H-bomb. He was as expert in nuclear weapons as 
one could be at the time in the UK and, in the words of the Study 
Group‟s chairman “chosen for... [his] personal merit rather than 
for... [his] official interest... being deeply interested and his 
opinion... [being] always valuable.”91  
It should not be forgotten that at this point the official weapon 
that Britain pursued was Skybolt and only after its cancellation was 
Polaris opted for. But as Professor Young has argued, and this was 
Brundrett‟s thinking as we saw earlier, Polaris was seen as a future 
option, an option which should nevertheless have been established 
as a better alternative to any other non-ballistic missile system.92 
Besides, in many quarters, Skybolt was seen as a political stop-
gap solution, and by this time, “the Air Staff and Air Ministry 
officials were virtually alone in their advocacy of the airborne 
deterrent.”93 Given that Skybolt was eventually cancelled, one 
could argue that the decision to go for Polaris was a foregone 
conclusion, but such a line of thinking would be missing important 
points. The case for Polaris was a viable option at the point of the 
cancellation of Skybolt because of important efforts from two 
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  DEFE 13/617, Powell to Minister, 23/3/1959. 
92
  Young, “Royal Navy‟s Polaris Lobby.”  
93
  Ibid, and Young, “Skybolt Crisis,” p. 630. 
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angles: the Royal Navy lobby and the scientist-missile lobby. The 
fact that, unlike that of Blue Streak, in the case of Polaris there was 
an immediate association with one of the three services should not 
obscure the role of the scientists of the missile lobby, who were 
pushing very strongly, and eventually successfully, towards the 
ballistic missile. This is a crucial aspect of the story which an inter-
service rivalry context misses.94 
These conclusions about the relative importance of 
Zuckerman and Cook are reinforced in the next section with the 
examination of the issue of the programme to improve the Polaris 
missiles with an indigenous British R&D effort. 
 
6.2.3 – Cook Vs Zuckerman: Chevaline 
 
 
Chevaline started from as early as the late 1960‟s and concerned 
the improvement of the Polaris missiles.95 Though it was an 
indigenous effort, there was close collaboration with the 
Americans.96 In his autobiography Zuckerman makes two claims 
regarding Chevaline. The one relates to his own position and he 
repeatedly makes clear that he was opposed from the very start to 
any improvement to the Polaris system.97 The second claim he 
makes is that the weaponeers of Aldermaston were responsible for 
the initial studies and later the very development of the Chevaline 
system. So strongly has Zuckerman made this argument that 
                                                 
94
   Young, “Skybolt Crisis”, p. 85, n. 129 notes that “a conventional „bureaucratic politics‟ analysis of 
these events... would miss the extent to which the air forces and the navies on both sides of the 
Atlantic enlisted their counterparts as allies.” This is certainly true and it also applies in the case of 
the role of scientists in the same matter, which Young misses. 
95
   Improvement by “hardening” (making the warhead less vulnerable to defensive nuclear explosions) 
and the use of “decoys” to fool the Anti-Ballistic Missile defence systems. 
96
   See John Baylis and Kristian Stoddart, „Britain and the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear 
Programme, 1967-82.‟ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 2003) pp. 124-155. 
97
   Zuckerman, Monkeys, ch. 32 and passim. 
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Graham Spinardi was prompted to write an article in 1997 refuting 
what he called the „Zuckerman thesis,‟ meaning that behind the 
arms race laid the influence of scientists or technologists; a 
deterministic thesis of “technologists-out-of-control.”98 To disprove 
Zuckerman, Spinardi traces the history of the development of 
nuclear weapons in the UK using a “bureaucratic politics” analysis. 
Analysing the Chevaline case, and using official sources and 
personal communication with participants,99 Spinardi reached the 
conclusion that “Chevaline is the prime example where advocacy 
by nuclear weapons proponents may have sustained a 
development lacking sound political support.”100 He attributes this 
momentum to no other than Sir William Cook and Cook‟s later 
biographer and former Aldermaston scientist Victor Macklen: 
 
…former Aldermaston Deputy Director, Sir William Cook… proved to 
be a formidable Whitehall operator. A member of the Aldermaston 
group that looked at the Polaris vulnerability issue recalled Cook‟s 
importance in that „he fought Zuckerman at the political level.‟101 
 
According to Spinardi, after Cook retired this momentum was 
carried through by Macklen. There is little reason to doubt 
Spinardi‟s conclusion about Cook‟s role. Indeed Zuckerman 
himself, although he does not name Cook, stated that “the 
departmental officials [of the Ministry of Defence]… who together 
                                                 
98
   See Spinardi, „Aldermaston‟. 
99
   The interviewees include Zuckerman. Spinardi, „Aldermaston‟, p. 576, n. 4. 
100
   Ibid., p. 574. 
101
   Ibid., p. 561. This information comes from an unidentified source. In fact in his article Spinardi 
makes the case, rather unconsciously, that except for the development of atomic and hydrogen 
bombs, which were never in a state of doubt, every other major system that was proposed was 
eventually developed, thus reinforcing in a sense Zuckerman‟s argument.  
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with Macklen, were now responsible for nuclear policy at the 
technical level were men who instinctively shared Aldermaston‟s 
aspirations.”102 Only later he hints to the fact that one of these was 
Cook.103 
In order to see how it came to it and these two allies in the 
matter of Polaris found themselves on opposite sides regarding 
Chevaline, one needs to remember what went on in the meantime. 
Until 1964, Zuckerman remained in a very strong position while at 
the Ministry of Defence, collaborating very effectively on a number 
of issues with Mountbatten, who remained Chief of the Defence 
Staff until 1965, including the all-important consolidation of the 
Service ministries under a unified Ministry of Defence. On top of 
this, in 1964 he became the first Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
Government as a whole. Following this re-organisation, the Chief 
Scientific Adviser would have two deputies: Allan Cottrell, 
Goldsmith‟s Professor of Metallurgy at Cambridge took the job, 
initially on a part-time basis, of Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser 
(Studies) responsible mainly for Operational Research matters;104 
and Sir William Cook became Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser 
(Projects) with primary responsibility for the development of 
weapons. What the criteria for the selection of Cook were is not 
evident from the official record. Certainly Zuckerman believed that 
“the Scientific Civil Service doesn‟t seem able to provide the kind 
of people I want. The Atomic Energy Authority has a better 
                                                 
102
   Zuckerman, Monkeys, p. 391, my emphasis. 
103
   Ibid., p. 393 and 394. 
104
   “Professor to help Sir S. Zuckerman”, The Times, 1/1/1965. Cottrell was also in and out of 
government: he was at the University of Birmingham until 1955 when he moved to AERE. He 
became Goldsmith‟s Professor of Metallurgy at Cambridge in 1958 before going to the Ministry of 
Defence and eventually succeeded Zuckerman as Chief Scientific Adviser to the government in 
1971. See his Who‟s Who entry. 
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reputation.”105 He certainly knew Cook well from their collaboration 
on Polaris and maybe he thought he could use his support in the 
future.106 If this was his thinking he grossly miscalculated.107 
In May 1966, Zuckerman left the Ministry of Defence to 
remain solely in the post of Chief Scientific Adviser to the 
Government as a whole. Although The Times reported at the time 
that “in Government quarters the point was made... that the 
change should not be explained by any difference assumed to 
have occurred between Mr Healy, the Defence Secretary, and Sir 
Solly”, quite the opposite was the actual case.108 Zuckerman 
appears to have overplayed his dual capacity as CSA to Healy and 
CSA to the government as a whole, in a number of cases by-
passing his minister and talking to other ministers in support of his 
opinions, wearing his CSA to the government hat.109 Mountbatten‟s 
retirement and the unorthodoxy of Zuckerman‟s dual appointment 
combined with his opinionated character did not help the situation. 
Though his two deputies were to jointly assume Zuckerman‟s 
responsibilities, there is little doubt that Cook was the more 
important one, since he was the only MoD scientist to have a place 
in the Defence Council; in 1967 he assumed the title of Chief 
                                                 
105
   Quoted in Terence Price, Political Physicist (Sussex; The Book Guilt, 2004) p. 158. This would 
obviously neglect the fact that Cook was one of the finest products of the scientific civil service. 
106
  On the other hand, maybe Zuckerman didn‟t have much to do with the appointment and Cook was 
imposed on him by Whitehall. The Times (12/6/1964) speculated that the appointment had to do 
with the fact that there would soon be talks about the supply of an American design of a light 
warhead for the Polaris missiles. Cook would certainly be the man for such a job, but he also had a 
general reputation of being the man who got the job done.  
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   Although nominally Zuckerman‟s subordinate, Cook was the highest paid official in the MoD and 
remained so until his retirement. This awkward situation was probably due to the fact that Cook was 
coming from the AEA, which had better pay-scales than civil service. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note, since it indicates that Cook was strongly desired to take the position at the MoD and 
different salaries within the civil service is an indicator of rank and seniority. See The Imperial 
Calendar and Civil Service List for the year 1965. 
108
  “Sir Solly gives up defence post”, The Times, 25/5/1966. 
109
  Ibid and Denis Healey, The Time of my Life (London, M. Joseph, 1990), p. 260; It is indicative, I 
think, that The Times article is written by the paper‟s political and not the defence correspondent. 
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Adviser (Projects and Research).110 Along with Cook, another 
crucial figure was also in the Ministry of Defence from 1967: Victor 
Macklen. As we have seen earlier, Macklen was at the Ministry of 
Defence from 1955, as Brundrett‟s second assistant on nuclear 
intelligence. He was the MoD official accompanying his boss in the 
nuclear talks with the Americans in 1957-8. With Brundrett‟s 
retirement he went to the Atomic Energy Authority as Head of the 
Reactor‟s Group Technical Secretariat, under Cook, becoming 
Deputy Director of Technical Operations in 1966. When Cook 
became the sole main figure in the MoD, he recruited Macklen as 
Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser (Studies and Nuclear) in 1967.111 
Thus, in 1967 the Ministry of Defence had in its ranks two career 
government scientists with long experience both in nuclear R&D 
and defence politics. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that 
Zuckerman, now alone at the Cabinet Office, was outplayed in the 
matter of Chevaline.  
Cook‟s opinion on the matter of Chevaline is indeed 
corroborated by available archival evidence. He thought as early 
as the summer of 1966 that the work on some kind of improvement 
on Polaris should start immediately giving two reasons for this 
insistence. The first one, which he stressed extensively, was the 
prospect of information exchange with the US. According to Cook, 
the Americans would be willing to carry their obligations under the 
1958 agreement only if the British side, through the work of the 
Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, proved capable to carry 
                                                 
110
   See the Imperial Calendar and Civil Service Yearbook for the year 1968 and “Mr Healy Gets 
Adviser on Policy”, The Times, 7/1/1967 and “Two New Defence Ministers”, The Guardian, 
7/1/1967. 
111
  See his Who’s Who entry. Macklen remained in the MoD for ten more years until he retired in 1979. 
His leaving the MoD on Brundrett‟s retirement and going with Cook at the AEA is another 
indication of the close relationship of the two. 
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successful research by themselves on decreasing the vulnerability 
of Polaris. The second reason had to do with the UK capabilities 
themselves: “if the U.S. would collaborate on such a programme 
this would be sufficiently attractive to maintain the key scientific 
and technical skills at AWRE, without which no future capability – 
thermonuclear, fission, or rectification in service of current warhead 
– is possible.”112 In other words, if Britain wanted to stay in the 
game there should be no stop in effort at any point. There was little 
original thinking behind Cook's evaluation of the situation. The 
cooperation with the United States had been a very strong motive 
behind the British crash programme to produce a proved hydrogen 
bomb in the mid 1950's, a programme of which Cook himself was, 
as we have seen, the most important agent.113 
In 1967, Cook was appointed to chair a Committee to report 
on the British prospects concerning its nuclear capabilities. The 
Cook Report gave three available options to the Labour 
government: to either abandon Polaris, or do nothing, or improve it 
with decoys and “hardening”.114 If we take into account the above it 
seems safe to assume that it was leaning towards the last option. 
At the political level there was uncertainty as to what the best way 
forward was. As Baylis and Stoddart claim, one of the main 
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  NA, DEFE 19/197, DCSA(P) to CSA, 2/8/1966.  
113
  It should be remembered that the justification for the continuation of studies on improving Polaris 
was completely in line with the policy regarding the best approach to research and development, 
which Cook had advocated many years earlier: “We do not know what future threats we shall have 
to meet. It is more important that we should explore the boundaries of possibilities than it is to 
exploit existing advances.” See chapter 5, section 5.3. 
114
  See Baylis and Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline Project,” p. 129. More recently Stoddart 
claims, citing the same correspondence as in the article with Baylis, that the Committee was under 
the chairmanship of Victor Macklen; in Kristan Stoddart, “The Wilson Government and British 
Responses to Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964-1970”, Contemporary British History, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 
1-33, at p. 13. In any case this disambiguation, if anything, shows the close relationship between the 
two nuclear experts in the Ministry of Defence, and reinforces Spinardi's claim about the 
momentum of the Polaris improvement programme being carried through by Macklen after Cook's 
retirement from the Ministry of Defence. 
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reasons for the reluctance on the part of the small number of 
ministers involved in discussions was the fact that Labour had 
committed itself to a policy of not going forward with a new 
generation of nuclear weapons.115 According to Baylis, 
Aldermaston had already started working on “Super Antelope”, the 
British version of the American “Antelope” programme, in the same 
year.116 By 1969, the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, 
was still ambivalent concerning which was the best way forward for 
the improvement of Polaris, 'Super Antelope' or the 'Master 
Dispenser', a main consideration being the cost of the two different 
approaches in a time of defence budget cuts.117 During 1970, 
Cook's year of retirement, according to Stoddart, the scientists of 
the Ministry of Defence were pushing for a year-long feasibility and 
project definition study, something which was strongly opposed by 
Zuckerman in the Cabinet Office.118 It should be noted that the 
latter's arguments were not in terms of opposition to nuclear 
weapons, or anything of the kind; rather it was framed in terms of 
financial cost and tactical considerations given the ongoing SALT 
negotiations, with which Zuckerman was closely involved.119 In the 
end, the new Heath administration, which came to government in 
the summer of 1970, approved the study which started a year 
later.120 
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  Baylis and Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline Project”, p. 129-130.Another reason was the 
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It would need more archival material to establish exactly how 
the Chevaline programme was carried through. Nevertheless, one 
thing seems safe to assume. Zuckerman‟s move to the Cabinet, 
although it has been treated as a confirmation of his influence and 
importance, in fact it seems to have undermined the powers he 
enjoyed as an official at the MoD, certainly in the field of 
defence.121 The fact that after Cook's departure, Macklen was the 
main agent should not be surprising. He was not simply a 
weaponeer of Aldermaston, as Zuckerman and Spinardi would 
have him – in fact he had never had an appointment in 
Aldermaston – but had been part of the MoD scientific lobby since 
the period of its formation under Brundrett in the mid 1950‟s.122  
 
6.3 – Concluding Remarks 
 
The very fact that this chapter is about scientists fighting over 
which is the best way to have nuclear weapons stands in complete 
contrast with the literature which portrays British scientists as 
opponents of nuclear weapons. Even Zuckerman, associated in 
the literature with opposition to nuclear weapons, comes out as a 
strong supporter, objecting to the programme of the improvement 
of Polaris in terms of financial cost and prudence, not as a scientist 
against nuclear weapons.123 Very important in this regard is that 
contrary to Richard Maguire's claims about a scientific and rational 
                                                 
121
  The elevation of Zuckerman to Cabinet level would necessarily have weakened his hold in the 
Ministry of Defence, as The Economist noted at the time: Anon. “The Technocrats: I‟ll have to ask 
Sir Solly”, The Economist, 31/10/1964, p. 476. 
122
  Spinardi, “Aldermaston”; Zuckerman,  Monkeys. Macklen had been, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3.5, in Cook‟s staff at the UKAEA. 
123
  Though the politics literature has shown his role for some while, the literature which concentrates 
on Zuckerman, the science adviser, has not picked up the point. A clear example is Maguire, 
“Scientific Dissent”, who finds himself in the awkward position to explain „Zuckerman the 
dissenter‟ and „Zuckerman the most influential scientist‟ at the same time. 
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opposition to Chevaline, the project was defended by expert 
scientists, namely Cook and Macklen. 
The main purpose of this chapter was not to show that 
scientists made any decisions regarding nuclear weapons, nor, of 
course, to suggest any kind of determinism of the kind Spinardi 
accused Zuckerman of. The argument that I put forward is that, 
specific decisions reached during the first half of the Cold War 
were very much influenced by a specific group of government 
scientists, through their expertise, active advice and often strong 
politicking. Explaining the technical merits or disadvantages of a 
project was only one part of the scientists' role in government. 
What they engaged with at the same time was the pursuit of the 
course which they considered was best for their country, both 
regarding general policies, as we saw in the previous chapter, and 
specific decisions regarding nuclear weapons.124 As part of the 
MoD scientific lobby, an outsider, like Zuckerman, could be very 
effective; outside of it he found himself outgunned. By the late 
1960‟s this lobby was still active and effective,125 with a new 
generation of government scientists at its centre,126 and in a new 
era of much more significant dependence on the Americans 
regarding nuclear delivery systems. 
 
  
                                                 
124
  As a government nuclear scientist, there would be little chance that Cook would not advocate 
keeping Aldermaston alive, if only out of collegial support. But the purpose here is not to delve into 
the way in which each individual‟s opinions were formed; rather it is to establish what these 
opinions were and examine whether the historical actors were effective in convincing others and 
turn their positions into government policy.  
125
  Of course, more research would be needed to establish the extent of their influence in the 1960‟s 
and later. 
126
  Cook was, after all, 11 years Brundrett‟s junior and Macklen 14 years Cook‟s junior. 
Conclusion: 
Scientists, the State and Defence in Twentieth 
Century Britain 
 
 
This thesis is about a group of British scientists who had 'been 
there for years.' They were there during the period 1946 to 1970, 
but they were not the famous academics of the time who wrote 
books and articles in the newspapers, magazines and journals. 
They didn't publish any autobiographies. People who were familiar 
with the workings of government may have and did come to know 
them and even formed friendly relationships with them. Maddox, 
the science correspondent of The Guardian did so with Sir Robert 
Cockburn, Chapman Pincher, the defence and science 
correspondent of The Express did so with Sir Frederick Brundrett, 
but the general public did not know them, though it would have 
needed only to dig a little deeper to do so.1 These scientists hardly 
feature in the relevant historiography.  
This thesis started from two vantage points. The first was 
Edgerton's argument about the importance of (non-academic) 
scientists in the twentieth century generally and in Britain in 
particular, the distinct roles of different kinds of scientists and the 
strong technocratic nature of the British state and its defence 
sector.2 The second was Peden‟s argument regarding the centrality 
of technology – apart from, and in combination with, economics – 
                                                 
1
   See, for example, the surprisingly accurate profile of Brundrett at the journal Discovery, written by 
Chapman Pincher. Chapman Pincher, “Sir Frederick Brundrett”, Vol. 16, May 1955, pp. 184-185. 
For more on this see later, pp. 270-271. 
2
   Edgerton, Warfare State. 
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in the formulation of British strategy, a strategy which under the 
circumstances he concluded to have been successful.3 This thesis 
sought to address a number of issues which come out from the 
intersection of these two works and it went one step further in both 
directions: on the one hand it concentrated on the highest ranking 
scientists of the defence field, giving a full sociological analysis of 
the group and its most important members (chapters 2 and 3); on 
the other, it delved into an examination of the role and position of 
the highest ranking scientists in Whitehall (chapter 4) and the 
formulation of British defence policy in the post-war period 
(chapters 5 and 6).  
The material presented here points towards reaching a 
number of conclusions regarding scientists in general, scientists in 
relation to the state and Britain in the twentieth century.  
The post-war period saw the creation of a new structure 
within the defence research and development scene with the 
creation of the Defence Research Policy Committee. This new 
committee was placed at the new Ministry of Defence, which was 
intended to play a coordinating role. Scholars have tended to 
stress the Ministry‟s importance only after 1964 when all the former 
defence departments were united under its wing. But this thesis 
showed clearly that this was not the case since co-ordination had 
started much earlier, certainly in the field of research and 
development.4 Already from the early 1950‟s, but certainly from 
1954 onwards, the Ministry of Defence had a central co-ordinating 
role in matters of R&D, in the position of the CSA  and Chairman of 
the Defence Research Policy Committee and, of course, the 
                                                 
3
   Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy. 
4
  There is a good chance that a similar case could be made for the case of production. 
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person of Sir Frederick Brundrett. This, Brundrett achieved by 
strengthening the numbers of his team in the Ministry with people 
of his choosing, by bringing under his immediate control a number 
of R&D projects and by positioning himself as the arbiter between 
the three services and their scientists in the eyes of his ministers 
and the Treasury. The focus point of the defence scientific team 
which Brundrett established within and around the MoD in the mid 
1950‟s was missile development. It was the MoD scientific-missile 
lobby. 
This positioning on behalf of Brundrett had both a personal 
and an institutional aspect and it did not stop at the level of R&D 
policy. He took advantage both of the coordinating and arbitrating 
roles he had developed as chairman of the DRPC and the 
importance of R&D decisions in relation to general defence policy 
during the 1950‟s and expanded his role in the general defence 
policy field. This found a clear expression in the Sandys White 
Paper of 1957 and key related decisions, such as the high priority 
assigned to R&D efforts and the Blue Streak ballistic missile. 
Following long established liberal-militarist traditions within state 
officialdom, the MoD scientific lobby expressed it for the new all-
destructive hydrogen-bomb era, pushing for “a redeployment of 
resources for a long-term strategy appropriate to the Cold War,” as 
Peden put it.5 The existence of this MoD scientific lobby and the 
influence that its members exercised leads me to argue that 
scientists were of crucial importance in the formulation Britain‟s 
post-war defence policy. 
In a traditional inter-service rivalry context, which remains the 
basis of analysis for a number of studies, this lobby does not fit in 
                                                 
5
   George Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p. 350. 
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and scientists, including the ones studied here, have been treated 
as serving the interests of one of the three services; in this context, 
the pursuit of different delivery systems for the nuclear warheads 
remains a struggle between the two dominant services, the Royal 
Navy, with its long standing tradition as the senior service, and the 
Royal Air Force, the relatively young but up until now the unrivalled 
expresser of Britain‟s strength.6 The existence of the MoD scientific 
lobby, working outside the services, calls for a different 
interpretation, which does not discard the rivalries, but adds a 
crucial aspect. While the Royal Navy and the RAF were pushing 
for the allocation of more resources and to acquire the prestige of 
the nuclear carrying force, the MoD scientific-missile lobby was 
thinking in terms of the most advanced technology. This, initially, 
took the form of Blue Streak, the, at least nominally, indigenous 
ground-to-ground ballistic missile, which, it should be noted, was 
intended to be handled operationally by the RAF, though the 
control of the R&D effort had firmly passed to the Ministry of 
Defence by the mid 1950‟s. When Blue Streak was, justifiably or 
not, judged obsolete, it took the form of the American submarine-
launched Polaris. This was not solely a struggle between the RAF 
and the Royal Navy, as the literature would have it. This was a 
struggle between the aeroplane, which had ceased to be the 
bomb-delivery system that would „always get through‟ and the 
ballistic missile. The key defence scientists at any given time 
between the mid 1950‟s and the late 1960‟s, whether Brundrett, 
Zuckerman or Cook, were all in favour of missiles.7 
This interpretation explains in a very satisfactory way two 
                                                 
6
   See Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane. 
7
   For Brundrett and Zuckerman these were Cockburn, Cook and Eric Williams. In the late 1960‟s 
Cook had Victor Macklen. 
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oddities which had never found a convincing explanation. One the 
one hand it explains Zuckerman‟s fluctuating influence depending 
where he found himself in Whitehall. At the MoD his influence was 
strongest for two reasons. First, the position of Chief Scientific 
Adviser to the Minister of Defence had already been built up by 
Brundrett as the regulator of matters relating to research and 
development and a new force of influence both in the internal 
politics of Whitehall and the formulation of policy. Second, as 
chapter six showed clearly, the one of the two issues which raised 
Zuckerman's status in Whitehall and in the popular imagination, 
Polaris, was a direct result of not only his machinations, important 
as they were, but of a whole bureaucratic game of which both 
Brundrett and Cook primarily and Sir Robert Cockburn secondarily, 
in their separate roles, were of indispensable importance.8 His 
influence diminished significantly when he moved to a nominally 
higher position in the Cabinet Office and when he opposed Cook 
and other career government scientists.  
This interpretation also explains very easily Brundrett‟s 
seemingly contradictory behaviour. His vigorous insistence and 
efforts to keep pursuing Blue Streak as Britain's carrier of the 
deterrent and the simultaneous effort to pursue Polaris as a future 
replacement, or later an alternative: the two efforts were not 
contradictory, rather they were very much complementary. He 
would have preferred a system procured in Britain but could not 
overlook the advantages of a seaborne ballistic missile deterrent. 
The goal was for the missile to replace the aeroplane and in this 
the MoD scientific lobby succeeded. 
                                                 
8
   It should be noted here that Zuckerman's fame was also strengthened by the issue of the 
establishment of the unified Ministry of Defence in 1964, a process of which he was an integral 
part, along with his Whitehall patron Lord Mountbatten.  
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The very existence of scientists at the highest levels of British 
government and, even more, the degree of influence they 
exercised on defence policy, sheds new light on how one should 
see the very fabric of the top policy-makers in the civil service. 
During the first half of the Cold War period, Britain felt the strong 
influence, at the practical level of policy and decision making, of a 
small number of scientists, who were not there as mere specialists 
on technical matters, but as influential shapers of policy. In the field 
of defence, where the traditional (military and administrative) 
officers of the state were still very much present, it was the 
recently-established at the top level, scientific officers who could tip 
the balance in a certain direction. This direction was in line with 
long established traditions, but this tradition was modernised and 
adjusted for the nuclear era. The ballistic missile fitted with thermo-
nuclear warheads was the new sword and the government 
scientists were the new knights. 
The role of scientists as observed in the British post-war 
defence case has important implications regarding how we think 
about scientists in relation to the state. The material in this thesis 
confirms in a very clear way the importance of identifying and 
thoroughly examining different kinds of scientists depending on 
their involvement with matters of the state and the different roles 
that both career government and external-to-the-state scientists 
could play in matters of policy. Different government scientists at 
different levels and different outsiders at different levels played a 
number of roles both in the division of power within government 
and in the formulation of policy. The use of the term „scientific 
adviser‟ cannot begin to describe these subtle, but very essential, 
differences and in many ways it can obscure them. Even if the 
267 
 
term was used in the titles of the positions of some of them, the 
material presented in this thesis leads me to argue that the primary 
role that the top government scientists played was that of de facto 
policy-makers.9 
Two more points need to be strongly stressed. First, these 
arguments are not the same as the one prevalent in the literature, 
namely that scientists do not stand “outside of the policy process 
and injecting a measure of objectivity into the proceedings.”10 This 
line of argument, widespread in the STS literature, seems to derive 
from the conclusions of the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
its narrow focus on the content of scientific contributions to policy 
debates. The role recognised is still an external advisory one, even 
if the content of the advice is influenced by social and political 
factors. And this may well be an accurate description for scientists‟ 
role in the American judicial system, as Sheila Jasanoff has 
shown,11 but it should not in any case be generalised and used for 
other cases as well, especially in matters relating to the formulation 
of state policy and the making of policy decisions, as Bernstein, 
Herken and others have done when analysing nuclear weapons 
decisions in the USA.12 This is not to deny that some scientists, 
either academics or low level government experts, may very well 
                                                 
9
   The term Scientific Adviser was widely used at the time – Brundrett was, after all, Chief Scientific 
Adviser at the Ministry of Defence – but this makes it an actor‟s category and the dangers of using 
actors' terms freely when examining history are well known. Nominally the government scientists 
were there on the one hand to run the departments and personnel which fell under their 
responsibility, an obviously important task during the Cold War and on the other, probably more 
importantly, they were there to guide their Ministers on matters in which they were experts; this 
expertise rested both on their qualifications as scientists, and more importantly with the years of 
experience in managing scientific and technological research and development. A useful analogy 
could be made with the administrators‟ side of the civil service. The fact that they had degrees in 
Classics did not in any obvious way qualify them to be Permanent Secretaries of the Treasury, for 
example, but what did was the accumulated experience of their career in government. Whether that 
was a good thing or not is not a question of interest here. 
10
   Balmer, Britain and Biological Weapons, p. 7. 
11
   Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Expert Advice as Public Drama (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
1995). 
12
  Herken, Cardinal Choices; Bernstein, “Four Physicists and the Bomb.” 
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have played this role. They were called upon to give advice in a 
specific matter which fell in their area of expertise. But, as Krige 
has demonstrated, the simple term „adviser‟ does not accurately 
describe, much less fully express, the complexities of the roles that 
even academics could play in government policy decisions.13 And 
this, because the framework of how to operate in order to influence 
policy was set by those scientists who were part of the government 
policy-making machine, in the British case the elite government 
scientists examined in this thesis. 
The second important point relates to how general the model 
of the scientist/policy-maker is. The scientist/policy-maker and his 
corresponding claims to expertise as analysed in this thesis is not 
a universal model that should be applied uncritically in any case 
study of scientists involved with policy formulation or decision-
making. After the Second World War different states developed 
different mechanisms for the involvement of scientists in matters of 
policy, differences stemming from their traditions before the war, 
their experiences during the war and, of course, their needs and 
capabilities in the aftermath of the war. The specific analysis 
presented above relates to the British case of the post-war period 
in the defence field. It is possible that in other fields, say where the 
public could have had closer involvement with matters of policy, 
outcomes may have been very different; all the more if one is 
examining another state or another period in time. In this respect, 
the important conclusion to retain from this thesis is that the 
scientist/policy-maker is a viable and prevalent model for the post-
war British defence case and could likely apply to other states as 
well; and this should not be surprising, since in order to be 
                                                 
13
   Krige, “Scientists as Policy Makers.” 
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influential one most likely must be part of the system which makes 
the decisions. At the same time, when examining matters of 
scientists in relation to state policy and decision-making, history-of-
science and STS scholars should keep in mind that they are also 
examining crucial aspects of that state‟s own wider history.14 
Taking the government scientist/policy-maker as the yardstick 
for assessing the role of a scientist involved in matters of state 
policy points towards revising how we see the well-known cases 
identified so far by scholars as the important scientists in relation to 
state policy and to whom the term „scientific adviser‟ owes much of 
its persistence. Regarding Britain, these would primarily be Sir 
Henry Tizard and Lord Zuckerman in their post-war roles.15 When 
these two, coming from outside the ranks of the civil service, took 
official positions in the Ministry of Defence they managed to be 
effective in the formulation of state policy only when they aligned 
themselves with existing policy-making machines and existing 
scientists policy-makers; and when they played roles which were 
similar to that of the permanent government scientists: not 
advising, but lobbying, seeking allies in Whitehall, pushing their 
political heads and Whitehall colleagues for the policy and 
decisions which they thought were best.  
Similar conclusions may be drawn for the much more studied 
American case. Even if Oppenheimer should be considered a 
„scientific adviser‟, that is an academic who at some point was 
advising the decision makers on which course to follow regarding 
nuclear weapons – although even this could be brought into doubt 
                                                 
14
   This should not be taken to mean that there is a „context‟ developed by others that scholars should 
uncritically use. On the contrary, they should be critical to the conclusions of existing „contexts‟ and 
project their own conclusions to better inform that context. 
15
   Another very particular case was Lord Cherwell, again atypical in many ways. 
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– certainly Teller, his nemesis, was not.16 Teller had for a prolonged 
period of time a permanent position in the American state 
apparatus and he very effectively sought political and military allies 
and lobbied senators and White House officials in order to push for 
the policies he thought best.17 There is good reason to think of 
insiders in the political game, like Teller, as the yardstick to 
measure others‟ influence and not the other way around. This way, 
a better sense of the stakes involved can be achieved and a better 
understanding of what the role of scientists actually was. It is 
striking to observe that, contrary to the popular image of Teller as 
the most influential figure behind much important and expensive 
government projects throughout the Cold War, the academic 
literature on the role of scientists has concentrated on a figure 
which, important as he was, in the end he was without any 
influence on government policy from the mid-1950‟s onwards. 
A last point I want to argue is that the positions that the 
scientists examined in this thesis assumed and the different roles 
we saw them playing makes automatically assigning the term 
'expert' to scientists less appealing. The literature has recognised 
that there are different levels of expertise18 but these have been 
traditionally related to different types of individuals. What the 
present study of government scientists‟ careers has shown is that 
the same individuals, and in this case scientists, acquired many 
different types of expertise during their careers in government. The 
university qualification turned to a purely technical R&D related 
field, which turned into more administrative technical R&D related 
                                                 
16
   I say „even if‟ because there is ample room to interpret Oppenheimer‟s role as one of a policy-
maker and not an adviser. 
17
   See Goodchild, Edward Teller where such an argument does not exist, but where the role described 
above is evident. 
18
   For the latest see Harry Collins, Rethinking Expertise. 
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expertise and so on, until they became „scientific mandarins‟ to use 
Edgerton's term.19 Thus, one cannot say that William Cook, for 
example, was an expert in nuclear matters and leave it there: 
unless the many necessary qualifications are examined our 
understanding of expertise and scientists is not only inaccurate, 
but misleading. It is crucially important to recognise that Cook‟s 
level of expertise in matters nuclear in 1956, at the height of the 
British h-bomb project of which he was Deputy Director, was very 
different after the successful completion of the tests in 1957, even 
more different after the exchange of information with the United 
States the next year and yet more different after he had supervised 
the engineering effort of the second generation of Britain's civil 
nuclear reactors. Furthermore, and this is more obvious, merely 
equating a scientist with an „expert‟ does not even begin to explain 
the different roles that Brundrett, Zuckerman, Cook and the rest of 
the government scientists played in the matter of Polaris; nor the 
significance that these differences have for our understanding of 
how these decisions were made and how these decisions can be 
made.  
Let me return to a point to which I alluded at the beginning of 
this chapter regarding the fact that people who were interested in 
finding out about the elite defence scientists could do so. Towards 
the end of completing this thesis I came across an article in 
Discovery magazine, written by The Express defence and science 
correspondent, Chapman Pincher in 1955.20 It is a full two-page 
                                                 
19
   In Warfare State, p. 184. 
20
   Discovery was a popular science magazine, as we would call it today, for many years edited by C. 
P. Snow. Pincher began as The Express' science and defence correspondent and ended up being a 
sort of free lancer for the newspaper, his main speciality being to uncover government secrets and 
inside information. Most famously he was involved in the Spycatcher affair. See his autobiography, 
Chapman Pincher, Pastoral Symphony: A Bumpkin's Tribute to Country Joys (Shrewsbury, UK: 
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portrait of what can only be described as a tribute to Frederick 
Brundrett, noting that he was unknown to the public and giving him 
credit as the most important British scientist of the time, given his 
influence in government policy and his independence of mind.21 A 
second older article also gives Brundrett his due. Laurence Martin, 
having interviewed all the major figures of the 1950's defence 
scene, had reached similar conclusions in 1962 without being able, 
like Pincher, to substantiate with details the claims or base them, 
like this thesis has done, on detailed archival research.22 These 
two cases suggest that secrecy is not the main reason for the 
neglect of the elite defence scientists in the literature.23 Of course 
the details of the roles that government scientists played need 
extensive and painstaking research in the archives, but the fact 
that so far the very existence of the elite defence scientists in the 
government scenery, never mind their importance and influence, is 
often ignored gives testimony to the influence of some scientific 
advisers to shape the historical record. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Swan Hill Press, 1993). 
21
   Chapman Pincher, “Sir Frederick Brundrett”, Discovery, Vol. 16, May 1955, pp. 184-185. It was the 
intention to reproduce the article here as Appendix II, but a suitable digital copy could not be 
obtained. 
22
   Laurence Martin, “The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The „Sandys Era‟”, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Mar., 1962), pp. 23-41.  
23
   Although, admittedly, secrecy had never been invoked as a reason explicitly about scientists. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
SCIENTIFIC AND PROCUREMENT POSITIONS IN DEFENCE, 1945-1964 
 
SCIENTIFIC POSITIONS: 
 
Admiralty, Chief RNSS 
1945-1947 Mr (later Sir) Charles Wright 
1947-1950 Mr (later Sir) Frederick Brundrett 
1950-1954 Mr (later Sir) William Cook 
1954-1961 Dr Hector Willis 
1962-1964 Dr Harold Purcell 
 
War Office, Scientific Adviser, Army Council later Chief Scientist WO: 
1946-1950 Dr (later Sir) Owen Wansbrough-Jones 
1951 Mr (later Sir) Graham Sutton 
1952-1954 Mr Henry Sargeaunt 
1955-1958 Mr Patrick Johnson 
1959 Mr Henry Sargeaunt 
1960-1964 Dr (later Sir) Walter Cawood 
 
Air Ministry, Scientific Adviser: 
1946-1947 Dr Henry Hulme 
1948-1953 Dr (later Sir) Robert Cockburn 
1954-1955 Dr George Field (on secondment from Canada) 
1955-1956 Mr Handel Davies 
1956-1958 Mr Stewart Scott Hall 
1959 Mr (later Sir) Morien Morgan 
274 
 
1960-1964 Mr Hayne Constant  
 
Ministry of Supply, Chief Scientist: 
1946-1948 Sir Ben Lockspeiser 
1949-1953 Mr (later Sir) Harry Garner 
1953-1959 Dr (later Sir) Owen Wansbrough-Jones 
 
Ministry of Aviation, Chief Scientist 
1960-1963 Sir Robert Cockburn 
 
 
PROCUREMENT POSITIONS 
 
Admiralty, Deputy Controller (R&D) 
1946-1964 Dr (later Sir) John Carroll 
 
Admiralty, Controller of the Navy and 3rd Sea Lord 
1945-1949 Admiral (Sir) Charles Daniel 
1949-1953 Admiral (Sir) Michael Denny 
1953-1956 Admiral (Sir) Ralph Edwards 
1956-1961 Admiral (Sir) Peter Reid 
1961-1965 Admiral (Sir) Michael Le Fanu 
 
Ministry of Supply, Controller Guided Weapons & Electronics 
1945-1949 responsible: Controller of Supplies (Air) and P.D.S.R. (Air) 
Mr (later Sir) Harry Garner; RAE responsible: Mr (later Sir) George 
Gardner 
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1949-1950 responsible: Controller of Supplies (Air) and P.D.S.R. (Air) 
Mr (later Sir) George Gardner 
1951-1956 Mr (later Sir) Steuart Mitchell 
1956-1959 Dr (later Sir) Robert Cockburn 
1959-1959 Sir Steuart Mitchell 
 
Ministry of Aviation, Controller Guided weapons & Electronics24 
1960-1962 Sir Steuart Mitchell 
1962-1966 Air Marshall (Sir) Edouard Grundy 
 
Ministry of Supply, Controller of Supplies (Air)  
1946-1950 Air Chief Marshall Sir Alex Coryton 
1950-1953 Air Chief Marshall (Sir) John Boothman 
 
Ministry of Supply, Controller of Aircraft 
1953-1956 Air Chief Marshall Sir John Baker 
1956-1959 Air Chief Marshall Sir Claude Pelly 
 
Ministry of Aviation, Controller of Aircraft 
1959-1963 Sir George Gardner 
1963-1966 Mr (later Sir) Morien Morgan 
 
Ministry of Supply, Controller of Supplies (Munitions) 
1946-1949 Lt-Gen (later Sir) George Wrisberg 
1949-1953 General Sir Kenneth Crawford 
                                                 
24
 In the Ministry of Technology, which in 1966 assumed the responsibilities of the Ministry of Aviation 
the positions of Controller for Guided Weapons and Electronics were kept in civilian scientific 
personnel: from 1966 to 1969, Mr (later Sir) Morien Morgan and from 1969 Mr (later Sir) Clifford 
Cornford. 
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Ministry of Supply, Controller of Munitions 
1953-1957 Lt-Gen (Sir) John Eldridge 
1957-1960 Lt-Gen (Sir) John Cowley 
 
War Office, Master-General of the Ordnance 
1960-1962 Lt-Gen Sir John Cowley 
1962-1963 Lt-Gen Sir Cecil Sugden 
1963-1966 Lt-Gen Sir Charles (Phibbs) Jones 
 
As is obvious from the above lists, the main procurement positions in the Service and Supply 
departments of the British state stayed with members of the Three Services. This had been 
the case from the creation of those positions from the 19th century and earlier and 
continued until the post-war period, certainly until 1970. A notable exception to this is the 
position of Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics which stayed under a civilian 
scientist for most the first half of the Cold War, with the exception of the period 1962 to 
1966, when it was under an Air Marshall. Why the post remained under a civilian for the 
important period during the development of an indigenous programme of Ballistic Missile 
(Blue Streak) is not self evidently explicable. It has to be noted though that R&D on un-
rotated projectiles (precursor to guided missiles in UK) was under Dr (later Sir) Alwyn Crow 
during the war (a civilian) and after the re-organisations in the Ministry of Supply after the 
war it went under the Principle Director Scientific Research (Air).25 With the beginning of 
more serious research in Guided Weapons after the commencement of Blue Streak in the 
early 1950’s the post of Controller was created (1951) occupied by the man who until then 
was responsible for the Armament Design Establishment. Thus, although research on rockets 
had started in the army as an AA weapon, in the second half of the 1940’s main 
responsibility for research lied with the RAE under Cawood.26 Cawood himself was coming 
from the post of Deputy Director, Scientific Research in the Army Research Establishment. 
The posts of Scientific Adviser/Chief Scientist were exclusively held by civilians, being the 
‘evolution’ of the posts of Director of Scientific Research in all the Service Departments in 
the inter-war period. It should be noted that their responsibility lay with the allocation of 
scientific personnel and with the co-ordination of research within their Departments’ various 
establishments, responsibility for the majority of which rested mostly with the Controllers.  
 
                                                 
25
 See Sir Alwyn Crow, “The British ministry of Supply” p. 13. 
26
 On the assumption of responsibility for rockets by the RAE see the chapter on Cook and Twigge, 
Early Development. 
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